Humean Argument for the Socialization of Gendered Constructs
I will argue that David Hume’s “Belief Theory” can be extended to show that habit and reflection form gendered constructs; thus, allowing for the flexibility of gendered constructs. Although many feminists disagree with using members of the philosophical cannon to support feminist theory, I would like to show that Hume’s theory could be extended to support feminist theory. In this essay I will show why feminists may agree with Hume’s “Belief Theory” and present Anette Baier and Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, two feminist writers who seem to favor my position. I will also suggest that concepts of gender can be manipulated by society and the individual for better or worse and explain why this flexibility is positive.
Annette Baier, president of the American philosophical association and professor at the University of Pittsburgh, explains the unsettled feelings feminists have for those in support of canonical works. She says in defense of one of her writings, “Many will dismiss my fondness for Hume’s writings as a sure indicator of my failure to transcend my philosophical upbringing in a patriarchal tradition” (Baier 20). Baier appears to be speaking of Mary Daly, a radical feminist, who believes women who adapt or take part in male traditions are tokens of the patriarchy, and only perpetuate it (Daly 335). Genevieve Lloyd, a professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales, also expresses discomfort with the canon when she acknowledges philosophy as a male tradition. She says, in her book The Man of Reason,"But there is one thing they [philosophers] have had in common throughout the history of the activity [philosophy]: They have been predominantly male; and the absence of women from the philosophical tradition has meant that the conceptualization of Reason has been done exclusively by men. It is not surprising that the results should reflect their sense of Philosophy as a male activity" (Lloyd 228-29). Such discomfort with the philosophical cannon has led some feminists to give up on “Reason” and philosophy all together (Lloyd 227). However, I have found that there are philosophers (in this case David Hume) whose ideas are applicable to feminist theory, despite the author’s original intent, and whose ideas may actually satisfy those who are avidly against canonical philosophers.
Hume’s philosophy seems to resemble the feeling and intuitive nature typically associated with femininity, which may be agreeable with certain feminist philosophers. Nel Noddings, who is known for her ethic of care, would probably be receptive to Hume’s use of feeling and sentience. Noddings supports an ethic that is based on caring relationships, rather than universal moral principles, and uses similar language to Hume. She says, “Women can and do give reasons for their acts, but the reasons often point to feelings, needs, impressions, and a sense of personal ideal rather than to universal principles and their application” (Noddings 3). Lloyd, who I’ve mentioned before, also sympathizes with Hume even though she believes he is ultimately “male-identified.” She believes Hume has reconstructed “Reason” to include intellect, emotion, and imagination, which she terms as the “wholeness of the mind” (Hume on the Passion for Truth 41). In The Man of Reason she argues that many philosophers disregard the senses and emotions, which are typically associated with femininity and are considered separate from Reason (The Man of Reason 227). Thus, she believes Hume’s conception of Reason to be more complete, as it includes a full bodily experience, and shifts the focus away from the common male conception of Reason. Sentience is ultimately what allows Hume to be “feminist-friendly,” and is the basis for my interpretation of Hume.
I will use Hume’s philosophy because it avoids using the common philosophical concept of Reason to explain knowledge, and closely resembles the theory of social construction. For Hume, knowledge is acquired through feeling and sentience, which is friendly to women partaking in the pursuit of knowledge, since women, within philosophy, have traditionally been associated with feelings and not with intellect or reasoning. I also believe Hume’s conception of knowledge relates to social construction in that it is dependent on habitual observation and interaction within a group. Gender is socially constructed in that humans observe how they are supposed to act, based on their sex, within a group of people and are also treated as if they were boys or as if they were girls from the perspective of that particular society. So, social construction is similar to Hume’s conception of knowledge, as habitual observation and interaction with a group are requirements for knowledge. I accept Hume as a basis for my feminist interpretation based on the above.
I will begin my interpretation of Hume by explaining his “Belief Theory,” which I will later show explains the socialization of gendered characteristics. In his book, titled An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume examines causation from a skeptic’s point of view. Previous philosophers (or pre-Humean philosophers) have attempted to explain the connection between cause and effect in terms of force or power. By using terms such as force or power, philosophers must attempt to explain what constitutes force or power. Hume rejects this argument with his “Belief Theory.” His theory begins with an examination of understanding. Hume sees the world in terms of experience, allowing the senses to inform his or her knowledge of the world. Therefore, if one cannot see, feel, or experience force, one cannot explain force (I 514), and the only possible way to make sense of cause and effect is to believe that the effect comes from the cause and vice versa (I 509). Hume uses this example to explain his position,"The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward sense. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects. Consequently, there is not, in any single particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection" (I 515). Hume explains that in order for one to believe in a connection between a cause and an effect, one must first have observed this cause producing this effect (I 507). In other words, a first step to learning about gravity would require a physical observation of an object falling to the ground. Once I have observed this a number of times, as well as observing similar objects falling, I begin to believe that this will happen in the future. Hume explains belief as a felling. In other words, when one believes that the cause will the lead to the effect, he or she feels that the cause will lead to the effect. One then habitually expects the observed cause to produce the observed effect. In short, Hume’s belief theory requires habitual experience of a cause and effect before one can believe that the cause leads to the effect.
If knowledge is based on the belief that a cause is followed by an effect, then our knowledge about gender roles could be created in the same way. There are several ways of explaining this. First, if one observes, for instance, women caring for children a majority of the time, and very rarely observes men doing this task, then one may assume (or believe) that women should care for children. In other words, if one habitually links the gender of a group to the task the group tends to perform, then one may become accustomed to, and believe in, the idea that women are the caretakers. Hume says, “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past” (I 508). One may also reaffirm his or her observations by reflecting upon the actions that he or she performs. For instance, if a boy was made to chop wood for the family and was not encouraged to cook, he would be better at chopping wood, than cooking for the family. Then, upon observing others, he noticed that other boys in the community were good at chopping wood, while the girls were not as good. From this observation he can easily assume that boys are better at chopping wood than girls, as he too knows he is better at chopping wood. The confidence in his ability to chop wood reinforces the observed belief that boys are better at chopping wood. Thus, by habitually being exposed to a group of women who act one way, or men another, certain gendered notions are created by the observer, and perhaps reinforced when reflecting upon his or her individual activities.
Habitually observing certain gender distinctions can confuse the origin of that gender distinction. The problem here is the observer does not know why the cause leads to the effect, rather he only knows that the observed phenomenon takes place. Hume says, “We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another, without instructing us in the secret connection which binds them together . . .” (I 516). In other words, the boy mentioned above does not know if boys are better at chopping wood than girls due to biological reasons, or if it is because the girls were never taught to chop wood, or for some other reason. All the observer knows is that the correlation exists. However, if we were basing our knowledge on habit, it would make sense that the boy is better at chopping wood because he has experience and has habitually practiced chopping wood. His muscles have had a chance to develop in order to perform the task, as well as his aim and technique. Therefore, when the unpracticed girl performs the task, she fails and looks awkward, which reaffirms the boy’s notion that girls are not as good at chopping wood. Thus, I am skeptical of anyone who claims men and women are biologically different (I am excluding reproductive differences here), as there is no clear distinction between what has been habitually learned and what is an actual biological difference.
Lawrence H. Summers, president of Harvard University, made comments at a conference on diversifying the science and engineering workforce, which shows how easily the origin of gender distinctions can be confused. Summers’ speech attempted to address the diversity policies at Harvard University. He contributed the lack of women in the science and engineering fields to familial choices and a lower aptitude in standardized tests (Summers). Although he never directly stated that women are biologically inferior to men in math and science, he does do a lot of work debunking the validity of socialization and suggesting that one reason women are not in high paying engineering jobs is due to their lower aptitude on standardized tests. Summers says,"Because if my reading of the data is right-it’s something people can argue about-that there are some systematic differences in variability in different (sex) populations, then whatever the set of attributes (standardized tests) are that are precisely defined to correlate with being an aeronautical engineer at MIT or being a chemist at Berkley, those are probably different in their standard deviations as well" (Summers). But here’s the confusion, when Summers suggests that the shortage of women in science and engineering fields is due to their lower standardized test scores, or their biological inferiority in these subjects, he is jumping to an unfounded conclusion about biology based on mere observation and a belief that this is the link between the correlating evidence. Summers has failed to explore scientifically or even empirically the other possible explanations for a shortage of women in science and engineering fields, as many of his sources and data are inconclusive or faulty (he even admits as much). In other words, Summers has continual observed the lack of women in the science and engineering fields for so long that he has reaffirmed his belief that women are just inferior with out seriously engaging in an investigation as to the origin of this problem.
Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, a professor at Western Illinois University, also believes Hume’s work to be applicable to ideas of social construction. She argues that Hume can be read from an environmentalist point of view, which argues that images of ourselves and others are socially constructed (Martinelli-Fernandez 196). She says, “The attraction of Hume’s theory is that the method by which we come to have a conception of self and become morally educated need not privilege one particular perspective, given that, according to Hume, we learn about the world, one another, and ourselves in concert with, and not in isolation from, one another”(Martinelli-Fernandez 213). In other words, Martinelli-Fernandez is arguing, using Hume’s account of personal identity, that the self does not stand alone, but is formed by its relationships with others and through its own personal reflection. Hume says of identity, “All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union as we have already observed” (T 571). In other words, there is no personal identity; rather, everything within the world is interconnected, leaving only parts to be identifiable by language. Hume also acknowledges that these interrelated parts are constantly changing. So, Martinelli-Fernandez is showing that the “self,” identifiable only by language, is only one piece of a large social group and is a reflection of that social group; therefore, the self is molded by the influences of others around it and is similar to the idea of social construction.
Since Hume believes humans and their environment are interconnected, I will argue based on Hume’s concept of interconnection that a shift in gender perspective could cause a change in gender norms. Hume says the mind has the ability to mix and match ideas, resulting in an object or a concept that does not exist; thus, one may be able to envision a world different from the present (I 509). A world full of unicorns would not be a plausible world to create (for we cannot create a unicorn, or can we?), but a world where men and women are allowed to achieve their full potential seems somewhat more plausible. If one is capable of envisioning this, and can also physically achieve some of the ideas in her vision, then it may be possible for her to initiate a change, or move towards her vision. However, this change will not take place immediately, rather it is a process that must be accepted by a majority of others before the construction of this vision is completed. I will illustrate this process through an example: A man envisions a world where men and women are free to live life to their fullest potential without gender restraints. This man realizes he likes this vision and wants to be treated by others in this manner; therefore, he attempts to treat others the way he wants to be treated. When other people ask why he is acting strangely he explains his vision. From here others observe his strange behavior. Some may ultimately object to his behavior, or may embrace his vision along with him. Regardless of how the others react, their understanding of the world has been challenged. If more and more people adopt this person’s vision, or if others have similar visions, then they too are influencing and challenging the idea of others, and are promoting a change in gender norms.
Annete Baier also believes Hume is useful to feminists, and turns to his “belief theory” in support of her argument. Baier believes Hume requires us to not only maintain our habits, which have created our social situation, but also to reflect, analyze, and question them (Baier 24). In other words, we should not idly habituate actions that lead to particular constructs, rather she would say Hume is arguing that we should carefully reflect on why these actions are beneficial actions, and question whether they should be habituated by everyone (Baier 29). She says,“Not merely must we be able to keep up the custom or habit in question after we have thought long and hard about its nature, its sources, its costs, and its consequences; we must also be able to turn the habit in question on itself and find that I can ‘bear its own survey’” (Baier 24).As mentioned before, Baier’s argument suggests that it is possible for one to reflect upon his or her position and the position of others within a society, and initiate change by setting an example.
Baier seems to be suggesting that Hume wants us to have some form of constructed morality for the good of humanity, but would Hume require us to have constructs of gender? I believe the appropriate response to this would be no. However, if gendered constructs somehow benefited humanity, or people of that gender, then he may suggest that the construction should be implemented. But I do not think Hume would limit us to these constructs. In other words, if a gender construct failed, or harmed society or people of that gender, then the construct should be adjusted to promote the well being of everyone. I agree with Baier in that Hume wants us to remain skeptical about the moral and social constructs we reinforce in order to promote the well being of the whole, which truly makes Hume’s “belief theory” feminist friendly and somewhat radical for his day and age.
Hopefully I have shown that Hume appears to provide a feminist-friendly account of gender constructs as he allows for flexibility within moral constructs. I have extended Hume’s “belief theory” to gender in order to explain how he may account for the formation of gender constructs, and the possibility for these constructs to change. I have also examined other feminist philosophers’ interpretation of Hume in order to support and guide my interpretation.
Works Cited
Baier, Annette. “Hume: The Reflective Women’s Epistemologist?” Feminist
Interpretations of David Hume. Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 19-38.
Daly, Mary. Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism. Boston: Beacon Press,
1978.
Lloyd, Genevieve. "The Man of Reason," excerpt, in Gender: Key Concepts in Critical
Theory, ed. by Carol C. Gould. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1997, pp. 225-230.
Lloyd, Genevieve. “Hume on the Passion for Truth.” Feminist Interpretations of
David Hume. Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 39-59.
Martinelli-Fernandez, Susan. “Social (re)construction: A Humean Voice on Moral
Education, Social Construction, and Feminism.” Feminist Interpretations of David Hume Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 194-217.
Summer, Lawrence H. “Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science &
Engineering Workforce.” The Office of the President. 14 Jan. 2005.
Annette Baier, president of the American philosophical association and professor at the University of Pittsburgh, explains the unsettled feelings feminists have for those in support of canonical works. She says in defense of one of her writings, “Many will dismiss my fondness for Hume’s writings as a sure indicator of my failure to transcend my philosophical upbringing in a patriarchal tradition” (Baier 20). Baier appears to be speaking of Mary Daly, a radical feminist, who believes women who adapt or take part in male traditions are tokens of the patriarchy, and only perpetuate it (Daly 335). Genevieve Lloyd, a professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales, also expresses discomfort with the canon when she acknowledges philosophy as a male tradition. She says, in her book The Man of Reason,"But there is one thing they [philosophers] have had in common throughout the history of the activity [philosophy]: They have been predominantly male; and the absence of women from the philosophical tradition has meant that the conceptualization of Reason has been done exclusively by men. It is not surprising that the results should reflect their sense of Philosophy as a male activity" (Lloyd 228-29). Such discomfort with the philosophical cannon has led some feminists to give up on “Reason” and philosophy all together (Lloyd 227). However, I have found that there are philosophers (in this case David Hume) whose ideas are applicable to feminist theory, despite the author’s original intent, and whose ideas may actually satisfy those who are avidly against canonical philosophers.
Hume’s philosophy seems to resemble the feeling and intuitive nature typically associated with femininity, which may be agreeable with certain feminist philosophers. Nel Noddings, who is known for her ethic of care, would probably be receptive to Hume’s use of feeling and sentience. Noddings supports an ethic that is based on caring relationships, rather than universal moral principles, and uses similar language to Hume. She says, “Women can and do give reasons for their acts, but the reasons often point to feelings, needs, impressions, and a sense of personal ideal rather than to universal principles and their application” (Noddings 3). Lloyd, who I’ve mentioned before, also sympathizes with Hume even though she believes he is ultimately “male-identified.” She believes Hume has reconstructed “Reason” to include intellect, emotion, and imagination, which she terms as the “wholeness of the mind” (Hume on the Passion for Truth 41). In The Man of Reason she argues that many philosophers disregard the senses and emotions, which are typically associated with femininity and are considered separate from Reason (The Man of Reason 227). Thus, she believes Hume’s conception of Reason to be more complete, as it includes a full bodily experience, and shifts the focus away from the common male conception of Reason. Sentience is ultimately what allows Hume to be “feminist-friendly,” and is the basis for my interpretation of Hume.
I will use Hume’s philosophy because it avoids using the common philosophical concept of Reason to explain knowledge, and closely resembles the theory of social construction. For Hume, knowledge is acquired through feeling and sentience, which is friendly to women partaking in the pursuit of knowledge, since women, within philosophy, have traditionally been associated with feelings and not with intellect or reasoning. I also believe Hume’s conception of knowledge relates to social construction in that it is dependent on habitual observation and interaction within a group. Gender is socially constructed in that humans observe how they are supposed to act, based on their sex, within a group of people and are also treated as if they were boys or as if they were girls from the perspective of that particular society. So, social construction is similar to Hume’s conception of knowledge, as habitual observation and interaction with a group are requirements for knowledge. I accept Hume as a basis for my feminist interpretation based on the above.
I will begin my interpretation of Hume by explaining his “Belief Theory,” which I will later show explains the socialization of gendered characteristics. In his book, titled An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume examines causation from a skeptic’s point of view. Previous philosophers (or pre-Humean philosophers) have attempted to explain the connection between cause and effect in terms of force or power. By using terms such as force or power, philosophers must attempt to explain what constitutes force or power. Hume rejects this argument with his “Belief Theory.” His theory begins with an examination of understanding. Hume sees the world in terms of experience, allowing the senses to inform his or her knowledge of the world. Therefore, if one cannot see, feel, or experience force, one cannot explain force (I 514), and the only possible way to make sense of cause and effect is to believe that the effect comes from the cause and vice versa (I 509). Hume uses this example to explain his position,"The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward sense. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects. Consequently, there is not, in any single particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection" (I 515). Hume explains that in order for one to believe in a connection between a cause and an effect, one must first have observed this cause producing this effect (I 507). In other words, a first step to learning about gravity would require a physical observation of an object falling to the ground. Once I have observed this a number of times, as well as observing similar objects falling, I begin to believe that this will happen in the future. Hume explains belief as a felling. In other words, when one believes that the cause will the lead to the effect, he or she feels that the cause will lead to the effect. One then habitually expects the observed cause to produce the observed effect. In short, Hume’s belief theory requires habitual experience of a cause and effect before one can believe that the cause leads to the effect.
If knowledge is based on the belief that a cause is followed by an effect, then our knowledge about gender roles could be created in the same way. There are several ways of explaining this. First, if one observes, for instance, women caring for children a majority of the time, and very rarely observes men doing this task, then one may assume (or believe) that women should care for children. In other words, if one habitually links the gender of a group to the task the group tends to perform, then one may become accustomed to, and believe in, the idea that women are the caretakers. Hume says, “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past” (I 508). One may also reaffirm his or her observations by reflecting upon the actions that he or she performs. For instance, if a boy was made to chop wood for the family and was not encouraged to cook, he would be better at chopping wood, than cooking for the family. Then, upon observing others, he noticed that other boys in the community were good at chopping wood, while the girls were not as good. From this observation he can easily assume that boys are better at chopping wood than girls, as he too knows he is better at chopping wood. The confidence in his ability to chop wood reinforces the observed belief that boys are better at chopping wood. Thus, by habitually being exposed to a group of women who act one way, or men another, certain gendered notions are created by the observer, and perhaps reinforced when reflecting upon his or her individual activities.
Habitually observing certain gender distinctions can confuse the origin of that gender distinction. The problem here is the observer does not know why the cause leads to the effect, rather he only knows that the observed phenomenon takes place. Hume says, “We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another, without instructing us in the secret connection which binds them together . . .” (I 516). In other words, the boy mentioned above does not know if boys are better at chopping wood than girls due to biological reasons, or if it is because the girls were never taught to chop wood, or for some other reason. All the observer knows is that the correlation exists. However, if we were basing our knowledge on habit, it would make sense that the boy is better at chopping wood because he has experience and has habitually practiced chopping wood. His muscles have had a chance to develop in order to perform the task, as well as his aim and technique. Therefore, when the unpracticed girl performs the task, she fails and looks awkward, which reaffirms the boy’s notion that girls are not as good at chopping wood. Thus, I am skeptical of anyone who claims men and women are biologically different (I am excluding reproductive differences here), as there is no clear distinction between what has been habitually learned and what is an actual biological difference.
Lawrence H. Summers, president of Harvard University, made comments at a conference on diversifying the science and engineering workforce, which shows how easily the origin of gender distinctions can be confused. Summers’ speech attempted to address the diversity policies at Harvard University. He contributed the lack of women in the science and engineering fields to familial choices and a lower aptitude in standardized tests (Summers). Although he never directly stated that women are biologically inferior to men in math and science, he does do a lot of work debunking the validity of socialization and suggesting that one reason women are not in high paying engineering jobs is due to their lower aptitude on standardized tests. Summers says,"Because if my reading of the data is right-it’s something people can argue about-that there are some systematic differences in variability in different (sex) populations, then whatever the set of attributes (standardized tests) are that are precisely defined to correlate with being an aeronautical engineer at MIT or being a chemist at Berkley, those are probably different in their standard deviations as well" (Summers). But here’s the confusion, when Summers suggests that the shortage of women in science and engineering fields is due to their lower standardized test scores, or their biological inferiority in these subjects, he is jumping to an unfounded conclusion about biology based on mere observation and a belief that this is the link between the correlating evidence. Summers has failed to explore scientifically or even empirically the other possible explanations for a shortage of women in science and engineering fields, as many of his sources and data are inconclusive or faulty (he even admits as much). In other words, Summers has continual observed the lack of women in the science and engineering fields for so long that he has reaffirmed his belief that women are just inferior with out seriously engaging in an investigation as to the origin of this problem.
Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, a professor at Western Illinois University, also believes Hume’s work to be applicable to ideas of social construction. She argues that Hume can be read from an environmentalist point of view, which argues that images of ourselves and others are socially constructed (Martinelli-Fernandez 196). She says, “The attraction of Hume’s theory is that the method by which we come to have a conception of self and become morally educated need not privilege one particular perspective, given that, according to Hume, we learn about the world, one another, and ourselves in concert with, and not in isolation from, one another”(Martinelli-Fernandez 213). In other words, Martinelli-Fernandez is arguing, using Hume’s account of personal identity, that the self does not stand alone, but is formed by its relationships with others and through its own personal reflection. Hume says of identity, “All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union as we have already observed” (T 571). In other words, there is no personal identity; rather, everything within the world is interconnected, leaving only parts to be identifiable by language. Hume also acknowledges that these interrelated parts are constantly changing. So, Martinelli-Fernandez is showing that the “self,” identifiable only by language, is only one piece of a large social group and is a reflection of that social group; therefore, the self is molded by the influences of others around it and is similar to the idea of social construction.
Since Hume believes humans and their environment are interconnected, I will argue based on Hume’s concept of interconnection that a shift in gender perspective could cause a change in gender norms. Hume says the mind has the ability to mix and match ideas, resulting in an object or a concept that does not exist; thus, one may be able to envision a world different from the present (I 509). A world full of unicorns would not be a plausible world to create (for we cannot create a unicorn, or can we?), but a world where men and women are allowed to achieve their full potential seems somewhat more plausible. If one is capable of envisioning this, and can also physically achieve some of the ideas in her vision, then it may be possible for her to initiate a change, or move towards her vision. However, this change will not take place immediately, rather it is a process that must be accepted by a majority of others before the construction of this vision is completed. I will illustrate this process through an example: A man envisions a world where men and women are free to live life to their fullest potential without gender restraints. This man realizes he likes this vision and wants to be treated by others in this manner; therefore, he attempts to treat others the way he wants to be treated. When other people ask why he is acting strangely he explains his vision. From here others observe his strange behavior. Some may ultimately object to his behavior, or may embrace his vision along with him. Regardless of how the others react, their understanding of the world has been challenged. If more and more people adopt this person’s vision, or if others have similar visions, then they too are influencing and challenging the idea of others, and are promoting a change in gender norms.
Annete Baier also believes Hume is useful to feminists, and turns to his “belief theory” in support of her argument. Baier believes Hume requires us to not only maintain our habits, which have created our social situation, but also to reflect, analyze, and question them (Baier 24). In other words, we should not idly habituate actions that lead to particular constructs, rather she would say Hume is arguing that we should carefully reflect on why these actions are beneficial actions, and question whether they should be habituated by everyone (Baier 29). She says,“Not merely must we be able to keep up the custom or habit in question after we have thought long and hard about its nature, its sources, its costs, and its consequences; we must also be able to turn the habit in question on itself and find that I can ‘bear its own survey’” (Baier 24).As mentioned before, Baier’s argument suggests that it is possible for one to reflect upon his or her position and the position of others within a society, and initiate change by setting an example.
Baier seems to be suggesting that Hume wants us to have some form of constructed morality for the good of humanity, but would Hume require us to have constructs of gender? I believe the appropriate response to this would be no. However, if gendered constructs somehow benefited humanity, or people of that gender, then he may suggest that the construction should be implemented. But I do not think Hume would limit us to these constructs. In other words, if a gender construct failed, or harmed society or people of that gender, then the construct should be adjusted to promote the well being of everyone. I agree with Baier in that Hume wants us to remain skeptical about the moral and social constructs we reinforce in order to promote the well being of the whole, which truly makes Hume’s “belief theory” feminist friendly and somewhat radical for his day and age.
Hopefully I have shown that Hume appears to provide a feminist-friendly account of gender constructs as he allows for flexibility within moral constructs. I have extended Hume’s “belief theory” to gender in order to explain how he may account for the formation of gender constructs, and the possibility for these constructs to change. I have also examined other feminist philosophers’ interpretation of Hume in order to support and guide my interpretation.
Works Cited
Baier, Annette. “Hume: The Reflective Women’s Epistemologist?” Feminist
Interpretations of David Hume. Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 19-38.
Daly, Mary. Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism. Boston: Beacon Press,
1978.
Lloyd, Genevieve. "The Man of Reason," excerpt, in Gender: Key Concepts in Critical
Theory, ed. by Carol C. Gould. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1997, pp. 225-230.
Lloyd, Genevieve. “Hume on the Passion for Truth.” Feminist Interpretations of
David Hume. Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 39-59.
Martinelli-Fernandez, Susan. “Social (re)construction: A Humean Voice on Moral
Education, Social Construction, and Feminism.” Feminist Interpretations of David Hume Ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. 194-217.
Summer, Lawrence H. “Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science &
Engineering Workforce.” The Office of the President. 14 Jan. 2005.
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