Humean Argument for the Socialization of Gendered Constructs

I will argue that David Hume’s “Belief Theory” can be extended to show that habit and reflection form gendered constructs; thus, allowing for the flexibility of gendered constructs. Although many feminists disagree with using members of the philosophical cannon to support feminist theory, I would like to show that Hume’s theory could be extended to support feminist theory. In this essay I will show why feminists may agree with Hume’s “Belief Theory” and present Anette Baier and Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, two feminist writers who seem to favor my position. I will also suggest that concepts of gender can be manipulated by society and the individual for better or worse and explain why this flexibility is positive.

Annette Baier, president of the American philosophical association and professor at the University of Pittsburgh, explains the unsettled feelings feminists have for those in support of canonical works. She says in defense of one of her writings, “Many will dismiss my fondness for Hume’s writings as a sure indicator of my failure to transcend my philosophical upbringing in a patriarchal tradition” (Baier 20). Baier appears to be speaking of Mary Daly, a radical feminist, who believes women who adapt or take part in male traditions are tokens of the patriarchy, and only perpetuate it (Daly 335). Genevieve Lloyd, a professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales, also expresses discomfort with the canon when she acknowledges philosophy as a male tradition. She says, in her book The Man of Reason,"But there is one thing they [philosophers] have had in common throughout the history of the activity [philosophy]: They have been predominantly male; and the absence of women from the philosophical tradition has meant that the conceptualization of Reason has been done exclusively by men. It is not surprising that the results should reflect their sense of Philosophy as a male activity" (Lloyd 228-29). Such discomfort with the philosophical cannon has led some feminists to give up on “Reason” and philosophy all together (Lloyd 227). However, I have found that there are philosophers (in this case David Hume) whose ideas are applicable to feminist theory, despite the author’s original intent, and whose ideas may actually satisfy those who are avidly against canonical philosophers.

Hume’s philosophy seems to resemble the feeling and intuitive nature typically associated with femininity, which may be agreeable with certain feminist philosophers. Nel Noddings, who is known for her ethic of care, would probably be receptive to Hume’s use of feeling and sentience. Noddings supports an ethic that is based on caring relationships, rather than universal moral principles, and uses similar language to Hume. She says, “Women can and do give reasons for their acts, but the reasons often point to feelings, needs, impressions, and a sense of personal ideal rather than to universal principles and their application” (Noddings 3). Lloyd, who I’ve mentioned before, also sympathizes with Hume even though she believes he is ultimately “male-identified.” She believes Hume has reconstructed “Reason” to include intellect, emotion, and imagination, which she terms as the “wholeness of the mind” (Hume on the Passion for Truth 41). In The Man of Reason she argues that many philosophers disregard the senses and emotions, which are typically associated with femininity and are considered separate from Reason (The Man of Reason 227). Thus, she believes Hume’s conception of Reason to be more complete, as it includes a full bodily experience, and shifts the focus away from the common male conception of Reason. Sentience is ultimately what allows Hume to be “feminist-friendly,” and is the basis for my interpretation of Hume.

I will use Hume’s philosophy because it avoids using the common philosophical concept of Reason to explain knowledge, and closely resembles the theory of social construction. For Hume, knowledge is acquired through feeling and sentience, which is friendly to women partaking in the pursuit of knowledge, since women, within philosophy, have traditionally been associated with feelings and not with intellect or reasoning. I also believe Hume’s conception of knowledge relates to social construction in that it is dependent on habitual observation and interaction within a group. Gender is socially constructed in that humans observe how they are supposed to act, based on their sex, within a group of people and are also treated as if they were boys or as if they were girls from the perspective of that particular society. So, social construction is similar to Hume’s conception of knowledge, as habitual observation and interaction with a group are requirements for knowledge. I accept Hume as a basis for my feminist interpretation based on the above.

I will begin my interpretation of Hume by explaining his “Belief Theory,” which I will later show explains the socialization of gendered characteristics. In his book, titled An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume examines causation from a skeptic’s point of view. Previous philosophers (or pre-Humean philosophers) have attempted to explain the connection between cause and effect in terms of force or power. By using terms such as force or power, philosophers must attempt to explain what constitutes force or power. Hume rejects this argument with his “Belief Theory.” His theory begins with an examination of understanding. Hume sees the world in terms of experience, allowing the senses to inform his or her knowledge of the world. Therefore, if one cannot see, feel, or experience force, one cannot explain force (I 514), and the only possible way to make sense of cause and effect is to believe that the effect comes from the cause and vice versa (I 509). Hume uses this example to explain his position,"The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward sense. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects. Consequently, there is not, in any single particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection" (I 515). Hume explains that in order for one to believe in a connection between a cause and an effect, one must first have observed this cause producing this effect (I 507). In other words, a first step to learning about gravity would require a physical observation of an object falling to the ground. Once I have observed this a number of times, as well as observing similar objects falling, I begin to believe that this will happen in the future. Hume explains belief as a felling. In other words, when one believes that the cause will the lead to the effect, he or she feels that the cause will lead to the effect. One then habitually expects the observed cause to produce the observed effect. In short, Hume’s belief theory requires habitual experience of a cause and effect before one can believe that the cause leads to the effect.

If knowledge is based on the belief that a cause is followed by an effect, then our knowledge about gender roles could be created in the same way. There are several ways of explaining this. First, if one observes, for instance, women caring for children a majority of the time, and very rarely observes men doing this task, then one may assume (or believe) that women should care for children. In other words, if one habitually links the gender of a group to the task the group tends to perform, then one may become accustomed to, and believe in, the idea that women are the caretakers. Hume says, “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past” (I 508). One may also reaffirm his or her observations by reflecting upon the actions that he or she performs. For instance, if a boy was made to chop wood for the family and was not encouraged to cook, he would be better at chopping wood, than cooking for the family. Then, upon observing others, he noticed that other boys in the community were good at chopping wood, while the girls were not as good. From this observation he can easily assume that boys are better at chopping wood than girls, as he too knows he is better at chopping wood. The confidence in his ability to chop wood reinforces the observed belief that boys are better at chopping wood. Thus, by habitually being exposed to a group of women who act one way, or men another, certain gendered notions are created by the observer, and perhaps reinforced when reflecting upon his or her individual activities.

Habitually observing certain gender distinctions can confuse the origin of that gender distinction. The problem here is the observer does not know why the cause leads to the effect, rather he only knows that the observed phenomenon takes place. Hume says, “We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another, without instructing us in the secret connection which binds them together . . .” (I 516). In other words, the boy mentioned above does not know if boys are better at chopping wood than girls due to biological reasons, or if it is because the girls were never taught to chop wood, or for some other reason. All the observer knows is that the correlation exists. However, if we were basing our knowledge on habit, it would make sense that the boy is better at chopping wood because he has experience and has habitually practiced chopping wood. His muscles have had a chance to develop in order to perform the task, as well as his aim and technique. Therefore, when the unpracticed girl performs the task, she fails and looks awkward, which reaffirms the boy’s notion that girls are not as good at chopping wood. Thus, I am skeptical of anyone who claims men and women are biologically different (I am excluding reproductive differences here), as there is no clear distinction between what has been habitually learned and what is an actual biological difference.

Lawrence H. Summers, president of Harvard University, made comments at a conference on diversifying the science and engineering workforce, which shows how easily the origin of gender distinctions can be confused. Summers’ speech attempted to address the diversity policies at Harvard University. He contributed the lack of women in the science and engineering fields to familial choices and a lower aptitude in standardized tests (Summers). Although he never directly stated that women are biologically inferior to men in math and science, he does do a lot of work debunking the validity of socialization and suggesting that one reason women are not in high paying engineering jobs is due to their lower aptitude on standardized tests. Summers says,"Because if my reading of the data is right-it’s something people can argue about-that there are some systematic differences in variability in different (sex) populations, then whatever the set of attributes (standardized tests) are that are precisely defined to correlate with being an aeronautical engineer at MIT or being a chemist at Berkley, those are probably different in their standard deviations as well" (Summers). But here’s the confusion, when Summers suggests that the shortage of women in science and engineering fields is due to their lower standardized test scores, or their biological inferiority in these subjects, he is jumping to an unfounded conclusion about biology based on mere observation and a belief that this is the link between the correlating evidence. Summers has failed to explore scientifically or even empirically the other possible explanations for a shortage of women in science and engineering fields, as many of his sources and data are inconclusive or faulty (he even admits as much). In other words, Summers has continual observed the lack of women in the science and engineering fields for so long that he has reaffirmed his belief that women are just inferior with out seriously engaging in an investigation as to the origin of this problem.

Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, a professor at Western Illinois University, also believes Hume’s work to be applicable to ideas of social construction. She argues that Hume can be read from an environmentalist point of view, which argues that images of ourselves and others are socially constructed (Martinelli-Fernandez 196). She says, “The attraction of Hume’s theory is that the method by which we come to have a conception of self and become morally educated need not privilege one particular perspective, given that, according to Hume, we learn about the world, one another, and ourselves in concert with, and not in isolation from, one another”(Martinelli-Fernandez 213). In other words, Martinelli-Fernandez is arguing, using Hume’s account of personal identity, that the self does not stand alone, but is formed by its relationships with others and through its own personal reflection. Hume says of identity, “All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union as we have already observed” (T 571). In other words, there is no personal identity; rather, everything within the world is interconnected, leaving only parts to be identifiable by language. Hume also acknowledges that these interrelated parts are constantly changing. So, Martinelli-Fernandez is showing that the “self,” identifiable only by language, is only one piece of a large social group and is a reflection of that social group; therefore, the self is molded by the influences of others around it and is similar to the idea of social construction.

Since Hume believes humans and their environment are interconnected, I will argue based on Hume’s concept of interconnection that a shift in gender perspective could cause a change in gender norms. Hume says the mind has the ability to mix and match ideas, resulting in an object or a concept that does not exist; thus, one may be able to envision a world different from the present (I 509). A world full of unicorns would not be a plausible world to create (for we cannot create a unicorn, or can we?), but a world where men and women are allowed to achieve their full potential seems somewhat more plausible. If one is capable of envisioning this, and can also physically achieve some of the ideas in her vision, then it may be possible for her to initiate a change, or move towards her vision. However, this change will not take place immediately, rather it is a process that must be accepted by a majority of others before the construction of this vision is completed. I will illustrate this process through an example: A man envisions a world where men and women are free to live life to their fullest potential without gender restraints. This man realizes he likes this vision and wants to be treated by others in this manner; therefore, he attempts to treat others the way he wants to be treated. When other people ask why he is acting strangely he explains his vision. From here others observe his strange behavior. Some may ultimately object to his behavior, or may embrace his vision along with him. Regardless of how the others react, their understanding of the world has been challenged. If more and more people adopt this person’s vision, or if others have similar visions, then they too are influencing and challenging the idea of others, and are promoting a change in gender norms.

Annete Baier also believes Hume is useful to feminists, and turns to his “belief theory” in support of her argument. Baier believes Hume requires us to not only maintain our habits, which have created our social situation, but also to reflect, analyze, and question them (Baier 24). In other words, we should not idly habituate actions that lead to particular constructs, rather she would say Hume is arguing that we should carefully reflect on why these actions are beneficial actions, and question whether they should be habituated by everyone (Baier 29). She says,“Not merely must we be able to keep up the custom or habit in question after we have thought long and hard about its nature, its sources, its costs, and its consequences; we must also be able to turn the habit in question on itself and find that I can ‘bear its own survey’” (Baier 24).As mentioned before, Baier’s argument suggests that it is possible for one to reflect upon his or her position and the position of others within a society, and initiate change by setting an example.

Baier seems to be suggesting that Hume wants us to have some form of constructed morality for the good of humanity, but would Hume require us to have constructs of gender? I believe the appropriate response to this would be no. However, if gendered constructs somehow benefited humanity, or people of that gender, then he may suggest that the construction should be implemented. But I do not think Hume would limit us to these constructs. In other words, if a gender construct failed, or harmed society or people of that gender, then the construct should be adjusted to promote the well being of everyone. I agree with Baier in that Hume wants us to remain skeptical about the moral and social constructs we reinforce in order to promote the well being of the whole, which truly makes Hume’s “belief theory” feminist friendly and somewhat radical for his day and age.

Hopefully I have shown that Hume appears to provide a feminist-friendly account of gender constructs as he allows for flexibility within moral constructs. I have extended Hume’s “belief theory” to gender in order to explain how he may account for the formation of gender constructs, and the possibility for these constructs to change. I have also examined other feminist philosophers’ interpretation of Hume in order to support and guide my interpretation.

Works Cited

Baier, Annette. “Hume: The Reflective Women’s Epistemologist?” Feminist
Interpretations of David Hume. Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 19-38.

Daly, Mary. Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism. Boston: Beacon Press,
1978.
Lloyd, Genevieve. "The Man of Reason," excerpt, in Gender: Key Concepts in Critical
Theory, ed. by Carol C. Gould. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1997, pp. 225-230.

Lloyd, Genevieve. “Hume on the Passion for Truth.” Feminist Interpretations of
David Hume. Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 39-59.

Martinelli-Fernandez, Susan. “Social (re)construction: A Humean Voice on Moral
Education, Social Construction, and Feminism.” Feminist Interpretations of David Hume Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 194-217.

Summer, Lawrence H. “Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science &
Engineering Workforce.” The Office of the President. 14 Jan. 2005.

Risking Forgiveness

I will argue that forgiveness, on a large-scale, is a risky response to mass atrocities because the perpetrators may wrong again, the atrocity may be forgotten, and the victims may not be satisfied with this response. I will use Martha Minow and Jeffrie Murphy to explain problems with forgiveness, and will use, as an example, the United States as a violator of numerous peace treaties with Native Americans to illustrate the risks of mass forgiveness. Finally, I will present an alternative to forgiveness that would ideally allow for reconciliation and justice, as well as a way of healing and a new identity for victims and perpetrators.
As mentioned above, I believe forgiving on a large-scale is risky because the victims of mass atrocities may not be ready to forgive and may not be satisfied with this response. Nietzsche, Butler, and Murphy would all agree that a natural response to mass atrocity or any atrocity would be anger. Butler says in Fifteen Sermons,
“It hath been shown, that mankind naturally feel some emotion of mind against injury and injustice, whoever are the sufferers by it; and even though the injurious design be prevented from taking effect. Let this be called anger, indignation, resentment, or by whatever name any one shall choose; the thing itself is understood, and is plainly natural.” (Butler 102)
They begin to differ in opinion when this anger is prolonged or transformed into resentment; however, I agree with Butler and find preventing or destroying resentment extremely difficult in situations of mass atrocity. Erasing one’s personal identity by killing relationships that he or she is dependent on, insulting and challenging one’s existence, and displacing one from his or her homeland is grounds enough for serious hatred and resentment. If we multiply this by existing survivors, the result is mass hatred. Hatred does not entail the desire to harm another; rather, hatred is an irrevocable ill feeling toward a person or persons who has harmed that individual. I believe hatred exists, in some form, inside of each survivor of mass atrocity or violence. Some may suppress this hatred, others may openly embrace it in an outward or inward manner, but it must be present, as survivors would not recognize the events that happened to them as atrocities. If a government or society forgives the perpetrators too suddenly, or without addressing the ill feelings the victims possess, then the government is not acting in the interest of the victims and the direction of their hatred will be frayed and unpredictable.
Large-scale forgiveness may be equated with forgetting, which may suppress the events that have shaped the lives of victims and perpetrators, and the environment (physical, economic, and emotional) surrounding the victims and perpetrators. If a government or society has forgiven others for committing acts of mass violence or atrocity, and does not maintain the memory through education, memorials, or by providing ways for victims to express their pain (art, music, literature, religion etc.), then there is no way for the victims to heal. In other words, large-scale forgiveness runs the risk of forgetting the many ways mass atrocity or violence has re-shaped the lives of the victims and perpetrators, when attention is no longer focused on the aftermath, but on returning to “normal”, or maintaining a forgiving attitude toward the perpetrators. I am not saying that forgiving will always lead to forgetting, but I am leery that governments may be too eager to “forgive and forget” in order to focus energy on the new, while avoiding painful memories and emotions.
Another risk of forgiveness is the possibility that the mass atrocity or violence may continue or happen again. If a government or society forgives without seeking some sort of punishment, then that society has no way of controlling or preventing the mass atrocity from happening again. Contracts and treaties as forms of forgiveness are not enough. If a government does not desire punishment, but desires forgiveness, then the government should seek to dismantle the ability of the perpetrators to continue their destruction. Forgiving is not an appropriate response by itself, it must be also be enforced.
Martha Minow, author of Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, would also agree that forgiveness is a risky response to mass atrocity. Minow spends a lot of time explaining that forgiveness often moves away from problems too quickly and leads to forgetting or public ignorance of the problem (Minow 15). She says,
“Yet, in practice, forgiveness often produces exemption from punishment . . . [which] sacrifices justice in a foreshortened effort to move on . . . [and] such an effort to move on often fails because the injury is not so much forgiven but publicly ignored, leaving it to fester . . .” (Minow 15).
Minow also believes that forgiving may lead to silence, which may cause psychological harm to victims. She says, “ . . . forgiveness may mean ultimately forgetting or putting aside the harm . . .Victims and witnesses who seek to forget ironically may assist the perpetrators by keeping silent about their crimes. Silence about violence locks perpetrators and victims in the cruel pact of denial, literally and psychologically” (Minow 16). She also explains that no one can be forced to forgive and that every individual has his or her own way of dealing with the events that have occurred (Minow 21). Denying victims their own response, Minow says, would further their suffering (Minow 21). She says, “Individuals respond uniquely and differently to horror. At least the responses are their own. To demand different ones may be yet another form of degradation and denial of their very being” (Minow 20). Minow does not deny the possibility of forgiveness, rather she finds it difficult and desires further questions to be asked if forgiveness were to take place (Minow 21). She would ask,
“ . . . what should count as a good reason to forgive . . . what would it take, and what do our current or imagined institutions need to do, to come to terms with the past, to help heal the victims, the bystanders, and even the perpetrators? What would promote reconstruction of a society devastated by atrocities? What could build a nation capable of preventing future massacres and incidents or regimes of torture?” (Minow 21).
Minow does acknowledge the benefits of forgiveness, but does not think they are equal to the risks involved. I agree with Minow’s criticism of forgiveness, but will use further criticism to support my argument.
Jefferie Murphy, co-author of Forgiveness and Mercy, mentions a criticism of forgiveness that is applicable to mass atrocities and shows one risk involved in large-scale forgiveness. Murphy explains that forgiveness should not be granted too quickly as it may insult the victim(s) (Murphy 17). He says, “Indeed, if I am correct in linking resentment to self-respect, a too ready tendency to forgive may properly be regarded as a vice because it may be a sign that one lacks respect for oneself” (Murphy 17). In other words, when a person or government grants forgiveness too quickly that person or government is ignoring, or suppressing the pain and suffering experienced, which disrespects the person(s) and does not allow the victim(s) to heal. I believe, in cases of mass atrocity, that a government who forgave immediately would not have time to acknowledge or assess the damage that has occurred, and would not have time to provide immediate help. Forgiving too quickly may also perpetuate violence, for the perpetrators may not feel guilty for their actions, since the victims appear to have recovered so quickly, and may continue the violence.
Forgiving too quickly has occurred in Western Society and is partly the reason for the severe decline in the Native American population. The United States government and Native Americans, as we know, often struggled over the ownership of land. In order for the United States to remain on good terms with the Natives, they would offer them a peace treaty, which outlined where the Native people’s territory began and where the white people’s territory ended. Although the Native’s were outraged by the white people’s destruction of their land and people, they forgave them by signing a peace treaty. Forgiveness was granted by the Native Americans in the sense that they did not resist the white man’s attempt to make peace, and accepted or reconciled past actions, while opening the door to future interactions. However, the United States government often disobeyed these treaties, capturing more Native American land and shedding more Native American blood.
Although many peace treaties were signed, I am only referring to those signed willingly. There are many cases where the Natives were forced to sign these treaties or else their villages would be destroyed, and there are many cases where the Natives were ill-informed or were not told the true nature of the treaty, but I am not referring to these cases. I am also speaking of the Native Americans in very loose terms, with many generalizations.
In this example the Native people forgave without truly understanding the intentions of the United States government, and without understanding the nature of peace treaties. In other words, Native Americans forgave too quickly, as they did not have a full understanding of the United States government’s intention or of peace treaties themselves. Robert Enright, co-author of Interpersonal Forgiveness, would say that the Native Americans did not genuinely forgive if they did not understand the United States intentions or the peace treaties. He says, “The individual engages in ‘reframing’ . . . by striving to understand the offender’s personal history, current pressures, and basic human worth” (Enright 54) However, I disagree with Enright and believe that the Native Americans probably thought they understood their perpetrators and continued on with the forgiving process, even though they were not aware of the white man’s intentions. I believe it is important to strive to understand one’s perpetrators; however, this cannot ensure that he or she will ever know the perpetrator’s full intentions. Fully understanding the intentions of the United States government would have probably been difficult for the Native Americans, as an institution as such would be a foreign concept; however, the Native Americans could have taken more time to investigate intentions further.
The Native people also had less of an ability to enforce the peace treaty when the United States broke the peace treaty, and did not implement or encourage punishment until later, when they began to understand the white man’s intention. So, the Native people forgave without a way of enforcing or punishing those who caused harm, which ties into my idea that forgiveness must have some form of punishment, or some way of protecting the forgivers from further violence, or a way of dismantling that, which is harming the one that has forgiven, in order for forgiveness to be workable. This example also shows that forgiving too quickly does not allow time to assess the intentions of the perpetrators.
Now that I have demonstrated problems with forgiveness, I will explain another possible response to mass violence that does not require or support forgiveness although it is not excluded. This response requires acknowledgment, understanding, acceptance, and punishment. Both perpetrators and victims need to acknowledge the pain experienced by victims. Acknowledging the pain is acknowledging the effect of the atrocity (acknowledgment could also be expressed through the forms of memorials, art, or religion). If one (either the government as a whole, or the individual) has acknowledged the pain and suffering, then he or she can begin to understand the possible ways this atrocity will shape and re-shape the lives of those involved (including victims, perpetrators, and bystanders) and the reasons why perpetrators acted in atrocious ways. Next, victims, perpetrators, and bystanders must accept what has happened and realize that these events will live with them for the rest of their lives. They must realize that this event is now a part of who they are. If they reject this idea, they reject themselves. Acceptance is not the same as forgiving, although forgiveness is in some ways a form of acceptance, and could be used at this point in my response. Finally, a method is needed to punish or dismantle those who have caused the atrocity. This will secure, or attempt to secure future atrocities from happening again and will express the discontent of the group of people harmed. This response incorporates the needs of many people and does not force one to forgive or feel vengeance. However, this response does require one to deal with the consequences of the atrocity whether he or she is a perpetrator, a victim, or a bystander.
Forgiving, as far as I can foresee, is too risky of a response (to mass atrocities) by itself and must be accompanied by ways to deal with the negative energy left after the atrocity has occurred, as well as ways of preventing further harm. I have shown the many criticisms of forgiveness by both Minow and Murphy, such as its leading to forgetting, not being able to prevent future atrocities, and insulting the victims, and I have outlined a possible response to mass atrocities, which would hopefully dissolve extreme negative feelings due to the atrocity, provide an outlet for these emotions, and prevent future atrocities.

Locke’s Concepts of Knowledge and Personal Identity

John Locke, in his book titled Essay Concerning Human Understanding, argues that knowledge requires one to know that he or she has knowledge of something. Locke also argues that one must perceive that he or she perceives in order for a personal identity to occur. This essay will show that both concepts are related in that they require reflective consciousness.
As mentioned before, Locke’s concept of knowledge is based on the theory that one must know he or she knows in order for knowledge to exist, but a further explanation of this concept should be exposed before one can understand it fully. To begin, Locke presents the concept of simple ideas. Simple ideas are the descriptive parts of an object, i.e., color, shape, size, temperature etc., which can be thought of separately from the whole (Locke 281). Simple ideas can also come about by reflection, or turning in on one’s internal functions, i.e., thinking, knowing, believing, etc. (Locke 276). These simple ideas are the basis of all knowledge (Locke 285), and create a person’s perception of the world (Locke 291). Locke says, “Perception is only when the mind receives the impression [of simple ideas]” (Locke 290). In other words, the mind perceives when a sensation has been sensed. Complex ideas are a bunch of simple ideas grouped together to create a larger idea, i.e., three lines of equal length joined together at each end creates a triangle (Locke 293). Humans take perception one step further by reflecting on the ideas perceived, or by realizing that they know, or perceive something (Locke 290). Knowledge requires perception; or, more precisely, the ability to discern, compare, compound, name, and abstract are the abilities necessary for knowledge (Locke 292-93). Locke emphasizes the ability to discern, “It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general. Unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge . . .” (Locke 292). So, one must realize that he or she is perceiving, or have the ability to reflect on something in order for that person to have knowledge of something.
Locke explains personal identity as the ability to perceive that one perceives, which is coherent to the logical structure of Locke’s explanation of knowledge. Locke says, “ This being premised, to find in what personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; this, I think, is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself . . .” (Locke 322). I believe what Locke is trying to say is that personal identity requires knowledge of the self, and in order to obtain knowledge of the self, one must be aware that he or she has knowledge of the self. A pig could not have personal identity because it does not appear to acknowledge that it exists. The pig may realize it has a physical body, but it does not reflect upon its body. It only reacts to its body. Reflection is needed in order for one to have a personal identity, just as knowing that one knows is needed for one to have knowledge of something. Reflection upon the self can also be called self-consciousness, as one’s conscious is focused on the self.
Both Locke’s concept of knowledge and his concept of personal identity require consciousness. Locke says, “ . . . consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things . . .” (Locke 323). In other words, consciousness is required to reflect upon, or think about, an idea of the self, and thereby constitutes personal identity. This type of consciousness, as I’ve mentioned before, can be called self-conscious. Consciousness is also required for knowledge. I mentioned before that one must have the ability to reflect, or think about simple ideas before he or she understands that he or she knows something. This act of reflection, or thought, is in essence, consciousness, for “consciousness always accompanies thinking” (Locke 323). In an effort to distinguish this type of consciousness from self-consciousness, it could be called general consciousness. So, Locke’s concept of knowledge and his concept of personal identity relate in that they both require consciousness.
So, according to Locke, all knowledge is based upon the ability to reflect, or maintain a certain consciousness of simple and complex ideas; therefore, personal identity is based upon the ability to acknowledge and reflect upon the idea of personal identity. Thus, for Locke, the relation between knowledge and personal identity is consciousness.

Daly vs. Beauvoir

Both Mary Daly, in her book Gyn/Ecology, and Simone de Beauvoir, in her book The Second Sex, argue for the independence and transcendence of women. However, the two authors have different methods of bringing this change about. Daly does not involve males in her concept of transcendence, which I will argue is difficult and hard to imagine. Although I have found both Daly and Beauvoir incredibly inspiring, I will argue that Beauvoir’s concept of transcendence provides a way of dealing with males, whereas Daly’s concept seems exclusionary and somewhat impossible.
Beauvoir wants women to transcend immanence (or passivity) and create a new type of woman, which will inevitably change the current economic, social, and cultural situation of women. She believes the reason for the oppression of women is their inability to apply their energy to the world due to their social situation (Beauvoir 194). She says for men, “Every subject plays his part as such specifically through exploits or projects that serve as a mode of transcendence; he achieves liberty only through a continual reaching out toward other liberties” (Beauvoir 193-194). Thus males are able to apply their energies to the world. Beauvoir claims that males deny women this opportunity (Beauvoir 194). She says, “They [men] propose to stabilize her as object and to doom her to immanence since her transcendence is to be overshadowed and forever transcended by another ego (conscience) which is essential and sovereign” (Beauvoir 194). Beauvoir suggests that women should form a new concept of the self in order to transcend immanence and apply their energies to the world in a similar fashion to males. She admits that women will have difficulties doing this, as they will be “torn between the past and the future” (Beauvoir 201). Therefore, Beauvoir says, “She must shed her old skin and cut her own new clothes” (Beauvoir 201). In other words, she must create a new identity, and a new image of woman. Beauvoir’s goal is for men and women to live together in an androgynous state, where both men and women are given the same opportunities, demands, and respect (Beauvoir 202). She believes this will happen if women transcend immanence and create a new identity.
Daly would argue against Beauvoir, claiming that she is perpetuating the patriarchy, and that true transcendence is creating a new self completely separate from this patriarchy. Daly speaks of “Token Torturers,” who are women who put on the male guise and perpetuate misogyny. Daly explains the Token Torturer as, “the woman who often unwittingly pleases her masters by . . . performing the acts which are less than gentlemanly, thus obscuring their role. She masks male responsibility and intent” (Daly 335). Daly goes on to remark that there are “token women doctors,” “token women senators,” and “token women professors” who are perpetuating the patriarchy by partaking in roles that are innately oppressive to women (Daly 335). Beauvoir encourages women to take up the same activities as men, as she sees the oppression of women due to the lack of opportunity rather than the innate oppressive nature of the activities themselves.
Daly’s concept of transcendence is quite different from Beauvoir’s in that women must create an entirely new situation (“time/space”) for themselves rather than rise to the level of men. Daly argues for the transcendence from the current patriarchy, rather than transcendence from immanence. She wants women to first recognize how the patriarchy oppresses women. She says,
“ . . . awareness of environment makes it possible to deflect both physical and semantic danger, to unspook the implicit messages coming from all sides . . . Such pattern discovery, or positive paranoia, functions also to dis-spell the power of prevailing myths and symbols, a power which depend partly upon their hiddenness” (Daly 341).
Daly believes unwrapping the myth is part of the process, but also requires women (or hags) to separate themselves physically through language, body language, dress, etc. by creating a new self identity (Daly 335). This sounds similar to Beauvoir’s desire to shed the old skin, and cut new cloths, but the difference here is Daly wants this time/space to exist outside of the patriarchy, whereas Beauvoir wants men and women to exist in cohesion.
Excluding men from the process, or the outcome, of transcendence is precisely where I diverge from Daly and steer toward Beauvoir, as I find it difficult for women to maintain a time/space for a long period of time without men. I am not entirely sure whether Daly is suggesting that this time/space should continue in isolation forever, or whether, at some point this time/space is no longer needed. But if this time/space were to maintain itself separately from males for a long period of time, I would have difficulty in imagining how males and females would interact, or if Daly would allow them to interact at all. Some women are attracted to men and will probably desire to intermingle with men at some point, although they may keep the patriarchy in mind while doing so. But perhaps Daly does believe that time/space is needed only until the patriarchy has been broken down. If this is what she intends, then I am unclear on whether she believes men will have changed when all is said and done. She shows how women will have changed when they have spun their own time/space, but she does not show how men will have changed from this process. I feel Daly is very unclear on the futuristic relation of men and women, and I feel she does not clarify how long the time/space is to exist separately from men. In other words, she appears exclusionary of men, which makes her theory seem somewhat impossible. Can we really escape men?
I believe Beauvoir provides a better example of how men and women are to exist together. She gives a somewhat detailed description of the mode of existence for men and women after transcendence has occurred for the majority of women. She says,
“If the little girl were brought up from the first with the same demands and rewards, the same severity and the same freedom, as her brothers, taking part in the same studies, the same games, promised the same future, surrounded with women and men who seemed to her undoubted equals . . . the child would perceive around her an androgynous world and not a masculine world” (Beauvoir 202).
Beauvoir also explains the attitude of men when equality has been achieved. She says, “ . . . the boy would not have a superiority complex if it were not instilled into him and if he looked up to women with as much respect as to men (Beauvoir 202). Beauvoir includes men in her futuristic outlook, whereas Daly fails to go into detail about her futuristic outlook once transcending is no longer necessary.
Feminism needs to include a way of dealing with men, as well as a way of redefining the constructs or doing away with the constructs of gender. I personally feel feminism is more about breaking down gender roles than it is about women’s issues alone. Men, too, face discrimination, and are constrained by their gender. Men are raped of their selves by other men in the patriarchy, just as women are. I believe Daly overlooks the damage the patriarchy has done to males, although she gives an excellent account of how the patriarchy effects women. Feminism cannot and should not exclude the experiences of men as they are in direct relation to and are a reflection of the experiences of women. I feel Daly’s analysis of the effects of patriarchal oppression can be extended to men and Beauvoir’s ideal, if set outside of the patriarchy, can be implemented as well. Together both Daly’s and Beauvoir’s ideas have the potential to form a new more comprehensive application of feminism.
I have shown the difference between Beauvoir’s concept of transcendence from immanence and Daly’s concept of transcendence from the patriarchy, as well as Daly’s inability to explain how time/space relates to men. I have also outlined my understanding of feminism, and the possible merger of both Daly and Beauvoir’s ideas, but I would like to raise one final question that I did not have a chance to address: Is Beauvoir’s ideal state for men and women within a patriarchy, or does she leave room for the possibility that her ideal state is something different than a patriarchy?

Responses to Adolph Eichmann

Primo Levi, in his book The Drowned and The Saved, presents his readers with the “gray zone” in an attempt to explain how a desire for power blurs the distinction between “good” and “bad.” Hannah Arendt, in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem, presents the trial of Adolph Eichmann, and explores the banal life he led. I will argue that Eichmann’s banality puts him into Levi’s gray zone, that Levi would want Eichmann persecuted to the fullest extent after an attempt was made to understand Eichmann, that Arendt would also agree that Eichmann should be persecuted to the fullest extent, but would not require one to understand Eichmann, and I will conclude that Levi’s response to Eichmann seems most appropriate to the victim.
Arendt presents the life of Adolph Eichmann as rather banal, and makes the point of arguing that Eichmann should be persecuted for his actions rather than his psychological intent, or motivation. Arendt points out that Eichmann’s banality seems to come from his lack of autonomy. She says, “The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else” (Arendt 49). She also points out that he often used “stock phrases” and “self-invented clichés” when he explained events to the court (Arendt 49), which provides more evidence for his inability to think. She mentions that Eichmann never seemed to do anything unless it was suggested to him. For example, when he was sick of his job as a sales man for his father’s company he did not quit, rather he suffered through it until he was offered to join the S.S. (Arendt 31). Arendt explains, “Kaltenbrunner had said to him: Why not join the S.S.? And he had replied, Why not? That was how it had happened, and that was about all there was to it” (Arendt 33) Eichmann was also a horrible student (Arendt 29), which may further the assumption that Eichmann lacked the ability to think. So, Eichmann appears to be influenced by others and lacks autonomy, which is evidence of a banal character.
Arendt, however, does not accept Eichmann’s banal, thoughtless existence as a reason to excuse Eichmann of his actions; rather, she has a problem with how the courts examine Eichmann. The court’s initial reaction was to prosecute Eichmann for his psychological intent, or motivation, for attempting to destroy the Jewish people (Arendt 277). However, Arendt believes one should focus on the history of events and the reactions of others when examining Eichmann. She explains,
“And just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations—as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not inhabit the world—we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang” (Arendt 277).
She states at the end of this quote that his actions against humanity are the only reasons Eichmann should be hanged, which shows that she wanted to move away from the court’s pervious interest in his psychological intent or motivation.
Levi would agree with Arendt that Eichmann should be held accountable for the slaughter of millions of Jews, but would disagree with her displeasure in psychologically evaluating Eichmann. I do not think he is saying that Eichmann’s fate should have been based upon his psychological intentions, but rather that an attempt should have been made to understand Eichmann. In a chapter titled "The Gray Zone", Levi reveals the psychological motivation of those inside the gray zone, and the inability for one to distinguish between the “good” and the “bad” (Levi 42). Levi sees morality within the nazi concentration camps as muddled and not easily delineated into categories of “right” and “wrong.” I believe he would extend this idea to Eichmann, and would push the court to understand how his morality has shifted. Levi says,
“The oppressor remains what he is, and so does the victim. They are not interchangeable. The former is to be punished and execrated (but, if possible, understood), the latter is to be pitied and helped; but both, faced by the indecency of the irrevocable act, need refuge and protection, and instinctively search for them” (Levi 25).
Levi understands that Eichmann’s morality has been twisted similarly to those inside of the gray zone, but should still be held accountable for his actions. Levi wants people to understand the process of confusion and fear that has lead to situations like the holocaust in case this situation occurs again.
A more detailed explanation of Levi’s gray zone is needed in order to understand why Levi would consider Eichmann a part of these gray zones. Levi provides a loose definition of what he considers a gray zone. He states, “It is a gray zone poorly defined, where the two camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge. This gray zone possesses an incredibly complicated internal structure and contains within itself enough to confuse our need to judge” (Levi 42). To begin, a gray zone cannot exist if those “masters” that Levi speaks of had not stripped the “servants,” or prisoners, of their power (Levi 39). The masters, who were inside of the grey zone, wanted power over the prisoners to obtain their goals. The servants wanted power, or privilege, in order to survive. In other words, “masters” chose, and perpetuated the gray zone, whereas prisoners were forced inside (Levi 42). In the case of the prisoners, the desire for power was a life or death issue, and the prisoner would do, “whatever it took to lift oneself above the norm” (Levi 41). One may have stolen bread from another when he knows that is wrong, for it would cause the death of another, but he, himself, would die otherwise (Levi 41). Morality within the gray zone was muddled and confused.
I have concluded from Levi’s chapter on Gray Zones that the “masters” are responsible for shaping the gray zone, are a part of the gray zone, but enter it differently. Eichmann would be considered a “master” of the gray zone since he held power over prisoners. The “masters” within the gray zone, as mentioned before, desired power for their own purposes, be it to secure their job in the S.S. (as Eichmann did), or for their own personal goals. This desire created the gray zone. The “masters” took away the power of the prisoners, which caused the prisoners to change their moral values in order to survive. “Masters” chose their position, due to limited circumstances in their lives, whether it was by free choice or by coercion, and were not forced into the gray zone as prisoners were. Levi says, “The pressure that a modern totalitarian state can exercise over the individual is frightful . . . Nevertheless, it is not permissible to admit that this pressure is irresistible, especially in the brief twelve-year term of the Third Reich” (Levi 29). The moralities of the “masters” within the gray zone were also muddled and confused similarly to the prisoners. Levi presents an example and explains,
“Now, this man Muhsfeld was not a compassionate person; his daily ration of slaughter was studded with arbitrary and capricious acts, marked by his inventions of refined cruelty . . . Had he lived in a different environment and epoch, he probably would have behaved like any other common man” (Levi 57).
So, the “masters” who created and became apart of the gray zone entered freely, where as the prisoners were forced inside the gray zone, acting out of necessity. Levi does not say this explicitly, however, I see the muddled nature of these “masters” as part of the confusion within that perpetuates the gray zone. To state it simply, the gray zone is a situation where the desire for power challenges one’s morality.
I believe, under Levi’s notion of the gray zone that Eichmann was a “master” coerced into, and muddled by the gray zone, and that Eichmann’s psychology is important to understand as similar events may occur again. As I have mentioned before, Eichmann did poorly in school, and lacked direction (Arendt 29). The SS was a viable option for someone struggling to create his or her own identity, and relied on people without a strong sense of self who they could easily manipulate (Prof. Norlock, Feb. 14, 2005). Arendt also shows that Eichmann was friendly with Jewish people, which encourages one to think that Eichmann was seduced into this situation. There seems to be no other way to explain how a person can be friends with Jewish people and then order the extermination of them, except through seduction. Although I understand the importance of zeroing in on the fact that Eichmann did perpetuate the slaughter of Jewish people, I do not agree with Arendt that his actions are the main issue of importance. If the courts believed that an evil person was needed to inflict evil upon others, I think it would be even more necessary to evaluate an instance where only a banal personality was needed to inflict evil upon others. With this said, I do not agree that Eichmann should have been hanged. Rather he should have been punished to the fullest extent, with life intact, and evaluated for the purposes of understanding the moral confusion that takes place under the influence of power.
Eichmann’s banal personality confuses one’s ability to understand evil as a result of banality, when one is typically inclined to understand evil as the result of evil. Levi’s gray zone is an explanation of this process, which induces confusion, and which has created Eichmann, the banal individual who has committed atrocious acts against humanity, and who has confused us ever sense.