Monday, January 09, 2006

A Comparison of Seneca and East Asian Philosophy

In this paper I will show a comparison between the philosophy of Lucius Annaeus Seneca and various East Asian thought. The purpose of this comparison is to show that the ancient Roman world has produced philosophies similar to East Asian thought, despite the stark differences often believed to exist between the two. I will, 1) begin with a brief summary of Seneca’s philosophy, 2) briefly discuss and distinguish the three main philosophies of eastern Asia, 3) explain the similarities and differences between Seneca and East Asian thought, and 4) discuss whether or not Seneca would agree with East Asian philosophies if he had had knowledge of them. This paper is not intended to involve an in depth discussion, but to show that the similarities are manifest in Seneca’s letters and East Asian thought.

Although Seneca was a student of the Stoic school of thought, he considered himself an eclectic. The Stoic philosophy was often seen by the layman of the day as a cold and inaccessible philosophy (Campbell 17). The Stoics were known for their ability to suppress the emotions and live detached from the world, which seemed difficult to do for those of great wealth or great poverty (Campbell 17). Seneca desired to humanize this philosophy and show that everyone could live a Stoic and happy life despite their financial situation (Campbell 18). Seneca also drew upon the ideas of the Peripatetics, who believed emotions were a necessary and integral part of human existence, if paired with reason (Manning 71). Thus, Seneca’s philosophy was eclectic in that he drew from the Stoics and Peripatetics, which made his view accessible to the average person.

For this paper I will be analyzing Seneca’s letters to his pupil Lucilius. This text is often referred to as the Epistulae Morales. Seneca wrote this during the later years of his life, around A.D 60. There is some objection as to whether the philosophy within these letters was written for the purpose of documenting his philosophy, or whether they were meant as a teaching tool for Lucilius. C.E. Manning argues that Seneca starts these letters in a more Peripatetic fashion and ends in a more Stoic manner, with the shift being a part of his teaching method (Manning 73). However, I find that if a shift occurs at all, it is most likely a result of an aging Seneca. As Seneca grew older and progressively sicker, he naturally grew more and more concerned with death; thus, his focus on accepting the fleeting nature of life became more adamant, and, therefore, more Stoic. In this paper I will consider Seneca’s letters to be of a true eclectic nature regardless of a shift in perspective. I will also view the Epistulae Morales as a true representation of his philosophy.

As I began to explicate Seneca’s conception of friendship and death, I found his philosophy on emotions particularly confusing and unclear. However, I believe this is what makes Seneca a true eclectic and allows his philosophy to be reminiscent of East Asian thought. When it comes to emotions, Seneca appears to follow the Stoic view, in that emotions are to be ruled by reason. However, he also believes emotions are not to be suppressed completely, as he finds this impossible, and a part of a different school of thought. He says, “Our wise man [the eclectic wise man] feels his troubles but overcomes them, while their wise man [the Epicurean wise man] does not even feel them” (Seneca 48). Thus, emotion is to be felt, but tamed by reason. Yet, Seneca is prone to say very contrary things about emotions. For instance, in letter LXII he says, “I can scarcely venture to demand that you should not grieve at all—and yet I am convinced that it is better that way” (Seneca 113). Here I believe Seneca is encouraging one to accept the death of a friend with due respect, rather than tormenting the self with tears and lamentation. The acceptance of death and the fleeting nature of life is similar to Buddhist non-attachment. Even the language, in a sense, is similar as two contrary suggestions are being proposed, and the student is left to decipher the meaning. Despite such contrary statements, the emotions, for Seneca, are the cause of suffering, and reason is the tool one could use to prevent or to dissolve suffering.

Now that I have presented a general idea of Seneca’s philosophy, I will begin a brief but relevant explanation of East Asian philosophy. First, I would like to give a general overview that captures the similar strands of thought that run through Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism.

East Asian philosophy is primarily concerned with maintaining holistic harmony. In other words, the world is a whole in which all entities are interconnected, creating harmony and balance. Division of the whole into parts, and valuing the parts over the whole is what causes imbalance and suffering. Thus, the self is not an entity divided or separate from the rest of the world. The self is intertwined with its environment, i.e., parents, friends, relatives, the natural world, past, present, etc. Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism all see this interconnection in a slightly different light, but all hold firm to the idea of holistic harmony.

Confucianism, in particular, values the maintenance of relationships as the primary way to maintain harmony and balance. To maintain this harmony, focus is put on mannerisms and external conduct, or li, and on an internal sense of feeling, or ren. The combination of li and ren promote moral interaction with others; thus, maintaining harmony and balance in all relationships. Li sets forth rules for interacting with others. By doing the right thing, one may develop a sense of moral feeling towards others.

Daoism maintains holistic harmony through a focus on the quality of action, or wu-wei. Wu-wei allows one to deal with the continually changing world by absorbing the self within his or her environment. In other words, when one is deeply integrated within his or her environment, one’s actions move with the environment. Fluidity of action comes about by absorbing oneself in the moment and understanding how the environment moves and flows. One is not concerned with the past, nor the present, only with the moment at hand. Eventually, one will be able to move fluidly within his or her environment without causing friction or imbalance.

In Buddhism harmony and balance is maintained through emptiness, or by letting go of those things/ideas that disturb the balance and cause suffering. The first principle underlies all of Buddhist thought. This principle is called duhkha, which means that all is suffering (Hershock 13). To be more specific, duhkha encourages us to open our senses to the suffering inherent within the world (Hershock 14). By doing this one can then precede in empting the world of suffering. Desire and attachment cause suffering, and friction in the world. When one empties the self of desire and attachment, one empties the self of suffering. Therefore, one allows the world to work in harmony, without the friction of suffering.

While Seneca is not a Buddhist, Daoist, or Confucian by any means, he certainly does touch on some very similar notes within these philosophical and religious traditions. For instance, Seneca provides Lucilius with particular mannerisms he is to use in public, which is reminiscent of Li. He is often reminding Lucilius to focus on the here and now, and devote full attention to friendship and learning, similar to Daoism. Seneca also has a conception of self that seems to touch on the concept of no self, although he fails to grasp the concept fully. Finally, the most obvious similarity is the idea of non-attachment, which runs through both Seneca’s philosophy and Buddhist philosophy. I will also compare the idea of suffering in both philosophies as this is relevant to the notion of non-attachment.

As I have mentioned before, holistic harmony is a theme that runs through the three East Asian philosophies that I have spoken of. Seneca touches on ideas of relational existence similar to holistic harmony. To begin, Seneca says, “The first thing philosophy promises us is the feeling of fellowship, of belonging to mankind and being members of a community; being different will mean the abandoning of that manifesto” (Seneca 37). So, according to Seneca, philosophy, or the pursuit of wisdom, draws one closer to humanity and to the community. He is not striving for individuality, or some form of Saint Hood. Philosophy is for the people, and is a way for them to co-exist peacefully. Although Seneca wants us to be integrated within the community, this quote does not reflect whether or not one is interconnected with the other beings in his or her community; rather, it is only suggesting that philosophy’s purpose is to draw one into that community. It is not until several letters later that he begins to explicate an idea of interconnection regarding human interaction. He says, “For even if its success is not immediate, it leaves a seed in the mind, and even after we’ve said goodbye to them, the evil follows us, to rear its head at some time or other in the future” (Seneca 228). In this quote, Seneca is speaking of the effects others may have on the individual. It appears that Seneca believes that every person we meet leaves in us a seed, just as we leave seeds in the others that we meet. These seeds can be good or bad, and can affect the person greatly, or only minimally. Seeds and a focus on community are two forms of interconnection within Seneca’s philosophy.

Seneca, somewhat ironically, provides the reader with two excellent aphorisms that present the world as an interconnected whole, indistinct of parts, while he is telling Lucilius that aphorisms deter from maintaining conformity and evenness in writing. He writes, “One tree by itself never calls for admiration when the whole forest rises to the same height” (Seneca 78) and “A woman is not beautiful when her ankle or arm wins compliments, but when her total appearance diverts admiration from the individual parts of her body” (Seneca 79). These aphorisms can be seen in two different ways. The first way being literal and in context with his writing within that particular letter, which suggests that a certain aspect of philosophy should not stand above another as they are all integral and important as a whole. However, this literal reading of the aphorisms can also be extended to reflect his actual philosophy. In other words, a philosopher cannot consider his or herself superior to others. That would defeat the philosopher’s purpose, as thinking of the self as above others encourages an indulgence in pride and is contrary to the idea of community (as I have mentioned above). Although one may have a better understanding of this philosophy, his or her responsibility is to help others understand that philosophy has the power to unite a community, creating a whole and beautiful picture. The philosopher, although a role model, is not to be revered as a saint or godly figure above the rest. These aphorisms further support Seneca’s desire for an interconnected community, which is similar to interconnection within East Asian thought.

Seneca’s philosophy demands that one’s external conduct (i.e., food consumption, physical activity, acceptance of pleasure or suffering, etc.) effects and shapes one’s internal morality similar to the Confucian concept of Li. He says, “Cling, therefore, to this sound and wholesome plan of life; indulge the body just so far as suffices for good health. It needs to be treated somewhat strictly to prevent it from being disobedient to the spirit” (Seneca 45). This quote seems to be suggesting that morality is affected by the body’s interaction with the world. In other words, the way the body acts, moves, partakes in life directly effects an inner morality. In Confucianism, abiding by li, which is a form of control over one’s external conduct, is directly related to one’s inner moral feeling, ren. Hahm Chaibong, in his essay entitled Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucaultian Interpretation, believes li to be a useful tool in cultivating an inner morality. He says, “It is a matter of cultivating, training, and disciplining one’s body so that it will always practice and manifest truth, virtue, and sincerity” (Chaibong 317). I think Seneca would have been very friendly to Chaibong’s understanding of li, as his philosophy also requires a discipline of body in order for a sense of inner morality to be cultivated. Seneca says, “. . . to reduce oneself, then, of one’s own free choice to a diet that no man has any real call to be apprehensive about even if he is sentenced to death that is an act of real spiritual greatness” (Seneca 69). So, reducing the diet to only what is necessary for survival is controlling one’s external conduct for the purpose of “spiritual greatness.” Thus, the idea that external conduct affects one’s internal morality is a commonality between both philosophies.

In Seneca’s letters he is stressing to Lucilius that Stoicism is about living naturally, which is also the focus in Daoism, although the definition of what is natural is slightly different. Seneca says, “Our motto, as everyone knows, is to live in conformity with nature . . .” (Seneca 37). In other words, Seneca is interested in a simple life that abides by the laws of nature. He says, “Your food should appease your hunger, your drink quench your thirst, your clothing keep out the cold, your house be a protection against inclement weather” (Seneca 45). Anything beyond what is necessary for living is unnecessary and unnatural. Living as nature intended is the foundation of Seneca’s philosophy. At one point in his fifth letter he shows the absurdity of hope and fear in humans through a comparison with animals who live with nature. He says, “Wild animals run from the dangers they actually see, and once they have escaped them worry no more. We however are tormented alike by what is past and what is to come . . . No one confines his unhappiness to the present” (Seneca 38). Seneca is saying that the animals who live simply and with nature are free of worry about the future. They don’t fear living in their environment; rather, they live in the moment, focusing on the present, which is the only thing of importance and necessity.

Seneca’s focus on the present and a return to nature is very Daoist. Wu-wei, as I have mentioned before, requires one to absorb his or herself within his or her environment. The environment is what guides the person in his or her actions. Chuang-Tzu says,

"Pleasure in things and anger against them, sadness and joy, forethought and regret, change and immobility, idle influences that initiate our gesture—music coming out of emptiness, vapour condensing into mushrooms—alternate before it day and night and no one knows from what soil they spring. Enough! The source from which it has these morning and evening, is it not that from which it was born" (Chuang-Tzu 50).

In other words, our happiness and our problems are not just mere phenomena; rather, they are grounded in nature, in the world. Humans create their own suffering and happiness. Learning to work with the environment will teach one how to move gracefully within his or her environment, easing the friction and suffering. In a way, that is what Seneca is trying to do. By leading a simple life and accepting the fluctuating nature of the world, one will minimize suffering and live with ease in the world. Thus, Seneca’s focus on living naturally and the Daoist notion of living with nature follow a similar line of moral thought.

The last comparison is between a Buddhist conception of non-attachment and Seneca’s conception of non-attachment. The entirety of Seneca’s philosophy is based on a notion of non-attachment. In other words, attaching the self to things that are fleeting leaves one dissatisfied with life and leads to suffering. The person who is non-attached is able to move through life with ease and with a happiness greater than any other happiness. He says,

"And if you come across a man who is never alarmed by dangers, never affected by cravings, happy in adversity, calm in the midst of storm, viewing mankind from a higher level and the gods from their own, is it not likely that a feeling will find its way into you of veneration for him" (Seneca 87).

Seneca’s vision of the non-attached person is remarkably similar to Buddhist non-attachment in that happiness or enlightenment cannot come about through attachment to worldly things. Daniel Zelinsky, author of Dogen’s “Ceaseless Practice,” writes about a popular zen story that reflects this idea of non-attachment. He says,

“For example, a famous Zen story tells of a monk who, upon returning to his hut to discover that all his possessions have been stolen, remains undisturbed: “The thief left it behind—the moon in the window.”(12) The monk’s response stands in sharp contrast to that of an attached individual, who, we can imagine, craving to maintain her possessions, would be crushed by such a discovery” (Zelinsky)

Seneca has a story with the exact same ending. He writes about a man named Stilbo who lost his house, his children, and his wife, but was a happy man regardless. Stilbo’s response to this tragedy, according to Seneca was, “‘all my possessions,’ he said, ‘are with me,’ meaning by this the qualities of a just, a good and an enlightened character, and indeed the very fact of not regarding as valuable anything that is capable of being taken away” (52). For Seneca, material things are of little to no significance. His main concern is with the pursuit of wisdom and the development of an inner morality. Suffering over the loss of a loved one or the loss of material possessions interferes with the pursuit of wisdom and only torments the soul needlessly, as eventually the soul will heal from its loss. If one accepts death one speeds up the healing process. A similar idea is present in Buddhist philosophy. In Buddhism desire and attachment are the causes, just as they are in Seneca’s philosophy (Hershock 16). By emptying oneself of desire and realizing the interconnectedness between all releases one of suffering (16). So, it appears that Seneca and Buddhism share the same logic when dealing with the suffering of the world.


Works Cited

Campbell, Robin. Letters from a Stoic. England: Penguin Classics, 1969.

Graham, A.C. Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1981.

Hershock, Peter D. Chan Buddhism. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2005.

Lau, D.C. Mencius. England: Penguin Classics, 1970.

Manning, C.E. The Consolatory Tradition and Seneca’s Attitude to the Emotions. Greece
& Rome. 2nd Ser., Vol.21, No.1 (Apr., 1974), 71-81.

Zelinski, Daniel. Dogen’s Ceaseless Practice. Journal of Buddhist Ethics. 2000.
http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/7/zelinski001.html. Accessed Dec. 10, 2005

Letter to Seneca

Revised Version

Dear Seneca,

I have recently taken great interest in reading your letters to your dear friend Lucilius. While I am sympathetic to your philosophy, others find your philosophy devoid of emotion. You would probably agree that your philosophy requires one to “conquer” emotion, but I would argue that you leave the door open to emotion. In other words, there are instances where you argue from a very Stoic perspective and other instances where you are for emotion in a more Peripatetic manner. I will begin by defining your conception of reason in regards to friendship and death, and then by showing how reason is involved in the conception of friendship and death. I will then show evidence of how emotion is integral to your philosophy.

Reason is a tool in the pursuit of knowledge, as well as a tool for taming the emotions. For you, Seneca, the pursuit of knowledge is what will lead one to a happy life (63). You say in your letter to Lucilius, “It is clear to you, I know, Luicilius, that no one can lead a happy life, or even one that is bearable, without the pursuit of wisdom, and that the perfection of wisdom is what makes the happy life . . .” (63). Reason, I have gathered from reading many of your letters and from understanding the role of reason in stoicism, is what allows the pursuit of wisdom. Reason is what sets humans apart from animals, and is one’s tool to overcome the suffering inherent to the human condition (15). In other words, reason is what allows a person to push away the emotions that typically correspond with pain and suffering, and instead, to focus on the pursuit of wisdom. For example, if one is used to having a luxurious bed to sleep in every night, and then is denied this bed, then he or she would feel an emotional loss, which causes suffering. If I am correct, Seneca, you would say that the use of reason could have prevented this suffering, if the person had only kept reason in sight. In other words, if one used her reason to prepare for the loss, one could have avoided the forming of emotions that lead to suffering. Thus, emotions that lead to suffering can be tamed by the use of reason, inorder to continue in the pursuit of wisdom. So, reason is the tool used to overcome emotions, which distract from the pursuit of wisdom, and is the tool that allows one to pursue wisdom.

Now that I have shown an understanding of your concept of reason in relation to emotions, I would like to begin a discussion of how reason, or the pursuit of wisdom (which includes reason), is involved in the making of friends and death. Friendship, to you, Seneca, is of great importance. You say to Lucilius in one of your letters, “Think for a long time whether or not you should admit a given person to your friendship. But when you have decided to do so, welcome him heart and soul, and speak as unreservedly with him as you would with yourself” (35). In other words, when deciding to be friends with someone, one should use his or her reason to determine the character of a person before letting this person into his or her world. Using reason in this way allows the subject to estimate the amount of suffering that could potentially occur if he or she were to adopt the non-subject as a friend; Thus, avoiding an emotional response that would interfere with the pursuit of wisdom. Thus, reason, in friendship, is used to determine the character of a friend and to suppress the emotions involved with the death of friend. Both uses of reason prevent future suffering and encourage the pursuit of wisdom.

Although, the above definition of friendship seems pretty clear, your discussion of the necessity of friendship is a bit unclear. You require the subject to be self-sufficient in that these friends are not required to make the subject happy; thus, the death of a friend should not sadden a person, as other significant relationships can be created (51). In other words, the subject should be content with her or his self, regardless of the gain or loss of a friend. However, you go on to say that the nature of human beings is to be with company (52). You say, “He is self-content and yet he would refuse to live if he had to live without any human company at all. Natural promptings (not thoughts of any advantage to himself) impel him towards friendship” (52). What you have written, Seneca, sounds a bit contradictory, but I think I understand what you mean. In other words, the desire for friendship is an instinctual desire and separate from reason. Thus, friendship is not ideal, as a person should be content without it, but is permitted based on instinctual desire. I think you would also agree that friendship can be permitted as it can bring benefit in the pursuit of wisdom, but is undesired as it has the potential to deter one from this pursuit, i.e., the death of a friend can cause emotional stirrings which deter from the pursuit. Therefore, one should be self-content upon the death of friend or without the company of friends, but is permitted to desire friendship, as the desire is instinctual and potentially beneficial.

Although at times you present your conception of friendship as being rationally based, at other times you present it as being emotionally based. For instance, in one of your letters you compare friendship to a romantic relationship. You say, “There can be no doubt that the desire lovers have for each other is not so very different form friendship . . .” (50). To further my point, you also state that friendship should not be for some kind of financial or pointed gain; rather, a friend is, “To have someone to be able to die for, someone I may follow into exile, someone for whose life I may put myself up as security and pay the price as well” (50). To say that the desire to die for another is not deeply passionate and emotionally based is quite absurd. I am not entirely clear as to how one can desire to die for another if he or she is not emotionally connected. I’m sure you would say that this is an instinctual desire, but I would be hesitant to write this off as being separate from emotion. Based upon the examples above, you also seem to incorporate emotion into the idea of friendship, which seems contradictory to the rational conception of friendship that I presented earlier.

Although you appear to advocate a very stoic and emotionless philosophy, you have not closed the gate to emotions entirely, although that is probably what you wanted. In a letter to Lucilius you say, “When one has lost a friend one’s eyes should be neither dry nor streaming. Tears, yes, there should be, but not lamentation . . . In our tears we are trying to find means of proving that we feel the loss. We are not being governed by our grief but parading it” (114). In other words, it appears that you are encouraging us to feel the pain, but instead of lingering on this sorrowful moment, one should learn from this emotional experience: emotion as a pedagogical tool. That is why you say we should be “governed by our grief.” To further my point, you also say, “Our wise man [the eclectic wise man] feels his troubles but overcomes them, while their wise man [the Epicurean wise man] does not even feel them” (48). In other words, you state that the distinction between Epicurean philosophy and your Eclectic philosophy is that, the Eclectic philosophy allows emotion, but has the power, or control, over it. Thus, it appears you are arguing that emotions are beneficial in some respects, but are negative if left unchecked, which goes against the traditional Stoic philosophy and falls in line with the Peripatetics.

As I mentioned before, it is easy for one to say that you are writing from a stoic postion; however, I would disagree, based upon your letters, and would say that your account of emotions is in line with the Peripatetics. The Peripatetics, according to C.E Manning, believed that emotions were, “a necessary part of his being, and though intended to be subordinate to man’s reason, they were nevertheless capable of giving him help. The work of reason therefore can be compared to that of the vine-dresser, whose task it is to lop off the wild growth . . .” (Manning 71). So, the Peripatetics find emotions as useful and necessary. Thus, when you say that we should cry, but not allow this crying into excess (114), you are following a Peripatetic view. Even if you were to say that ideally, one should be devoid of emotion (Prof. Taber, Nov. 29, 2005), this would be going against your later remark that your Eclectic philosophy is distinguished from the Epicureans’ in terms of the experience of emotion, and would be in the Peripatetics.

Thus, your philosophy, Seneca, is not as devoid of emotion as some might believe. Your understanding of emotion is neither entirely Stoic, nor entirely Peripatetic. Perhaps that is why you call this an Eclectic school of thought. However, this leads me to think that some of your thoughts are contradictory. I am eager to hear a clear and concise response to my letter in regards to the role of emotions in your account of friendship and death.

Sincerely,
Karen Jarboe


Works Cited

Campbell, Robin. Letters from a Stoic. England: Penguin Classics, 1969.

Manning, C.E. The Consolatory Tradition and Seneca’s Attitude to the Emotions. Greece

& Rome. 2nd Ser., Vol.21, No.1 (Apr., 1974), 71-81.