Responses to Adolph Eichmann

Primo Levi, in his book The Drowned and The Saved, presents his readers with the “gray zone” in an attempt to explain how a desire for power blurs the distinction between “good” and “bad.” Hannah Arendt, in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem, presents the trial of Adolph Eichmann, and explores the banal life he led. I will argue that Eichmann’s banality puts him into Levi’s gray zone, that Levi would want Eichmann persecuted to the fullest extent after an attempt was made to understand Eichmann, that Arendt would also agree that Eichmann should be persecuted to the fullest extent, but would not require one to understand Eichmann, and I will conclude that Levi’s response to Eichmann seems most appropriate to the victim.
Arendt presents the life of Adolph Eichmann as rather banal, and makes the point of arguing that Eichmann should be persecuted for his actions rather than his psychological intent, or motivation. Arendt points out that Eichmann’s banality seems to come from his lack of autonomy. She says, “The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else” (Arendt 49). She also points out that he often used “stock phrases” and “self-invented clichés” when he explained events to the court (Arendt 49), which provides more evidence for his inability to think. She mentions that Eichmann never seemed to do anything unless it was suggested to him. For example, when he was sick of his job as a sales man for his father’s company he did not quit, rather he suffered through it until he was offered to join the S.S. (Arendt 31). Arendt explains, “Kaltenbrunner had said to him: Why not join the S.S.? And he had replied, Why not? That was how it had happened, and that was about all there was to it” (Arendt 33) Eichmann was also a horrible student (Arendt 29), which may further the assumption that Eichmann lacked the ability to think. So, Eichmann appears to be influenced by others and lacks autonomy, which is evidence of a banal character.
Arendt, however, does not accept Eichmann’s banal, thoughtless existence as a reason to excuse Eichmann of his actions; rather, she has a problem with how the courts examine Eichmann. The court’s initial reaction was to prosecute Eichmann for his psychological intent, or motivation, for attempting to destroy the Jewish people (Arendt 277). However, Arendt believes one should focus on the history of events and the reactions of others when examining Eichmann. She explains,
“And just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations—as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not inhabit the world—we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang” (Arendt 277).
She states at the end of this quote that his actions against humanity are the only reasons Eichmann should be hanged, which shows that she wanted to move away from the court’s pervious interest in his psychological intent or motivation.
Levi would agree with Arendt that Eichmann should be held accountable for the slaughter of millions of Jews, but would disagree with her displeasure in psychologically evaluating Eichmann. I do not think he is saying that Eichmann’s fate should have been based upon his psychological intentions, but rather that an attempt should have been made to understand Eichmann. In a chapter titled "The Gray Zone", Levi reveals the psychological motivation of those inside the gray zone, and the inability for one to distinguish between the “good” and the “bad” (Levi 42). Levi sees morality within the nazi concentration camps as muddled and not easily delineated into categories of “right” and “wrong.” I believe he would extend this idea to Eichmann, and would push the court to understand how his morality has shifted. Levi says,
“The oppressor remains what he is, and so does the victim. They are not interchangeable. The former is to be punished and execrated (but, if possible, understood), the latter is to be pitied and helped; but both, faced by the indecency of the irrevocable act, need refuge and protection, and instinctively search for them” (Levi 25).
Levi understands that Eichmann’s morality has been twisted similarly to those inside of the gray zone, but should still be held accountable for his actions. Levi wants people to understand the process of confusion and fear that has lead to situations like the holocaust in case this situation occurs again.
A more detailed explanation of Levi’s gray zone is needed in order to understand why Levi would consider Eichmann a part of these gray zones. Levi provides a loose definition of what he considers a gray zone. He states, “It is a gray zone poorly defined, where the two camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge. This gray zone possesses an incredibly complicated internal structure and contains within itself enough to confuse our need to judge” (Levi 42). To begin, a gray zone cannot exist if those “masters” that Levi speaks of had not stripped the “servants,” or prisoners, of their power (Levi 39). The masters, who were inside of the grey zone, wanted power over the prisoners to obtain their goals. The servants wanted power, or privilege, in order to survive. In other words, “masters” chose, and perpetuated the gray zone, whereas prisoners were forced inside (Levi 42). In the case of the prisoners, the desire for power was a life or death issue, and the prisoner would do, “whatever it took to lift oneself above the norm” (Levi 41). One may have stolen bread from another when he knows that is wrong, for it would cause the death of another, but he, himself, would die otherwise (Levi 41). Morality within the gray zone was muddled and confused.
I have concluded from Levi’s chapter on Gray Zones that the “masters” are responsible for shaping the gray zone, are a part of the gray zone, but enter it differently. Eichmann would be considered a “master” of the gray zone since he held power over prisoners. The “masters” within the gray zone, as mentioned before, desired power for their own purposes, be it to secure their job in the S.S. (as Eichmann did), or for their own personal goals. This desire created the gray zone. The “masters” took away the power of the prisoners, which caused the prisoners to change their moral values in order to survive. “Masters” chose their position, due to limited circumstances in their lives, whether it was by free choice or by coercion, and were not forced into the gray zone as prisoners were. Levi says, “The pressure that a modern totalitarian state can exercise over the individual is frightful . . . Nevertheless, it is not permissible to admit that this pressure is irresistible, especially in the brief twelve-year term of the Third Reich” (Levi 29). The moralities of the “masters” within the gray zone were also muddled and confused similarly to the prisoners. Levi presents an example and explains,
“Now, this man Muhsfeld was not a compassionate person; his daily ration of slaughter was studded with arbitrary and capricious acts, marked by his inventions of refined cruelty . . . Had he lived in a different environment and epoch, he probably would have behaved like any other common man” (Levi 57).
So, the “masters” who created and became apart of the gray zone entered freely, where as the prisoners were forced inside the gray zone, acting out of necessity. Levi does not say this explicitly, however, I see the muddled nature of these “masters” as part of the confusion within that perpetuates the gray zone. To state it simply, the gray zone is a situation where the desire for power challenges one’s morality.
I believe, under Levi’s notion of the gray zone that Eichmann was a “master” coerced into, and muddled by the gray zone, and that Eichmann’s psychology is important to understand as similar events may occur again. As I have mentioned before, Eichmann did poorly in school, and lacked direction (Arendt 29). The SS was a viable option for someone struggling to create his or her own identity, and relied on people without a strong sense of self who they could easily manipulate (Prof. Norlock, Feb. 14, 2005). Arendt also shows that Eichmann was friendly with Jewish people, which encourages one to think that Eichmann was seduced into this situation. There seems to be no other way to explain how a person can be friends with Jewish people and then order the extermination of them, except through seduction. Although I understand the importance of zeroing in on the fact that Eichmann did perpetuate the slaughter of Jewish people, I do not agree with Arendt that his actions are the main issue of importance. If the courts believed that an evil person was needed to inflict evil upon others, I think it would be even more necessary to evaluate an instance where only a banal personality was needed to inflict evil upon others. With this said, I do not agree that Eichmann should have been hanged. Rather he should have been punished to the fullest extent, with life intact, and evaluated for the purposes of understanding the moral confusion that takes place under the influence of power.
Eichmann’s banal personality confuses one’s ability to understand evil as a result of banality, when one is typically inclined to understand evil as the result of evil. Levi’s gray zone is an explanation of this process, which induces confusion, and which has created Eichmann, the banal individual who has committed atrocious acts against humanity, and who has confused us ever sense.