Letter to Seneca
Revised Version
Dear Seneca,
I have recently taken great interest in reading your letters to your dear friend Lucilius. While I am sympathetic to your philosophy, others find your philosophy devoid of emotion. You would probably agree that your philosophy requires one to “conquer” emotion, but I would argue that you leave the door open to emotion. In other words, there are instances where you argue from a very Stoic perspective and other instances where you are for emotion in a more Peripatetic manner. I will begin by defining your conception of reason in regards to friendship and death, and then by showing how reason is involved in the conception of friendship and death. I will then show evidence of how emotion is integral to your philosophy.
Reason is a tool in the pursuit of knowledge, as well as a tool for taming the emotions. For you, Seneca, the pursuit of knowledge is what will lead one to a happy life (63). You say in your letter to Lucilius, “It is clear to you, I know, Luicilius, that no one can lead a happy life, or even one that is bearable, without the pursuit of wisdom, and that the perfection of wisdom is what makes the happy life . . .” (63). Reason, I have gathered from reading many of your letters and from understanding the role of reason in stoicism, is what allows the pursuit of wisdom. Reason is what sets humans apart from animals, and is one’s tool to overcome the suffering inherent to the human condition (15). In other words, reason is what allows a person to push away the emotions that typically correspond with pain and suffering, and instead, to focus on the pursuit of wisdom. For example, if one is used to having a luxurious bed to sleep in every night, and then is denied this bed, then he or she would feel an emotional loss, which causes suffering. If I am correct, Seneca, you would say that the use of reason could have prevented this suffering, if the person had only kept reason in sight. In other words, if one used her reason to prepare for the loss, one could have avoided the forming of emotions that lead to suffering. Thus, emotions that lead to suffering can be tamed by the use of reason, inorder to continue in the pursuit of wisdom. So, reason is the tool used to overcome emotions, which distract from the pursuit of wisdom, and is the tool that allows one to pursue wisdom.
Now that I have shown an understanding of your concept of reason in relation to emotions, I would like to begin a discussion of how reason, or the pursuit of wisdom (which includes reason), is involved in the making of friends and death. Friendship, to you, Seneca, is of great importance. You say to Lucilius in one of your letters, “Think for a long time whether or not you should admit a given person to your friendship. But when you have decided to do so, welcome him heart and soul, and speak as unreservedly with him as you would with yourself” (35). In other words, when deciding to be friends with someone, one should use his or her reason to determine the character of a person before letting this person into his or her world. Using reason in this way allows the subject to estimate the amount of suffering that could potentially occur if he or she were to adopt the non-subject as a friend; Thus, avoiding an emotional response that would interfere with the pursuit of wisdom. Thus, reason, in friendship, is used to determine the character of a friend and to suppress the emotions involved with the death of friend. Both uses of reason prevent future suffering and encourage the pursuit of wisdom.
Although, the above definition of friendship seems pretty clear, your discussion of the necessity of friendship is a bit unclear. You require the subject to be self-sufficient in that these friends are not required to make the subject happy; thus, the death of a friend should not sadden a person, as other significant relationships can be created (51). In other words, the subject should be content with her or his self, regardless of the gain or loss of a friend. However, you go on to say that the nature of human beings is to be with company (52). You say, “He is self-content and yet he would refuse to live if he had to live without any human company at all. Natural promptings (not thoughts of any advantage to himself) impel him towards friendship” (52). What you have written, Seneca, sounds a bit contradictory, but I think I understand what you mean. In other words, the desire for friendship is an instinctual desire and separate from reason. Thus, friendship is not ideal, as a person should be content without it, but is permitted based on instinctual desire. I think you would also agree that friendship can be permitted as it can bring benefit in the pursuit of wisdom, but is undesired as it has the potential to deter one from this pursuit, i.e., the death of a friend can cause emotional stirrings which deter from the pursuit. Therefore, one should be self-content upon the death of friend or without the company of friends, but is permitted to desire friendship, as the desire is instinctual and potentially beneficial.
Although at times you present your conception of friendship as being rationally based, at other times you present it as being emotionally based. For instance, in one of your letters you compare friendship to a romantic relationship. You say, “There can be no doubt that the desire lovers have for each other is not so very different form friendship . . .” (50). To further my point, you also state that friendship should not be for some kind of financial or pointed gain; rather, a friend is, “To have someone to be able to die for, someone I may follow into exile, someone for whose life I may put myself up as security and pay the price as well” (50). To say that the desire to die for another is not deeply passionate and emotionally based is quite absurd. I am not entirely clear as to how one can desire to die for another if he or she is not emotionally connected. I’m sure you would say that this is an instinctual desire, but I would be hesitant to write this off as being separate from emotion. Based upon the examples above, you also seem to incorporate emotion into the idea of friendship, which seems contradictory to the rational conception of friendship that I presented earlier.
Although you appear to advocate a very stoic and emotionless philosophy, you have not closed the gate to emotions entirely, although that is probably what you wanted. In a letter to Lucilius you say, “When one has lost a friend one’s eyes should be neither dry nor streaming. Tears, yes, there should be, but not lamentation . . . In our tears we are trying to find means of proving that we feel the loss. We are not being governed by our grief but parading it” (114). In other words, it appears that you are encouraging us to feel the pain, but instead of lingering on this sorrowful moment, one should learn from this emotional experience: emotion as a pedagogical tool. That is why you say we should be “governed by our grief.” To further my point, you also say, “Our wise man [the eclectic wise man] feels his troubles but overcomes them, while their wise man [the Epicurean wise man] does not even feel them” (48). In other words, you state that the distinction between Epicurean philosophy and your Eclectic philosophy is that, the Eclectic philosophy allows emotion, but has the power, or control, over it. Thus, it appears you are arguing that emotions are beneficial in some respects, but are negative if left unchecked, which goes against the traditional Stoic philosophy and falls in line with the Peripatetics.
As I mentioned before, it is easy for one to say that you are writing from a stoic postion; however, I would disagree, based upon your letters, and would say that your account of emotions is in line with the Peripatetics. The Peripatetics, according to C.E Manning, believed that emotions were, “a necessary part of his being, and though intended to be subordinate to man’s reason, they were nevertheless capable of giving him help. The work of reason therefore can be compared to that of the vine-dresser, whose task it is to lop off the wild growth . . .” (Manning 71). So, the Peripatetics find emotions as useful and necessary. Thus, when you say that we should cry, but not allow this crying into excess (114), you are following a Peripatetic view. Even if you were to say that ideally, one should be devoid of emotion (Prof. Taber, Nov. 29, 2005), this would be going against your later remark that your Eclectic philosophy is distinguished from the Epicureans’ in terms of the experience of emotion, and would be in the Peripatetics.
Thus, your philosophy, Seneca, is not as devoid of emotion as some might believe. Your understanding of emotion is neither entirely Stoic, nor entirely Peripatetic. Perhaps that is why you call this an Eclectic school of thought. However, this leads me to think that some of your thoughts are contradictory. I am eager to hear a clear and concise response to my letter in regards to the role of emotions in your account of friendship and death.
Sincerely,
Karen Jarboe
Works Cited
Campbell, Robin. Letters from a Stoic. England: Penguin Classics, 1969.
Manning, C.E. The Consolatory Tradition and Seneca’s Attitude to the Emotions. Greece
& Rome. 2nd Ser., Vol.21, No.1 (Apr., 1974), 71-81.
Dear Seneca,
I have recently taken great interest in reading your letters to your dear friend Lucilius. While I am sympathetic to your philosophy, others find your philosophy devoid of emotion. You would probably agree that your philosophy requires one to “conquer” emotion, but I would argue that you leave the door open to emotion. In other words, there are instances where you argue from a very Stoic perspective and other instances where you are for emotion in a more Peripatetic manner. I will begin by defining your conception of reason in regards to friendship and death, and then by showing how reason is involved in the conception of friendship and death. I will then show evidence of how emotion is integral to your philosophy.
Reason is a tool in the pursuit of knowledge, as well as a tool for taming the emotions. For you, Seneca, the pursuit of knowledge is what will lead one to a happy life (63). You say in your letter to Lucilius, “It is clear to you, I know, Luicilius, that no one can lead a happy life, or even one that is bearable, without the pursuit of wisdom, and that the perfection of wisdom is what makes the happy life . . .” (63). Reason, I have gathered from reading many of your letters and from understanding the role of reason in stoicism, is what allows the pursuit of wisdom. Reason is what sets humans apart from animals, and is one’s tool to overcome the suffering inherent to the human condition (15). In other words, reason is what allows a person to push away the emotions that typically correspond with pain and suffering, and instead, to focus on the pursuit of wisdom. For example, if one is used to having a luxurious bed to sleep in every night, and then is denied this bed, then he or she would feel an emotional loss, which causes suffering. If I am correct, Seneca, you would say that the use of reason could have prevented this suffering, if the person had only kept reason in sight. In other words, if one used her reason to prepare for the loss, one could have avoided the forming of emotions that lead to suffering. Thus, emotions that lead to suffering can be tamed by the use of reason, inorder to continue in the pursuit of wisdom. So, reason is the tool used to overcome emotions, which distract from the pursuit of wisdom, and is the tool that allows one to pursue wisdom.
Now that I have shown an understanding of your concept of reason in relation to emotions, I would like to begin a discussion of how reason, or the pursuit of wisdom (which includes reason), is involved in the making of friends and death. Friendship, to you, Seneca, is of great importance. You say to Lucilius in one of your letters, “Think for a long time whether or not you should admit a given person to your friendship. But when you have decided to do so, welcome him heart and soul, and speak as unreservedly with him as you would with yourself” (35). In other words, when deciding to be friends with someone, one should use his or her reason to determine the character of a person before letting this person into his or her world. Using reason in this way allows the subject to estimate the amount of suffering that could potentially occur if he or she were to adopt the non-subject as a friend; Thus, avoiding an emotional response that would interfere with the pursuit of wisdom. Thus, reason, in friendship, is used to determine the character of a friend and to suppress the emotions involved with the death of friend. Both uses of reason prevent future suffering and encourage the pursuit of wisdom.
Although, the above definition of friendship seems pretty clear, your discussion of the necessity of friendship is a bit unclear. You require the subject to be self-sufficient in that these friends are not required to make the subject happy; thus, the death of a friend should not sadden a person, as other significant relationships can be created (51). In other words, the subject should be content with her or his self, regardless of the gain or loss of a friend. However, you go on to say that the nature of human beings is to be with company (52). You say, “He is self-content and yet he would refuse to live if he had to live without any human company at all. Natural promptings (not thoughts of any advantage to himself) impel him towards friendship” (52). What you have written, Seneca, sounds a bit contradictory, but I think I understand what you mean. In other words, the desire for friendship is an instinctual desire and separate from reason. Thus, friendship is not ideal, as a person should be content without it, but is permitted based on instinctual desire. I think you would also agree that friendship can be permitted as it can bring benefit in the pursuit of wisdom, but is undesired as it has the potential to deter one from this pursuit, i.e., the death of a friend can cause emotional stirrings which deter from the pursuit. Therefore, one should be self-content upon the death of friend or without the company of friends, but is permitted to desire friendship, as the desire is instinctual and potentially beneficial.
Although at times you present your conception of friendship as being rationally based, at other times you present it as being emotionally based. For instance, in one of your letters you compare friendship to a romantic relationship. You say, “There can be no doubt that the desire lovers have for each other is not so very different form friendship . . .” (50). To further my point, you also state that friendship should not be for some kind of financial or pointed gain; rather, a friend is, “To have someone to be able to die for, someone I may follow into exile, someone for whose life I may put myself up as security and pay the price as well” (50). To say that the desire to die for another is not deeply passionate and emotionally based is quite absurd. I am not entirely clear as to how one can desire to die for another if he or she is not emotionally connected. I’m sure you would say that this is an instinctual desire, but I would be hesitant to write this off as being separate from emotion. Based upon the examples above, you also seem to incorporate emotion into the idea of friendship, which seems contradictory to the rational conception of friendship that I presented earlier.
Although you appear to advocate a very stoic and emotionless philosophy, you have not closed the gate to emotions entirely, although that is probably what you wanted. In a letter to Lucilius you say, “When one has lost a friend one’s eyes should be neither dry nor streaming. Tears, yes, there should be, but not lamentation . . . In our tears we are trying to find means of proving that we feel the loss. We are not being governed by our grief but parading it” (114). In other words, it appears that you are encouraging us to feel the pain, but instead of lingering on this sorrowful moment, one should learn from this emotional experience: emotion as a pedagogical tool. That is why you say we should be “governed by our grief.” To further my point, you also say, “Our wise man [the eclectic wise man] feels his troubles but overcomes them, while their wise man [the Epicurean wise man] does not even feel them” (48). In other words, you state that the distinction between Epicurean philosophy and your Eclectic philosophy is that, the Eclectic philosophy allows emotion, but has the power, or control, over it. Thus, it appears you are arguing that emotions are beneficial in some respects, but are negative if left unchecked, which goes against the traditional Stoic philosophy and falls in line with the Peripatetics.
As I mentioned before, it is easy for one to say that you are writing from a stoic postion; however, I would disagree, based upon your letters, and would say that your account of emotions is in line with the Peripatetics. The Peripatetics, according to C.E Manning, believed that emotions were, “a necessary part of his being, and though intended to be subordinate to man’s reason, they were nevertheless capable of giving him help. The work of reason therefore can be compared to that of the vine-dresser, whose task it is to lop off the wild growth . . .” (Manning 71). So, the Peripatetics find emotions as useful and necessary. Thus, when you say that we should cry, but not allow this crying into excess (114), you are following a Peripatetic view. Even if you were to say that ideally, one should be devoid of emotion (Prof. Taber, Nov. 29, 2005), this would be going against your later remark that your Eclectic philosophy is distinguished from the Epicureans’ in terms of the experience of emotion, and would be in the Peripatetics.
Thus, your philosophy, Seneca, is not as devoid of emotion as some might believe. Your understanding of emotion is neither entirely Stoic, nor entirely Peripatetic. Perhaps that is why you call this an Eclectic school of thought. However, this leads me to think that some of your thoughts are contradictory. I am eager to hear a clear and concise response to my letter in regards to the role of emotions in your account of friendship and death.
Sincerely,
Karen Jarboe
Works Cited
Campbell, Robin. Letters from a Stoic. England: Penguin Classics, 1969.
Manning, C.E. The Consolatory Tradition and Seneca’s Attitude to the Emotions. Greece
& Rome. 2nd Ser., Vol.21, No.1 (Apr., 1974), 71-81.
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