Body as Source of Intelligibility: Supporting the Notion of a Different Intelligibility due to the Inhibited Intentionality of the Feminine
This paper will show that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body as the source of intelligibility, or knowledge of world can be extended to provide an explanation for limited feminine motility. I will begin by 1) setting up the problem of women’s motility, 2) explaining Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of motility and intelligibility, and 3) introducing Iris Young’s theory that women move in the world differently. Next, I will present Young’s theory in a way that suggests feminine intelligibility is shaped by feminine motility, and may support a difference between masculine and feminine intelligence. As evidence of how bodily motility shapes intelligibility, I will use the Confucian concept of li, as presented in Hahm Chaibong’s essay entitled Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucaultian Interpretation, and Joe Hyams’ book entitled Zen in the Martial Arts to show the Martial Artists belief in intelligibility through the practice of a physical art.
While all human beings possess the ability to move, (even quadriplegics, as technology has given them ways of interacting with the world) I will be writing about the varying degrees of motility, in particular, the difference between modes of feminine and masculine motility. Models of feminine motility have been created by past philosophers, religious and educational institutions, as well as institutions of health and fitness (along with many others), which have supported an understanding of feminine motility that is the direct opposite of masculine motility. Masculine movement, on the one hand, includes the ability to move in the world with strength and confidence of body. Strength and confidence are the bodily skills needed to protect, to build, to destroy, and to rule (general masculine characteristics). Feminine movement, on the other hand, includes the ability to move with grace and lightness of body. Grace and lightness are skills needed to obey, to serve, to do intricate and detailed work, and to please (general feminine characteristics). The two categories of motility oppose each other in that the masculine category cannot, at the same time, possess feminine characteristics of motility, or vice versa. A person of strength and confidence cannot be light and graceful. Strength is generally accompanied by bulk (although there are exceptions) and bulk is often absent of grace. Thus, feminine motility and masculine motility are two opposed categories of movement.
As mentioned, past philosophers and religious institutions (to name a few) have supported a similar mode of feminine motility. Influential philosophers such as Kant, Rousseau, and Aristotle all believed that feminine bodies were weak and incapable of masculine activities. Kant says, “her figure in general is finer, her features more delicate and gentler. . .” (Kant 116). Rousseau presents his view of the feminine body explicitly. He says, “It is the part of the one [the male] to be active and strong, and the other [the female] to be passive and weak” (Emile 131), and Aristotle, who seems to be the least friendly to the feminine body, says, “females are weaker and colder in their nature; and we should look upon the female state as being as it were a deformity . . .” (Aristotle 65). The feminine body here is passive, weak, sedentary, and ornamental. If the feminine body is weak and incapable than its motility will vary from its masculine counterpart.
Religions have also maintained and encouraged a similar view of feminine motility. In Christian churches, and in the religion itself, the feminine body has represented purity, a source of food and nourishment, and peace. A body that is pure is a body that is untouched and that does not seek touching. It does not move within the world, but retains and maintains it original state; thus, on this account, the feminine body is a body that is sedentary. In other words, it doesn’t move out in the world, but into itself, its pure state. The feminine body as a source of food and nourishment, while providing an important role within society, can also be seen as the weakening of the feminine body. When a woman is breast-feeding she gives of herself, i.e., her energy and her strength, to another. If she does not receive the proper nourishment, her strength will diminish. Even as a cook for others, she still expends her energy and strength for the nourishment of others. The feminine body as a symbol of peace also promotes a sedentary view of the feminine body in that she is not actively engaged with the world, but to maintain a peaceful state, or passive engagement. When I speak of peace here, I am not speaking of world peace or peace for the state, but peace for the home, peace for the village, etc. Peace, in this sense, is a state of maintaining and not necessarily a state of active engagement.
Merleau-Ponty provides the foundation for my discussion about feminine motility. This will serve as my interpretation of Merleau-Ponty and not necessarily a summary of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, particularly my interpretation on intelligibility.
For Merleau-Ponty, motility is inseparable from world; thus, an explanation of world according to Merleau-Ponty is needed. World for Merleau-Ponty is given, i.e., world exists prior to our entrance into it, and is what we enter into and are given upon conception. Merleau-Ponty says, “The world is there before any possible analysis of mine . . .” (CPR 81). World does not come about through a gradual realization of it, but is already there at the start. Perception, however, grants us different access to understanding world. Merleau-Ponty says, “. . . the world is what we perceive” (CPR 87). It allows us to focus on particular aspects, helping to organize and to come to a temporal understanding of world. World is temporal in that it is a moving understanding, i.e., as we age, we gain a different understanding of world; thus, knowledge of world constantly shifts and is temporal. However, perception will never allow us to fully grasp or possess world. Merleau-Ponty says, “I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible” (CPR 87). So, consciousness of world is brought about through perception of world, which brings with it temporal knowledge of world.
Later in the Phenomenology of Perception, particularly in the section “The Lived Body,” Merleau-Ponty discusses how our bodies are what inform us of world. In other words, our bodies are what give us the capability to perceive. It is the motility of the body which creates world. He says, “Consciousness is being towards the thing through the intermediary of the body” (The Body 154-55). So, bodies are vehicles of openness which experience/perceive the world. As bodies perceive, as they move within the world, they become conscious of world; thus, as consciousness develops, world develops. As infants our bodies are inexperienced within the world (motility isn’t fully developed), which may explain our general inability to remember life as an infant, but with time our bodies gain experience within the world, and, therefore, gain consciousness. Our bodies allow us to form a horizon of knowledge.
Intelligibility comes from knowledge of world, and, therefore motility. Merleau-Ponty says, “A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its ‘world’, and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it. . .” (Merleau-Ponty 155). Thus, when the body learns to move within the world in a particular way, that movement is incorporated into, and becomes a part of, world for that being. It is the culmination of world, at a given moment, that creates intelligibility. Fragments of knowledge do not constitute intelligibility; rather, intelligibility is a horizon of knowledge, or the accumulation of knowledge gained through motility (or the body moving toward things in the world). Merleau-Ponty says,
At each successive instant of movement, the preceding instant is not lost sight of. It is, as it were, dovetailed into the present, and present perception generally speaking consists in drawing together, on the basis of one’s present position, the succession of previous positions, which envelop each other (The Body 155).So, past movements, or past knowledge, are incorporated into the current perception of world. In other words, as being gains knowledge it doesn’t forget it; rather, it uses that knowledge to inform one’s physical movements in the present. This, again, means that knowledge is always in motion. As long as we are moving we are acquiring knowledge of world and re-inventing our intelligibility. So, for Merleau-Ponty, motility enables beings to acquire a horizon of knowledge, i.e., motility allows the development of intelligibility.
Iris Young writes an essay in response to Merleau-Ponty entitled, Throwing Like a Girl. While Young is sympathetic towards Merleau-Ponty’s work, she argues that feminine movement is different than masculine movement and uses Merleau-Ponty’s account of motility and intelligibility to show that while women have bodies that move towards the world their bodies are, at the same time, “laden with immanence.”
In section II of Throwing Like a Girl, Young argues that there are three modalities of feminine movement: ambiguous transcendence, inhibited intentionality, and discontinuous unity. She finds the source of these modalities in that woman’s experience of the body is both as a thing and as a capacity (Young 264). Young points out that in Merleau-Ponty’s work, he often speaks of the body as a transcendence to the world, an openness that connects being and world. She says, “The transcendence of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty describes is a transcendence that moves out from the body in its immanence in an open and unbroken directedness . . .” (Young 265). However, Young argues that, for women, there is another layer attached to this transcendence, which makes the experience quite different. She says, “While feminine bodily existence is a transcendence and openness to the world, it is an ambiguous transcendence, a transcendence that is at the same time laden with immanence” (Young 265). In other words, feminine movement doesn’t simply begin in immanence (i.e., in a child like state), but remains in immanence (Young 265). For example, girls (and boys for that matter) who have not been taught to throw will only use the part of the body that is directly related to the motion while the rest of the body remains “rooted in immanence” (Young 265). This immanence, she believes, can be extended to the majority of feminine movements. She argues that women are typically the ones who remain in this state of immanence, while the boys (who are not subject to “sexist oppression in contemporary society” and have been taught to throw) learn to put their whole bodies into the motion of throwing, allowing the body to competently complete the task. Feminine transcendence is ambiguous in that it both has the potential to move away from the body’s initial immanence, but at the same time it holds itself back from this “continuous calling forth of capacities” (i.e., from the continuous usage of its physical capacity).
Inhibited intentionality relates to what I have just sketched out, that of the restricted movement of the feminine body. Young finds that Merleau-Ponty’s account of “intentionality in motility” points towards an uninterrupted movement from aim to enactment. In other words, movement first starts with an aim and then ends in the enactment. Young argues that feminine intentionality is interrupted in that the enactment is believed by her to be problematic. Young says, “Feminine bodily existence is an inhibited intentionality, which simultaneously reaches toward a projected end with an ‘I can’ and withholds its full bodily commitment to that end in a self-imposed ‘I cannot’ (Young 265). In other words, the feminine body does not go towards a task with a confident “I can;” rather, it underestimates its real physical potential. For example, when stretching to reach a food item up high, it is a feminine style of movement not to reach to the individual’s full reaching capacity, or, if we go back to the throwing example, it is a feminine style of movement not to put the whole body into the throwing motion. So, the feminine intentionality is inhibited by a false belief in its motility. Thus, aim and enactment are problematic in this account of feminine motility.
Young goes on to argue that the unity of feminine movement is discontinuous. Discontinuous unity is the breaking up of movement from aim to enactment. She argues that on Merleau-Ponty’s account movement smoothly goes from aim to enactment in one continuous unified motion, but Young wants to say that feminine movement is discontinuous because the aim doesn’t always lead to competent enactment. In other words, women often know that they have the potential to perform an action, as they have seen others do it, but don’t believe they can competently perform the action themselves; thus, there is a discontinuity in their performance of the action. She says, “The part of the body that is transcending toward an aim is in relative disunity from those that remain immobile” (Young 266). So, in the example of the feminine throwing style, the arm is in disunity with the rest of the body, the person does not engage the whole body in the act of throwing but only one part. Thus, the aim is separated from the act, as the body inefficiently attempts to perform the action. Belief in one’s incompetence is what maintains this state of immanence and reinforces discontinuous unity.
Space is also an issue for Young. If women move differently within the world, their understanding and usage of space must be different as well. There are three modalities in regards to spatiality as well: enclosed space, double spatiality, and positioned space. As I have mentioned before, feminine movement tends to be small and limited and feminine bodily comportment tends to take up little space. While much space is available, the feminine body makes very little use of it. Young says, “The space, that is, that is physically available to the feminine body is frequently of greater radius than the space that she uses and inhabits” (Young 268). Young uses the example of women (typical women) catching a ball. She says most women tend to wait for the ball and then react to it when it comes near, rather than move towards the ball to catch it (Young 269). In this example, which can be extended to other types of movement, space is not utilized despite its presence. The problem here, Young will argue, is that there is a conflict between the “here” and “yonder.” In other words, the space that is “here” is tangible, but the space “yonder” is not to the feminine spatial eye. She says, “The space of the ‘yonder’ is a space in which feminine existence projects possibilities in the sense of understanding that ‘someone’ could move within it, but not I” (Young 268). She refers to this as double spatiality. Rooting the self in the ‘here’ positions the self in space. She says, “In its immanence and inhibition, feminine spatial existence is positioned by a system of coordinates that does not have its origin in her own intentional capacities” (Young 269). In other words, she feels fixed and unable to move. Another way of looking at this is to think of feminine motility as being “field-dependent.” In other words, her movement is rooted in the immediate space around her and does not extend beyond this position, although the potential exists. Young calls this positioned space.
For my argument I will accept Merleau-Ponty’s account of motility and intelligibility, as well as Young’s feminist account of Merleau-Ponty, but would like to focus attention on the difference in intelligibility between males and females due to the difference in motility. If intelligibility comes from motility (as Merleau-Ponty would have it) and if motility is inhibited for women (as Young would have it), then women’s intelligibility is also inhibited. In other words, I will argue that one’s mental capacity is shaped by one’s physical capacity, as it is one’s movement in the world that informs him or her of world.
Young presents a study that shows how spatial intelligibility is influenced by motility. She says, ". . . it has been claimed that males have a greater capacity for lifting a figure out of its spatial surroundings and viewing relations in space as fluid and interchangeable, where as females have a greater tendency to regard figures as embedded within and fixed by their surroundings" (Young 268).Young believes that the feminine tendency to embed figures in their surroundings is the result of feminine body spatiality, as I have mentioned before, that orients the body to a rooted place in relation to its surroundings. She says, “If feminine body spatiality is such that the woman experiences herself as rooted and enclosed, on the reversibility assumption it would follow that visual space for feminine existence also has its closures of immobility and fixity” (Young 269). In other words, knowledge of visual spatiality is gained through an understanding of body spatiality, like a chain of events. For example, if there exists a belief, even a subconscious belief, that the body is rooted, then there is a likely possibility that the person will move as if she were rooted. If this rooted experience is the sum of her experiences, then it is likely that her visual spatiality will be shaped similarly, as these are her only experiences in the world. This seems to be one of the few places where she directly ties intelligibility and motility together for purposes beyond explanation of her theory. I will take this idea and extend it to all aspects of her theory, showing how it may be applicable to women today.
Ambiguous transcendence plays a large part in the hindrance of feminine intelligibility. As mentioned before, ambiguous transcendence is the simultaneous moving away from immanence and holding oneself back from “the continuous calling forth of capacities.” If feminine movement is ambiguous, if it lacks direction, then the experience of ambiguous direction can be extended to the mental processes. Our bodies place us in positions that expose us to different types of knowledge. If the body lacks a direction and focus, then the body, as a whole, will acquire knowledge that is ambiguous. In other words, in this situation, the body will acquire knowledge that is fragmented or pulled apart. For example, a person may understand her physical potentiality, but doubts her ability to achieve it (either consciously or unconsciously). The fact that her body experiences this conflicted, ambiguous sensation leaves her to acquire a conflicted and ambiguous intelligibility, since intelligibility is gained from experienced motility according to Merleau-Ponty. Thus, feminine intelligibility is fragmented if feminine transcendence remains in a state of immanence.
In terms of inhibited intentionality, intelligibility is hindered in that if the body is immanent in its moving out into the world, i.e., if the body reaches out, but does not reach to its full potential in a fluid motion, then feminine intelligibility will develop in a similar fashion. In other words, if one is seeking knowledge but is hesitant that she will be capable of obtaining this knowledge, then the motion from the aim to the acquisition becomes problematic. She will remain immanent in her aim and will not fully reach toward her goal, just as her body remains immanent in the action of throwing. This may be a contributing reason why women score lower on the mathematical portion of standardized tests, as women are often told they are not as equally competent as males in mathematics, just as they are told they are not as equally competent as males in athletics. If they believe this to be true, then when (or if) they do aim at gaining mathematical knowledge, they may doubt their ability to do so, especially if their previous bodily experiences is an experience of incompetence; thus, inhibiting their intention to acquire mathematical knowledge. In this case, the aim is made problematic by self doubt. So, our bodily experiences provide us with information about our capabilities that informs our belief in our mental capacities, with the result being that women perform differently than men in mathematics and other areas of study.
Effort put toward acquiring knowledge is also discontinuous for many women. Just as the connection between aim and acquisition is unfocused and problematic, it is also discontinuous. In other words, the motion from aim to acquisition is broken. As mentioned before in the throwing example, feminine bodily experience is often discontinuous, with the arm being severed from the body in its motion, i.e., the whole body is not put into the motion of the ball. This type of body movement provides the ground work for our intelligibility, as our movement within the world informs our intelligibility. Thus, when women go to learn a new concept or idea, they run the risk of not putting their whole effort into the learning process, as a result of the problems above: ambiguous transcendence and inhibited intentionality. Evidence of this can be seen, again, in the mathematics where women may feel inhibited, which ultimately leaves the directed motion of learning broken and discontinuous. Thus, lack of physical confidence (freedom to move within the world) hinders mental confidence and development.
Evidence of gaining intelligibility from the body can be seen in many East Asian philosophies and in the martial arts. In Confucianism, Li is a way of molding and shaping the body to create an ethical being. Hahm Chaibong writes an essay entitled, Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucaultian Interpretation, where he discusses how intelligibility is gained from li. Also, Joe Hyams’ book entitled, Zen in the Martial Arts, shows an example of how intelligibility in gained from the practice of the martial arts. Although Zen in the Martial Arts is not scholarly writing, Hyams is a long standing practitioner of the martial arts, who has studied more than the physical element of the martial art, but also the spiritual. I will use both of these writers in my examples.
According to Chaibong, in Confucianism there is no distinction between mind and body; rather, the mind and body are one, in a way that mind and body cannot be distinguished. Chaibong says,"Confucianism does not accept the soul-body, res cogitans-res extensa dichotomy so dear to Western thought . . . It would be misleading, therefore, to say that Confucianism ‘prioritizes’ the body over the soul, res extensa over res cogitans. One would have to go further and say that for Confucianism, body is all there is" (Chaibong 316).In other words, the body is an opening to the world through which intelligibility is gained and through which character is made visible. Mind is not considered something that is in accord with body, or that one can point to in any way. To say that mind and body work together is to distinguish between the two. Body is all there is. Thus, intelligibility for the Confucian does not come from the brain or mind alone, but comes from the body.
Within Confucianism is the concept of li, which can be described as a ritual way of movement, used to develop the ethical self, and, from which, I will argue, intelligibility arises. Chaibong explains li as, “. . . a matter of cultivating, training, and disciplining one’s body so that it will always practice and manifest truth, virtue, and sincerity” (Chaibong 318). In other words, ritual activity trains the body to act appropriately and from this ritual, morality arises. Chaibong says, “Li is a codification of what is considered “proper” behavior far all social contexts in which one finds oneself” (Chaibong 317). So, li can be extended to all activities of life, including menial tasks, as well as intense training in the martial arts. If these ritual movements are practiced and accepted fully by the practitioner, then the person will come to understand morality, putting the practitioner in harmony with the people and world around him or her. In other words, knowledge is gained through the ritual movements leading to a cultivated intelligibility. So, for Confucians, li, or ritual movement, provides a way of showing how physical movement leads to the development of intelligibility, which, in this case, would be considered a moral intelligibility. The example of li corresponds with my previous argument that women’s inhibited intentionality, in regards to bodily movement, can lead to inhibited intelligibility.
The martial arts could be considered a way of practicing li; thus, the martial arts could be a way of showing how movement of the body informs intelligibility. For instance, to perform many of the moves in the martial arts, more than just physical strength is needed. In other words, while learning to perform a move there’s a shift in perspective that occurs; this allows one to perform moves otherwise thought impossible. This shift in perspective isn’t necessarily body centered, but is a perspective that can be adapted to all aspects of life. For instance, when learning complicated moves in the martial arts, or moves that are physically strenuous, one must learn to focus on the moment and push away all other thoughts. Until this is done, the movement cannot be executed. The ability to comprehend this idea also does not allow one to execute the movement; rather, it is through the actual physical practice of mastering it that knowledge is gained. Many martial artists claim that the ability to focus while doing physical activities finds its way into their everyday lives. Hyam speaks of this in his book, when he tells the story of a day at his dojo where he was squeezing practice in between two work appointments and felt very distracted. He was performing very poorly and his instructor knew exactly what was wrong and told Hyam, “As long as what you are doing at the moment is exactly what you are doing at that moment and nothing else, you are one with yourself and with what you are doing—and that is Zen . . .” (Hyam 20). After this class, Hyam noticed that he felt anxious and distracted while doing many activities in his life and tried to apply the same focused technique he usually does in his martial art practice to his daily activities, and he did so with success. Thus, he learned this focus through the physical discipline/ritual of the martial arts. So, the practice of martial arts can be considered similar to li and can be used as an example in showing that intelligibility is gained from the body. At the same time, this example can be used to show that women’s inhibited intentionality results in limited intelligibility, in that the physical body is not engaging in activities that will encourage its development.
In this paper I have shown that motility leads to intelligibility. With Merleau-Ponty providing the foundation for my argument and Young extending Merleau-Ponty’s theory to take gender into account, I have shown that women’s intentionality has been historically inhibited and that this inhibition has lead to a limited intelligibility. Through examples of li and the martial arts, I have also shown how this primarily philosophical and abstract method of thinking about intelligibility and the body is applicable to real phenomenological experiences. This paper is significant to me and to philosophy in that it attempts to explicate the reason why women may think differently than men in a way that goes beyond a mere biological or environmental explanation, showing how environment and biology are inter-related and are, in many ways, inseparable.
Works Cited
Aristotle. “On the Generation of Animals.” Philosophy of Woman. Ed. Mahowald, Mary
Briody. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978.
Chaibong, Hahm. “Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucaultian Interpretation.” Philosophy East and West. Vol.51, No.3, Eight East-West Philosophers’ Conference. (Jul., 2001), pp. 315-324.
Hyams, Joe. Zen in the Martial Arts. New York: Bantam Books, 1979.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Phenomenology of Perception.” The Continental Philosophy Reader (CPR). Eds. Richard Kearney and Mara Rainwater. New York: Routledge, 1996.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Phenomenology of Perception.” The Body. Meldon, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1999
Plato. “Republic.” Philosophy of Woman. Ed. Mahowald, Mary Briody. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Emile of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Trans. William Boyd. New York: Teachers College Press, 1956.
Young, Iris. “Throwing Like a Girl.” Body and Flesh: A Philosophical Reader. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
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While all human beings possess the ability to move, (even quadriplegics, as technology has given them ways of interacting with the world) I will be writing about the varying degrees of motility, in particular, the difference between modes of feminine and masculine motility. Models of feminine motility have been created by past philosophers, religious and educational institutions, as well as institutions of health and fitness (along with many others), which have supported an understanding of feminine motility that is the direct opposite of masculine motility. Masculine movement, on the one hand, includes the ability to move in the world with strength and confidence of body. Strength and confidence are the bodily skills needed to protect, to build, to destroy, and to rule (general masculine characteristics). Feminine movement, on the other hand, includes the ability to move with grace and lightness of body. Grace and lightness are skills needed to obey, to serve, to do intricate and detailed work, and to please (general feminine characteristics). The two categories of motility oppose each other in that the masculine category cannot, at the same time, possess feminine characteristics of motility, or vice versa. A person of strength and confidence cannot be light and graceful. Strength is generally accompanied by bulk (although there are exceptions) and bulk is often absent of grace. Thus, feminine motility and masculine motility are two opposed categories of movement.
As mentioned, past philosophers and religious institutions (to name a few) have supported a similar mode of feminine motility. Influential philosophers such as Kant, Rousseau, and Aristotle all believed that feminine bodies were weak and incapable of masculine activities. Kant says, “her figure in general is finer, her features more delicate and gentler. . .” (Kant 116). Rousseau presents his view of the feminine body explicitly. He says, “It is the part of the one [the male] to be active and strong, and the other [the female] to be passive and weak” (Emile 131), and Aristotle, who seems to be the least friendly to the feminine body, says, “females are weaker and colder in their nature; and we should look upon the female state as being as it were a deformity . . .” (Aristotle 65). The feminine body here is passive, weak, sedentary, and ornamental. If the feminine body is weak and incapable than its motility will vary from its masculine counterpart.
Religions have also maintained and encouraged a similar view of feminine motility. In Christian churches, and in the religion itself, the feminine body has represented purity, a source of food and nourishment, and peace. A body that is pure is a body that is untouched and that does not seek touching. It does not move within the world, but retains and maintains it original state; thus, on this account, the feminine body is a body that is sedentary. In other words, it doesn’t move out in the world, but into itself, its pure state. The feminine body as a source of food and nourishment, while providing an important role within society, can also be seen as the weakening of the feminine body. When a woman is breast-feeding she gives of herself, i.e., her energy and her strength, to another. If she does not receive the proper nourishment, her strength will diminish. Even as a cook for others, she still expends her energy and strength for the nourishment of others. The feminine body as a symbol of peace also promotes a sedentary view of the feminine body in that she is not actively engaged with the world, but to maintain a peaceful state, or passive engagement. When I speak of peace here, I am not speaking of world peace or peace for the state, but peace for the home, peace for the village, etc. Peace, in this sense, is a state of maintaining and not necessarily a state of active engagement.
Merleau-Ponty provides the foundation for my discussion about feminine motility. This will serve as my interpretation of Merleau-Ponty and not necessarily a summary of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, particularly my interpretation on intelligibility.
For Merleau-Ponty, motility is inseparable from world; thus, an explanation of world according to Merleau-Ponty is needed. World for Merleau-Ponty is given, i.e., world exists prior to our entrance into it, and is what we enter into and are given upon conception. Merleau-Ponty says, “The world is there before any possible analysis of mine . . .” (CPR 81). World does not come about through a gradual realization of it, but is already there at the start. Perception, however, grants us different access to understanding world. Merleau-Ponty says, “. . . the world is what we perceive” (CPR 87). It allows us to focus on particular aspects, helping to organize and to come to a temporal understanding of world. World is temporal in that it is a moving understanding, i.e., as we age, we gain a different understanding of world; thus, knowledge of world constantly shifts and is temporal. However, perception will never allow us to fully grasp or possess world. Merleau-Ponty says, “I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible” (CPR 87). So, consciousness of world is brought about through perception of world, which brings with it temporal knowledge of world.
Later in the Phenomenology of Perception, particularly in the section “The Lived Body,” Merleau-Ponty discusses how our bodies are what inform us of world. In other words, our bodies are what give us the capability to perceive. It is the motility of the body which creates world. He says, “Consciousness is being towards the thing through the intermediary of the body” (The Body 154-55). So, bodies are vehicles of openness which experience/perceive the world. As bodies perceive, as they move within the world, they become conscious of world; thus, as consciousness develops, world develops. As infants our bodies are inexperienced within the world (motility isn’t fully developed), which may explain our general inability to remember life as an infant, but with time our bodies gain experience within the world, and, therefore, gain consciousness. Our bodies allow us to form a horizon of knowledge.
Intelligibility comes from knowledge of world, and, therefore motility. Merleau-Ponty says, “A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its ‘world’, and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it. . .” (Merleau-Ponty 155). Thus, when the body learns to move within the world in a particular way, that movement is incorporated into, and becomes a part of, world for that being. It is the culmination of world, at a given moment, that creates intelligibility. Fragments of knowledge do not constitute intelligibility; rather, intelligibility is a horizon of knowledge, or the accumulation of knowledge gained through motility (or the body moving toward things in the world). Merleau-Ponty says,
At each successive instant of movement, the preceding instant is not lost sight of. It is, as it were, dovetailed into the present, and present perception generally speaking consists in drawing together, on the basis of one’s present position, the succession of previous positions, which envelop each other (The Body 155).So, past movements, or past knowledge, are incorporated into the current perception of world. In other words, as being gains knowledge it doesn’t forget it; rather, it uses that knowledge to inform one’s physical movements in the present. This, again, means that knowledge is always in motion. As long as we are moving we are acquiring knowledge of world and re-inventing our intelligibility. So, for Merleau-Ponty, motility enables beings to acquire a horizon of knowledge, i.e., motility allows the development of intelligibility.
Iris Young writes an essay in response to Merleau-Ponty entitled, Throwing Like a Girl. While Young is sympathetic towards Merleau-Ponty’s work, she argues that feminine movement is different than masculine movement and uses Merleau-Ponty’s account of motility and intelligibility to show that while women have bodies that move towards the world their bodies are, at the same time, “laden with immanence.”
In section II of Throwing Like a Girl, Young argues that there are three modalities of feminine movement: ambiguous transcendence, inhibited intentionality, and discontinuous unity. She finds the source of these modalities in that woman’s experience of the body is both as a thing and as a capacity (Young 264). Young points out that in Merleau-Ponty’s work, he often speaks of the body as a transcendence to the world, an openness that connects being and world. She says, “The transcendence of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty describes is a transcendence that moves out from the body in its immanence in an open and unbroken directedness . . .” (Young 265). However, Young argues that, for women, there is another layer attached to this transcendence, which makes the experience quite different. She says, “While feminine bodily existence is a transcendence and openness to the world, it is an ambiguous transcendence, a transcendence that is at the same time laden with immanence” (Young 265). In other words, feminine movement doesn’t simply begin in immanence (i.e., in a child like state), but remains in immanence (Young 265). For example, girls (and boys for that matter) who have not been taught to throw will only use the part of the body that is directly related to the motion while the rest of the body remains “rooted in immanence” (Young 265). This immanence, she believes, can be extended to the majority of feminine movements. She argues that women are typically the ones who remain in this state of immanence, while the boys (who are not subject to “sexist oppression in contemporary society” and have been taught to throw) learn to put their whole bodies into the motion of throwing, allowing the body to competently complete the task. Feminine transcendence is ambiguous in that it both has the potential to move away from the body’s initial immanence, but at the same time it holds itself back from this “continuous calling forth of capacities” (i.e., from the continuous usage of its physical capacity).
Inhibited intentionality relates to what I have just sketched out, that of the restricted movement of the feminine body. Young finds that Merleau-Ponty’s account of “intentionality in motility” points towards an uninterrupted movement from aim to enactment. In other words, movement first starts with an aim and then ends in the enactment. Young argues that feminine intentionality is interrupted in that the enactment is believed by her to be problematic. Young says, “Feminine bodily existence is an inhibited intentionality, which simultaneously reaches toward a projected end with an ‘I can’ and withholds its full bodily commitment to that end in a self-imposed ‘I cannot’ (Young 265). In other words, the feminine body does not go towards a task with a confident “I can;” rather, it underestimates its real physical potential. For example, when stretching to reach a food item up high, it is a feminine style of movement not to reach to the individual’s full reaching capacity, or, if we go back to the throwing example, it is a feminine style of movement not to put the whole body into the throwing motion. So, the feminine intentionality is inhibited by a false belief in its motility. Thus, aim and enactment are problematic in this account of feminine motility.
Young goes on to argue that the unity of feminine movement is discontinuous. Discontinuous unity is the breaking up of movement from aim to enactment. She argues that on Merleau-Ponty’s account movement smoothly goes from aim to enactment in one continuous unified motion, but Young wants to say that feminine movement is discontinuous because the aim doesn’t always lead to competent enactment. In other words, women often know that they have the potential to perform an action, as they have seen others do it, but don’t believe they can competently perform the action themselves; thus, there is a discontinuity in their performance of the action. She says, “The part of the body that is transcending toward an aim is in relative disunity from those that remain immobile” (Young 266). So, in the example of the feminine throwing style, the arm is in disunity with the rest of the body, the person does not engage the whole body in the act of throwing but only one part. Thus, the aim is separated from the act, as the body inefficiently attempts to perform the action. Belief in one’s incompetence is what maintains this state of immanence and reinforces discontinuous unity.
Space is also an issue for Young. If women move differently within the world, their understanding and usage of space must be different as well. There are three modalities in regards to spatiality as well: enclosed space, double spatiality, and positioned space. As I have mentioned before, feminine movement tends to be small and limited and feminine bodily comportment tends to take up little space. While much space is available, the feminine body makes very little use of it. Young says, “The space, that is, that is physically available to the feminine body is frequently of greater radius than the space that she uses and inhabits” (Young 268). Young uses the example of women (typical women) catching a ball. She says most women tend to wait for the ball and then react to it when it comes near, rather than move towards the ball to catch it (Young 269). In this example, which can be extended to other types of movement, space is not utilized despite its presence. The problem here, Young will argue, is that there is a conflict between the “here” and “yonder.” In other words, the space that is “here” is tangible, but the space “yonder” is not to the feminine spatial eye. She says, “The space of the ‘yonder’ is a space in which feminine existence projects possibilities in the sense of understanding that ‘someone’ could move within it, but not I” (Young 268). She refers to this as double spatiality. Rooting the self in the ‘here’ positions the self in space. She says, “In its immanence and inhibition, feminine spatial existence is positioned by a system of coordinates that does not have its origin in her own intentional capacities” (Young 269). In other words, she feels fixed and unable to move. Another way of looking at this is to think of feminine motility as being “field-dependent.” In other words, her movement is rooted in the immediate space around her and does not extend beyond this position, although the potential exists. Young calls this positioned space.
For my argument I will accept Merleau-Ponty’s account of motility and intelligibility, as well as Young’s feminist account of Merleau-Ponty, but would like to focus attention on the difference in intelligibility between males and females due to the difference in motility. If intelligibility comes from motility (as Merleau-Ponty would have it) and if motility is inhibited for women (as Young would have it), then women’s intelligibility is also inhibited. In other words, I will argue that one’s mental capacity is shaped by one’s physical capacity, as it is one’s movement in the world that informs him or her of world.
Young presents a study that shows how spatial intelligibility is influenced by motility. She says, ". . . it has been claimed that males have a greater capacity for lifting a figure out of its spatial surroundings and viewing relations in space as fluid and interchangeable, where as females have a greater tendency to regard figures as embedded within and fixed by their surroundings" (Young 268).Young believes that the feminine tendency to embed figures in their surroundings is the result of feminine body spatiality, as I have mentioned before, that orients the body to a rooted place in relation to its surroundings. She says, “If feminine body spatiality is such that the woman experiences herself as rooted and enclosed, on the reversibility assumption it would follow that visual space for feminine existence also has its closures of immobility and fixity” (Young 269). In other words, knowledge of visual spatiality is gained through an understanding of body spatiality, like a chain of events. For example, if there exists a belief, even a subconscious belief, that the body is rooted, then there is a likely possibility that the person will move as if she were rooted. If this rooted experience is the sum of her experiences, then it is likely that her visual spatiality will be shaped similarly, as these are her only experiences in the world. This seems to be one of the few places where she directly ties intelligibility and motility together for purposes beyond explanation of her theory. I will take this idea and extend it to all aspects of her theory, showing how it may be applicable to women today.
Ambiguous transcendence plays a large part in the hindrance of feminine intelligibility. As mentioned before, ambiguous transcendence is the simultaneous moving away from immanence and holding oneself back from “the continuous calling forth of capacities.” If feminine movement is ambiguous, if it lacks direction, then the experience of ambiguous direction can be extended to the mental processes. Our bodies place us in positions that expose us to different types of knowledge. If the body lacks a direction and focus, then the body, as a whole, will acquire knowledge that is ambiguous. In other words, in this situation, the body will acquire knowledge that is fragmented or pulled apart. For example, a person may understand her physical potentiality, but doubts her ability to achieve it (either consciously or unconsciously). The fact that her body experiences this conflicted, ambiguous sensation leaves her to acquire a conflicted and ambiguous intelligibility, since intelligibility is gained from experienced motility according to Merleau-Ponty. Thus, feminine intelligibility is fragmented if feminine transcendence remains in a state of immanence.
In terms of inhibited intentionality, intelligibility is hindered in that if the body is immanent in its moving out into the world, i.e., if the body reaches out, but does not reach to its full potential in a fluid motion, then feminine intelligibility will develop in a similar fashion. In other words, if one is seeking knowledge but is hesitant that she will be capable of obtaining this knowledge, then the motion from the aim to the acquisition becomes problematic. She will remain immanent in her aim and will not fully reach toward her goal, just as her body remains immanent in the action of throwing. This may be a contributing reason why women score lower on the mathematical portion of standardized tests, as women are often told they are not as equally competent as males in mathematics, just as they are told they are not as equally competent as males in athletics. If they believe this to be true, then when (or if) they do aim at gaining mathematical knowledge, they may doubt their ability to do so, especially if their previous bodily experiences is an experience of incompetence; thus, inhibiting their intention to acquire mathematical knowledge. In this case, the aim is made problematic by self doubt. So, our bodily experiences provide us with information about our capabilities that informs our belief in our mental capacities, with the result being that women perform differently than men in mathematics and other areas of study.
Effort put toward acquiring knowledge is also discontinuous for many women. Just as the connection between aim and acquisition is unfocused and problematic, it is also discontinuous. In other words, the motion from aim to acquisition is broken. As mentioned before in the throwing example, feminine bodily experience is often discontinuous, with the arm being severed from the body in its motion, i.e., the whole body is not put into the motion of the ball. This type of body movement provides the ground work for our intelligibility, as our movement within the world informs our intelligibility. Thus, when women go to learn a new concept or idea, they run the risk of not putting their whole effort into the learning process, as a result of the problems above: ambiguous transcendence and inhibited intentionality. Evidence of this can be seen, again, in the mathematics where women may feel inhibited, which ultimately leaves the directed motion of learning broken and discontinuous. Thus, lack of physical confidence (freedom to move within the world) hinders mental confidence and development.
Evidence of gaining intelligibility from the body can be seen in many East Asian philosophies and in the martial arts. In Confucianism, Li is a way of molding and shaping the body to create an ethical being. Hahm Chaibong writes an essay entitled, Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucaultian Interpretation, where he discusses how intelligibility is gained from li. Also, Joe Hyams’ book entitled, Zen in the Martial Arts, shows an example of how intelligibility in gained from the practice of the martial arts. Although Zen in the Martial Arts is not scholarly writing, Hyams is a long standing practitioner of the martial arts, who has studied more than the physical element of the martial art, but also the spiritual. I will use both of these writers in my examples.
According to Chaibong, in Confucianism there is no distinction between mind and body; rather, the mind and body are one, in a way that mind and body cannot be distinguished. Chaibong says,"Confucianism does not accept the soul-body, res cogitans-res extensa dichotomy so dear to Western thought . . . It would be misleading, therefore, to say that Confucianism ‘prioritizes’ the body over the soul, res extensa over res cogitans. One would have to go further and say that for Confucianism, body is all there is" (Chaibong 316).In other words, the body is an opening to the world through which intelligibility is gained and through which character is made visible. Mind is not considered something that is in accord with body, or that one can point to in any way. To say that mind and body work together is to distinguish between the two. Body is all there is. Thus, intelligibility for the Confucian does not come from the brain or mind alone, but comes from the body.
Within Confucianism is the concept of li, which can be described as a ritual way of movement, used to develop the ethical self, and, from which, I will argue, intelligibility arises. Chaibong explains li as, “. . . a matter of cultivating, training, and disciplining one’s body so that it will always practice and manifest truth, virtue, and sincerity” (Chaibong 318). In other words, ritual activity trains the body to act appropriately and from this ritual, morality arises. Chaibong says, “Li is a codification of what is considered “proper” behavior far all social contexts in which one finds oneself” (Chaibong 317). So, li can be extended to all activities of life, including menial tasks, as well as intense training in the martial arts. If these ritual movements are practiced and accepted fully by the practitioner, then the person will come to understand morality, putting the practitioner in harmony with the people and world around him or her. In other words, knowledge is gained through the ritual movements leading to a cultivated intelligibility. So, for Confucians, li, or ritual movement, provides a way of showing how physical movement leads to the development of intelligibility, which, in this case, would be considered a moral intelligibility. The example of li corresponds with my previous argument that women’s inhibited intentionality, in regards to bodily movement, can lead to inhibited intelligibility.
The martial arts could be considered a way of practicing li; thus, the martial arts could be a way of showing how movement of the body informs intelligibility. For instance, to perform many of the moves in the martial arts, more than just physical strength is needed. In other words, while learning to perform a move there’s a shift in perspective that occurs; this allows one to perform moves otherwise thought impossible. This shift in perspective isn’t necessarily body centered, but is a perspective that can be adapted to all aspects of life. For instance, when learning complicated moves in the martial arts, or moves that are physically strenuous, one must learn to focus on the moment and push away all other thoughts. Until this is done, the movement cannot be executed. The ability to comprehend this idea also does not allow one to execute the movement; rather, it is through the actual physical practice of mastering it that knowledge is gained. Many martial artists claim that the ability to focus while doing physical activities finds its way into their everyday lives. Hyam speaks of this in his book, when he tells the story of a day at his dojo where he was squeezing practice in between two work appointments and felt very distracted. He was performing very poorly and his instructor knew exactly what was wrong and told Hyam, “As long as what you are doing at the moment is exactly what you are doing at that moment and nothing else, you are one with yourself and with what you are doing—and that is Zen . . .” (Hyam 20). After this class, Hyam noticed that he felt anxious and distracted while doing many activities in his life and tried to apply the same focused technique he usually does in his martial art practice to his daily activities, and he did so with success. Thus, he learned this focus through the physical discipline/ritual of the martial arts. So, the practice of martial arts can be considered similar to li and can be used as an example in showing that intelligibility is gained from the body. At the same time, this example can be used to show that women’s inhibited intentionality results in limited intelligibility, in that the physical body is not engaging in activities that will encourage its development.
In this paper I have shown that motility leads to intelligibility. With Merleau-Ponty providing the foundation for my argument and Young extending Merleau-Ponty’s theory to take gender into account, I have shown that women’s intentionality has been historically inhibited and that this inhibition has lead to a limited intelligibility. Through examples of li and the martial arts, I have also shown how this primarily philosophical and abstract method of thinking about intelligibility and the body is applicable to real phenomenological experiences. This paper is significant to me and to philosophy in that it attempts to explicate the reason why women may think differently than men in a way that goes beyond a mere biological or environmental explanation, showing how environment and biology are inter-related and are, in many ways, inseparable.
Works Cited
Aristotle. “On the Generation of Animals.” Philosophy of Woman. Ed. Mahowald, Mary
Briody. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978.
Chaibong, Hahm. “Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucaultian Interpretation.” Philosophy East and West. Vol.51, No.3, Eight East-West Philosophers’ Conference. (Jul., 2001), pp. 315-324.
Hyams, Joe. Zen in the Martial Arts. New York: Bantam Books, 1979.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Phenomenology of Perception.” The Continental Philosophy Reader (CPR). Eds. Richard Kearney and Mara Rainwater. New York: Routledge, 1996.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Phenomenology of Perception.” The Body. Meldon, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1999
Plato. “Republic.” Philosophy of Woman. Ed. Mahowald, Mary Briody. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Emile of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Trans. William Boyd. New York: Teachers College Press, 1956.
Young, Iris. “Throwing Like a Girl.” Body and Flesh: A Philosophical Reader. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
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