Philosophical Influences of Gender on the BodyColette Dowling, in her book The Frailty Myth, challenges conventional ideas about male and female bodies by suggesting that conceptions of gender influence the way men and women use their physical bodies. By adapting Dowling’s position I will show how canonical and influential philosophers of the past have influenced our current conceptions of gender, and I will show how these gender concepts are then expressed through our physical bodies. By showing how embodied notions of gender affect our physicality, I hope to show the negative impact this has had on women, as well as ways in which women may reach their physical potential. During this project I will also take on a self shaping project of my own, in which I will learn Tang Soo Do, a Korean martial art, which will allow me to expose ways in which the frailty myth affects me.
I will first establish what I mean by the notion of gender before I begin a formal discussion of its affect on the body. When I speak of gender I am referring to a socially constructed mode of existence, which can be separated from one’s physical sex, but is very much linked to it. For example, the concept of masculinity is primarily located in the male body, but attributes of masculinity can be attributed to both men and women. The same applies to femininity. Thus, if man exuded frailty he may be considered womanly, as frailty is associated with femininity. However, I do not think that gender roles are easily interchangeable; rather, they are embodied by each individual. I do believe, with work and training, that a person could refocus his or her conception of gender. I will use Anne Fausto-Sterling, as well as my own interpretation of David Hume in order to further explain and support my concept of gender.
Humean Argument on GenderI will argue that Hume's “belief theory” can be used to explain the existence of gendered constructs. In this paper I will: (1) explain Hume's belief theory, (2) show how gender roles are formed by Hume's belief theory, (3) show how the origin of gender roles are often confused, and (4) show that gender, according to Hume's theory, is flexible.
In An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume begins explicating his belief theory by questioning the correlation between cause and effect. He does not see a direct reason to believe that a cause will necessarily lead to an effect. Hume says,
In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary, since there are always many other effects which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural (Hume 502).
For example, it is a common assumption that the sun will set in the evening. However, Hume would argue that the sun setting is just one thing that could happen. Imagining that the sun may never set, or that only half the sun would set are also conceivable possibilities. Thus, Hume is trying to understand why humans believe that one particular arbitrary cause leads to one particular arbitrary effect.
Pre-Humean philosophers and scientists alike believe in a direct connection between cause and effect, which they term as force, power, or energy; however, Hume does not believe this is an appropriate explanation as one cannot experience force, power, or energy, only the effect of the cause. Knowledge for Hume is acquired through experience. The only way one can have knowledge of a thing is if he or she has experienced it or something similar (Hume 498). The memory allows one to remember the feelings and sensations of a past situation and compare them to a present situation. Hume argues that scientists and philosophers have no way of directly experiencing force because they have no empirical knowledge of force. Wynona can experience a ball hitting her in her in the head, but she cannot experience the force, itself, without the ball. Thus, force is not the necessary connection between a cause and effect; rather, force is one possible explanation of how a cause creates an effect. Hume says, “ . . . experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another, without instructing us in the secret connection which binds them together and renders them inseparable” (Hume 516).
For Hume, the only connection one can make between a cause and an effect is a belief that the cause leads to the effect (Hume 507). One, who has become accustomed to apples dropping from trees in the fall, will believe that this is the nature of apple trees. Hume says, “For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say that this propensity is the effect of Custom” (Hume 506). Custom or habit creates a belief or feeling in a specific correlation between a cause and an effect.
If knowledge, for Hume, is based on the belief that a cause is followed by an effect, then our concepts of gender could be created in the same way. There are several ways of explaining this. First, if one observes, for instance, women caring for children the majority of the time, and very rarely observes men doing this task, then one may assume (or believe) that women should care for children. In other words, if one habitually links the gender of a group to the task the group tends to perform, then one may become accustomed to, and believe in, the idea that women are the caretakers. Hume says, “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past” (Hume 508). Thus, our notions of gender are not necessarily linked to our biological sex; rather, sex is customarily linked to arbitrary characteristics.
Gender is not only constructed through the observation of others, but is internalized. Little boys are often told, either directly or indirectly, that men are strong and if they want be “real men” they must be strong. Little boys, who want to fit in and be like their fathers and role models, then believe that strength is a pre-requisite to adulthood. The internalization of this gendered construct occurs when the little boy is influenced through observation and by the words of others and begins to practice being strong through play, sports, or working out with his father. These children do not care about strength in and of itself, although it has plenty of advantages, but about the masculinity that has been linked to strength. The gendered notion of strength then becomes internalized and a part of the little boy's perception of his gendered self.
Habitually observing certain gender distinctions can confuse the origin of that gender distinction. The problem here is the observer does not know why the cause leads to the effect; rather, he only knows that the observed phenomenon takes place. In other words, if a boy was made to chop wood for his family and was not encouraged to cook, he would be better at chopping wood, as that is what he is most experienced at. Then, upon observing others, he notices that other boys in the community are good at chopping wood, while the girls were not as good, and assumes that boys are better at chopping wood than girls. Now this lad does not know if boys are better at chopping wood than girls due to biological reasons, or if it is because the girls were never taught to chop wood, or for some other reason. All the observer knows is that the correlation exists. Thus, our customary beliefs about gender are not clear cut.
Lawrence H. Summers, former president of Harvard University, made comments at a conference on diversifying the science and engineering workforce, which shows how easily the origin of gender distinctions can be confused. Summers’ speech attempted to address the diversity policies at Harvard University. He contributed the lack of women in the science and engineering fields to familial choices and a lower aptitude in standardized tests. While at first it seems as if Summers were simply stating facts, that there is a difference in performance between males and females and that he is trying to find a solution to this problem, he later slowly and somewhat vaguely moves his argument toward a belief or an acceptance that this is just the way things are. His argument begins this assent as he questions if this difference can truly be contributed to socialization. He says, "Somehow little girls are all socialized towards nursing and little boys are socialized towards building bridges. No doubt there is some truth in that. I would be hesitant about assigning too much weight to that hypothesis for two reasons. First, most of what we've learned from empirical psychology in the last fifteen years has been that people naturally attribute things to socialization that are in fact not attributable to socialization . . . The second empirical problem is that girls are persisting longer and longer" (Summers).
Here he is trying to show that socialization is not the answer to understanding the reason for difference in performance between the sexes and that people tend to jump too quickly to this conclusion. While he never outright provides an explanation to this difference, his hypothesis is that these difference, while they can’t be solely contributed to socialization, unfortunately, have to be accepted as fact (meaning scientific fact, as that is how westerners produce facts). He says, "So, I think, while I would prefer to believe otherwise, I guess my experience with my two and a half year old twin daughters who were not given dolls and who were given trucks, and found themselves saying to each other, look, daddy truck is carrying the baby truck, tells me something. And I think it's just something that you probably have to recognize. There are two other hypotheses that are all over [he only gives one: socialization]" (Summers). In other words, Summers is saying that while socialization is another hypothesis for this difference is wrong, his hypothesis is what he believes is most likely and hard to deny. The key here are the words “other hypothesis,” which seems to suggest that this example of his daughters and their trucks is his hypothesis. If this is the case, then he seems to be suggesting that we just have to accept that no matter what we do to try to change male and female habits, the old tendencies will always preside. He provides further evidence of this when he says that improvements in gender distribution in other departments have exceeded expectations, but for some reason this improvement is not seen in the math and science fields (Summers). In other words, this evidence can be taken to mean that socialization has been successful in encouraging women to develop skills in areas they excel at but is problematic when it comes to areas women do not excel at. Thus, it seems that despite societies efforts to close this gap in the fields of math and science it just isn’t able to.
So, if we were to put this example into the context of Hume’s belief theory, Summers seems to be saying that if socialization isn’t the answer, then it must be biology. Summers is falling back on the most habitual answer, the one that has been most commonly held by social institutions throughout history. The habitual nature of seeing women and men maintaining their gender roles despite efforts to socialize differently has made him think that this must be the answer. I will grant that in this speech he is attempting to publicly address this issue, but at the same time he is reinforcing previous habitual beliefs by falling back to the biology issue. So, Summers seems to fall into the crutch of habit when it comes to distinguishing the difference between the performance of males and females in the science and mathematic fields.
I have explained how our current concepts of gender have been formed according to Hume's belief theory, but I would also like to show that Hume provides for flexibility in the construction of gender. While Hume would agree that it is in our nature to construct ideas of gender based on custom (Hume 510), he would not suggest that the current constructs are permanent. If gender arises due to cultural or social custom, then gender norms can be changed. Hume is admitting that current social ideas are not fixed, when he states that one only believes that a cause leads to an effect. Thus, over time, if gender is challenged and new concepts are adapted, and a large group of people begin to believe or become accustomed to new ideas about gender, gender will change. Gender is an impermanent and changeable aspect of our social and individual lives.
So, gender, according to my interpretation of Hume, is created by society, is embodied by the individual, yet is not necessarily a result of one's biological sex, and is impermanent. This understanding of gender supports my greater claim that our bodies are physically shaped by our concepts of gender, as Hume's concept of custom allows for the internalization of gender.
A Biological and Environmental Account of Gender In this section I will show a biologist’s account of gender in terms of genes, hormones, and one’s environment. As I have mentioned in my Humean interpretation on gender, gender does not necessarily arise from biological sex. Anne Fausto-Sterling’s account of gender supports my theory. While many scientists have argued that males and females are predisposed to act differently according to genetics or hormones (or both), Fausto-Sterling reveals a different account of the biology of gender and sex that challenges these old assumptions. In this paper I will show Fausto-Sterling’s account of genes on “gender” and of hormones on “gender,” and show how Fausto-Sterling’s account supports my argument that “gender” is a product of our habits and beliefs.
In Myths of Gender, Fausto-Sterling argues that our brains and bodies are not determined strictly by our genetics; rather, she believes that living beings (both human and animal) are continually affected/shaped by their environment. Fausto-Sterling says that a common assumption about human biology is that the environment is completely separate from and disparate to the biological development of a person (Myths of Gender 76). However, she believes something quite different: that one’s environment is the interaction between one’s biological body and the social world. She says, “Environment is not only multi-tiered, it is also without time limits. It exerts, rather, a cumulative continuum of effects over an entire lifetime” (Myths of Gender 76). Thus, the body and brain do not stop developing after birth, or after four years, or even after adolescence; rather, it continues to change throughout one’s life. So, Fausto-Sterling is challenging the common assumption that genes are the ultimate determinate in the shaping and structuring of the body.
Fausto-Sterling speaks of environment in several different ways: in utero, conscious, and subconscious. A fetus, that is in utero, is affected by the actions of the uterine mother. I believe this concept is common knowledge, as most of us understand the health risks a uterine mother’s smoking habit has on her fetus. However, hormone levels in utero are also responsible for the development of a fetus. For example, the lack of the hormone Dihydrotestosterone in the womb of a chromosomally male fetus will cause the “boy” to be born with female or neutral external genitalia and male internal genitalia. When testosterone is produced by the testes during puberty, the male internal genitalia drop down, and become visible (Myths of Gender 84). Thus, hormone levels in utero are one aspect of the fetus’ development that is not a result of the genes.
One’s conscious environment includes actions or verbal thoughts purposefully imposed on another. Fausto-Sterling uses the example of West Kenyan children who were taught by their mothers to walk at a very early age. These mothers purposefully encouraged their children to walk by the use of play and disciplined interaction. Western psychologists, according to Fausto-Sterling, had previously thought it impossible to teach children of such a young age to walk (Myths of Gender 75). What this shows is that environmental factors, and not necessarily genetics, are an influential part of the development of a human being. Fausto-Sterling says, “. . . we can properly consider the development of motor skill-often thought of by developmental psychologists as genetically directed-only in the context of a child’s physical and social environment” (Myths of Gender 75). Thus, a person’s environment is not limited to influences in the womb, but is also influenced by the purposeful teachings of others, or the manner in which one purposefully organizes another’s surroundings. Conscious environmental factors are also a part of the development of the human child and not genetics alone.
Subconscious environmental factors include actions and implemented thought patterns that one is not consciously aware of, but are transmitted to others. Fausto-Sterling provides an example of one-day-old infants who attempt to mimic adults. She says, “One-day-old infants show exact prolonged segments of movement correlating precisely in time with the speech patterns and rhythm of the adults talking to them” (Myths of Gender 75). To relate this more specifically, the adult is unaware that her movements are encouraging the baby’s movements, but ultimately, the encouragement is done and the baby is affected by her actions. Thus, subconscious environmental factors are also a part of the physical development of a human child, which must be taken into consideration along with genetics.
Fausto-Sterling would also argue that sex is not as clear cut as we are led to believe. She says, sex chromosomes, which are believed to be the catalyst in the development of the genitals and the male or femaleness of the body are not the sole determinate of sex, as hormones in later years may alter the shape of the body (even in utero as I have mentioned before) (Myths of Gender 84). Fausto-Sterling points toward Dihydrotestosterone deficient children in Santo-Domingo, who as children have the anatomy of a female, but drop the testes during puberty (Myths of Gender 86). This phenomenon occurs when Dihydrotestosterone, which is the hormone that promotes the growth of male or female genitalia, is not made within the womb of an XY chromosome child. The child is usually born with female external genitalia and male internal genitalia. When the child reaches puberty and the testes begin to secrete testosterone, the testes drop and the “female (?)” becomes a “male (?)” to the visual eye (Myths of Gender 84). This example provides a perfect explanation of how influential the environment is upon the sexing of the body and demonstrates why genes do not get the last word.
Not only does Fausto-Sterling argue against the idea that genetics are the final determinate of our physical and emotional state, she also argues against the common assumption that hormones determine our gendered emotional states. For example, women are often thought to be moody around the beginning of their menstrual cycle, as many believe this is the time that hormone levels in females dramatically fluctuate, which is inherent in the phrase “mood swing.” However, the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective’s, Our Bodies Ourselves, explains that during this time of the menstrual cycle there is only a gradual decrease in estrogen, which seems contrary to a dramatic “swinging of moods” (Our Bodies Ourselves 285). Fausto-Sterling, also offers criticism of the studies done to prove emotional changes around the time of the menstrual period. She says that correlation studies, which have been used to prove this assumption, are faulty as they do not determine the cause. Fausto Sterling writes, “As Parlee points out, most correlational studies seem to assume that when emotional changes correspond to changes in the menstrual cycle, hormones must be to blame” (Myths of Gender 102). These studies assume that hormones are the cause of emotional changes, when in reality the researchers never actually investigated the cause. She also notes that the male is often used as the example of the norm (Myths of Gender 105). Since the male does not have a menstrual cycle, his testosterone levels are not investigated in the same manner as estrogen and the menstrual cycle, even though there is a monthly cycle of testosterone within the male body. The assumption is that women’s monthly cycle is peculiar to the female body and is prone to abnormalities (Myths of Gender 105). Thus, many of the studies done on emotional states often associated with women’s menstrual cycle are faulty and are held up against a male norm.
Another common assumption related to hormones is that testosterone is what makes men more ambitious than women, and excessive levels of testosterone is what makes men into serial killers and violent child molesters. If that were the case then crime could easily be wiped out of existence: just make sure everyone’s testosterone levels are in check. Also, would it not mean that people who are in power have higher levels of testosterone (not excessive, but higher)? Fausto-Sterling points us towards a study done on sex offenders who were castrated to control their violent tendencies. She says, "One of the only follow-up studies that looked at the effect of castration on aggression and violence, however, found the treatment so ineffective that nine out of sixteen men castrated solely to ‘calm them down’ subsequently died as a result of aggressive encounters" (Myths of Gender 126).Although very few studies have been done, there have been attempts to correlate levels of aggression with levels of testosterone (Myths of Gender 127). But again, these are only correlative, which means there is no way of showing the actual cause. Fausto-Sterling says, “Elevated testosterone levels may in fact, result from aggressive behavior” (Myths of Gender 127), just as lowered estrogen levels my result from depression. And finally, Fausto-Sterling points out that measuring aggression is a difficult task if one has not clearly defined what he or she means by aggression (Myths of Gender 127).
I have previously articulated a concept of gender, based on Hume’s belief theory, that heavily weighed upon environmental factors, and which works very well with Fausto-Sterling’s biological interpretation of gender. As I have mentioned before, gender is formulated through the habits and customs of our social environment. In other words, the notions of gender in which society supports, is in most cases, passed down to the children, who begin to internalize and identify the self with this notion of gender. These internalized notions of gender affect our physical and mental states (i.e, a child who confines herself to a room and studies all day may be weaker than a child who plays football all day). Fausto-Sterling also supports this contention, as she argues that the in utero, subconscious, and conscious environments all contribute to the development of a child, and to the development of a gendered body and mind. She uses many examples, some of which have been listed above. Fausto-Sterling uses a study that was done between 1966 and 1973, which examined the personality traits of Kenyan boys who were forced to do “women’s work,” as there was a shortage of women. The men in this Kenyan society were particularly aggressive; however, the boys grew up to be noticeably less aggressive than the other men (Myths of Gender 152). By using this example, she is showing that environment affects the gender characteristics of an individual, just as my notion of internalized gender affects the physical and emotional state of an individual.
Another way that Fausto-Sterling works well with my contention is in her criticism of correlational studies. As I have mentioned before, Fausto-Sterling disagrees with correlational studies, as they do not prove the cause of the correlation. Fausto-Sterling, thus, is providing me with evidence that there is little to no proof that genes or hormones are the direct cause of feminine or masculine characteristics. In my Humean interpretation of gender, I argue that one should not jump to the conclusion that feminine or masculine characteristics are caused by biology, as one does not know the direct cause, or the origin of these characteristics. Thus, Fausto-Sterling is furthering my argument by compiling and analyzing the studies that have been done on gendered characteristics and their link to biology. Her conclusion supports my argument in that the cause of gendered characteristic cannot be solely based on biology, as we cannot clearly separate biology from environment, but can only explain gender and sex through an understanding of how the environment interacts with the body.
In conclusion, Fausto-Sterling’s concept of gender is based on biological findings of environmental effects on the body. Further support is gained by illuminating the problems with past and current research on the correlation between biology and gendered characteristics. Based on the above, Fausto-Sterling argues that gender, and even sex, is not strictly determined by genetics or hormones, or even a combination of the two, but by in utero, subconscious, and conscious environmental factors. She would say that environment and biology are intricately connected, which closely relates to my Humean interpretation on gender.
“The Frailty Myth” In this paper I will explicate the contention of Colette Dowling’s book The Frailty Myth. To begin, I will first outline Dowling’s definition of “the frailty myth,” and then present her findings on the life of women before the frailty myth. Secondly, I will present what she believes are the current ramifications of the frailty myth. Last, I will show what she believes should be/could be done to overcome the myth.
Dowling defines the frailty myth as a culmination of gendered notions about men’s and women’s bodies which have weakened and subordinated the bodies of white females, and strengthened and empowered the body of white males. She specifically defines it as,
". . . the social domination of women’s bodies. It is about girls’ and women’s restricted physical development. It is about the attempt to keep them feeling as doctors, educators, and religious leaders have intended them to feel: physically limited" (Dowling 6)One reason she is fond of the word “myth” in explanation of this phenomenon, is that a myth is believed to be true, whereas a hoax, let us say, is a conscious deceit (Dowling 6). A myth is deeply engrained in culture, whereas a hoax is conspired by a group of people. In other words, one cannot point his or her finger to a single point of blame.
The myth has taken centuries to work its way into modern society; although she does not go into the development of this long history, she does point out that the myth seems to have come to a head after the industrial revolution (Dowling 12). She explains that during this time period the need for bodily strength decreased, as machines took the place of bodies. With the advent of machines, almost anyone was capable of finding a job and supporting his or her self and family. However, those men and women who identified masculinity with strength and prosperity saw the future of masculinity in danger, especially since the women’s movement was also gaining speed (Dowling 23). Strength was one element men clung to in order to separate the two sexes and prove their superiority. She says of the male mentality of the day, “If women were determined to act like men, men would up the ante: a woman could never be a he-man. A man could always develop more muscle” (Dowling 24). But the focus on muscular strength in men was not enough to divide the sexes (perhaps out of a subconscious fear that women might also be as strong as men). For the first time, scientific exploration of the female reproduction system began to take place; however, since the majority of doctors at this time were males, a serious bias was imposed on medical knowledge of the female reproductive system. Dowling writes about floating uteruses, decaying genitals, and infertility, which doctors claimed were a result of too much physical activity, and how menstruating, according to the medical knowledge of the day, required almost every ounce of energy a woman had (Dowling 12-22). Thus, women were prescribed to an inactive existence, by the male (and some, but very few, female) doctors of the time. Educational and religious authorities also supported the findings of these doctors, furthering the suppression of physical activities. Of course, I will note, that the notion of female passivity had been taking shape prior to the industrial revolution, but that Dowling centers on this time period as the culmination of these ideas.
Dowling also notes that the frailty myth has not always been in existence; however, historians have either overlooked, ignored, suppressed, or feminized the history of strong women. She pulls from Olga Soffers, a leading authority on hunters and gatherers of the Ice Age, who says that women provided 70 percent of the family’s nutrients. She also points out that women were not only gatherers, they also hunted small game with the use of the bow and arrow, set traps, and participated in animal drives. Children were also included in these activities (Dowling 7). In Sparta, where the women and men lived separately, women were taught to hunt, ride horses, swim, run, and drive chariots, as well as wrestle and throw discus and javelin (Dowling 8). And in the middle ages women jousted, and were archers, and played a similar game to what we call darts. But of course they were never allowed to advance to the upper levels of competition (Dowling 8). Frontier women, in the United States, also performed physically demanding jobs such as killing dear (with guns), catching and tying hogs, using an ax to remove beehives, etc, (Dowling 10-11). Women have even been participants of war, in West Africa, Europe, and the United States. Women in Eritrea, Africa, have also recently participated in war, fighting side by side with men (Dowling 11). Of course, many of these stories are alien to the average westerner. Dowling, in reference to Soffers’ comments, says that the common belief that men were the primary providers for the Ice Age family, “was the result of certain questions not being asked . . .” (Dowling 7). In other words, a cultural bias that men are traditionally the “bread winners,” and women the caretakers, has allowed evidence of women’s physical prowess to be overlooked. She also notes that often the stories of women’s participation in battle are hidden. She says, “Some, like Joan of Arc, eventually become heroines. Others remain hidden once their day is over” (Dowling 11). Thus, despite a history of physically powerful women, historians and preservers of masculine and feminine notions have suppressed evidence of women’s physical prowess.
Dowling believes the ramifications of the frailty myth are continued in society today, as men and women are taught to act according to gendered notions of physicality. Dowling believes that masculinity and femininity, “are totally manufactured concepts,” which become internalized and alter the body (Dowling 46). She says, “Gender is a system of ideas about men and women that we live our lives by. The more we live the system, the more internalized it becomes, and the more it actually gets translated into our bodies” (Dowling 44). If we look at popular culture in western society, men and women of all ages and races are constantly flooded with images of skinny white female models and muscular athletic men. These models supply an image of appropriate feminine and masculine physical bodies. Also, television provides images of appropriate gender movement. But not only are these gendered ideas embedded in popular culture, parents, teachers, doctors, and peers encourage an accepted notion of gender that often steers toward the masculine/feminine hierarchy of strength vs. weakness. Dowling presents a study, which shows that little boys are often encouraged by their parents to run, jump, and climb, whereas little girls often receive negative reactions from their parents for the same behavior. She concludes that if little boys are encouraged to be more active, then this is a likely reason why they perform better on force and power tests than girls even at young age (Dowling 51). She continues with numerous studies, (too many to speak about here and many that Fausto-Sterling also mentions), which show that different training results in a difference in physical performance. Thus, women and men who internalize or embody physically restricting or physically enhancing notions of gender, particularly at an early age, will ultimately affect the shape and size of his or her body.
On a more positive note, Dowling believes women can overcome the frailty myth with training. She says, “It’s gender training that turns girls obsessive about ‘femininity,’ gender training that deprives them of the natural use of, and pleasure in, their bodies” (Dowling 58). Thus, she would say if girls are trained to embrace their bodies and learned how to utilize their body’s full potential, then girls would grow to be strong and confident and achieve the unachievable. Not only does she emphasize that physical training is the key to achieving girls’ physical potential, but also psychological training. For instance, she speaks of Nicola Thost, a German snowboarder, who emphasizes that one can’t be worried about falling, otherwise she will fall. Fear of falling, or fear of taking risks is part of the reason Dowling believes women are not achieving their potential. If more and more women are encouraged to take risks, and are rewarded for these risks even when they don’t turn out so good, then, and only then, will women succeed (Dowling 217-18). Physical and psychological training and gender flexibility are what is needed if women are to obtain their physical prowess.
While there is much more to say about The Frailty Myth, this paper has briefly outlined Dowling’s contention by first defining what she means by the frailty myth and how it still affects women today. Secondly, this paper has shown that the frailty myth is not static; rather, evidence of women’s strength before the frailty myth has been summarized, as well as an applicable theory as to how the frailty myth can be overcome in accordance with Dowling’s book.
Introduction to Part II of The Philosophical Influences of Gender on the Body
My initial and primary goal for this project was to define what I meant by gender and to show examples of how gender is translated into our physical bodies. The next step in this project is to show how canonical philosophers have created gendered philosophies and have helped to reinforce “the frailty myth.” I will begin this introduction with a compendium of the main points presented last semester. I will then explain the relevance of this project to my own life, and why this project is of importance to both men and women. Finally, I will show the importance of and the criteria for examining how canonical philosophers have helped to give shape to “the frailty myth” and how these philosophies continue to shape our bodies today. This introduction is intended to be a brief overview of my later work.
While all three of my papers from the first half of the project dealt with arguments suggesting that gender does not necessarily emanate from biology, but from our conceptions of gender, each were different in that they came from different backgrounds, i.e., from a philosophical, biological, and historical background. While this is good in that it shows the relevance of my argument to different fields of thought, I would also like to point out that all three arguments are philosophical in nature, as they are challenging and questioning past philosophies on gender. In my Humean interpretation, custom creates a cultural philosophy on gender, which leaves room for the possibility of creating new gender philosophies as society sees fit. Fausto-Sterling has also questioned scientific assumptions based on particular philosophies of gender, which distorted scientific findings relating gendered actions to biological functions. And Dowling, in The Frailty Myth, demonstrated how the culmination of historical gendered philosophies, deeming women physically weak, encouraged and translated physical weakness into the feminine body. Thus, when I speak of gender, I am speaking of the philosophies that have created our concept of gender and that can be seen throughout history, in science, and in philosophy.
My Humean interpretation of gender dealt specifically with the difficulties in determining the cause of an effect, or vice versa, which can confuse the origin of gendered beliefs. This interpretation also gave an explanation as to how gender is internalized through custom, which determines the physical shape of the body. My point of emphasis in regards to this interpretation, at this point in my project, is on the physical shaping of the body through customary philosophies of gender. For instance, one customary philosophy about the male gender is that males are to be strong protectors. When this notion of maleness is adopted and internalized, the male begins to take steps toward fulfilling this ideology. In other words, the male is taking up a philosophy on maleness. If humans are presented with limited customary philosophies on gender, then humans act and interact in limited ways (which is primarily what happened in the late part of the 19th century), thus creating limited acceptable body shapes (for example, the waif, feminine body, and the ultra-muscular, masculine body). So, with the help of Hume’s belief theory, I have come to the conclusion that customary philosophies, that do not necessarily emanate from a biological point of origin, are left to be internalized by the general public, who in turn begin fulfilling and shaping their bodies accordingly.
While my Humean interpretation provided an argument for the formation of customary philosophies based on assumptions about the causes of gender, my paper on Fausto-Sterling involved the deconstruction of scientific evidence linking gendered characteristics to biology. In other words, I showed that Fausto-Sterling was interested in exposing the flaws in past scientific studies and providing new scientific evidence suggesting that environment plays a large part in the biological development of humans. So, the theory behind Fausto-Sterling’s biological account of gender development is similar to Hume’s in that past assumptions have not provided us with knowledge of the actual cause, but have distorted the origin and created a customary philosophy about the biological nature of gender. In one way Fausto-Sterling is arguing that our environment shapes our physical development (for example, this would mean that there’s a chance that women are weaker because they are raised to be weaker), but another point of interest is that if scientists are using scientific evidence to “prove” that gender is inherently determined by biology (despite faulty studies), then they are in turn, reinforcing the frailty myth. Therefore, our customary philosophies about gender are becoming even more customary. So, Fausto-Sterling is a nice complement to my Humean interpretation of gender and does an excellent job showing how our gendered philosophies shape our bodies.
My paper on Dowling’s The Frailty Myth is more explicit in articulating how a historical culmination of customary philosophies on gender have impacted the physical development of white upper and middle class men and women of western origin, as this book was my inspiration for this project. I chose to articulate “the frailty myth” last as it sums up my Humean interpretation and my paper of Fausto-Sterling very well. Dowling argues that it is physical training that women lack. Boys are taught from an early age to live up to a strong, masculine gender ideology and adopt a philosophy to become this masculine ideal. Girls, on the other hand, have a different ideal that does not involve physical improvement, but rather emphasizes fragility and passivity. This concept is very similar to Fausto-Sterling in that one’s physical development is dependent on his or her environment. It also works with my Humean interpretation as one internalizes his or her society’s customary gender roles, believing this is the way he or she is supposed to act; consequentially, his or her body develops accordingly.
My paper on “the frailty myth” also touches on the notion that these gender philosophies did not come from one source, but emanated from religion, philosophy, politics, science, education, etc. In other words, “the frailty myth” was a culmination of great thinkers, as well as the average everyday citizen. The myth was everywhere, with no single point of origin. However, Dowling does argue that creating a new philosophy of gender, or creating new customs (to use Humean vocabulary) would allow women to break out of this myth and experience their full physical potential (or at least come to respect/acknowledge their potential).
Over winter break I have had the opportunity to explore and reflect on the ways my gender philosophy has physically shaped me. To do this, I joined Miller’s Tang Soo Do Institute (MTSDI), which is a small dojang that teaches the Korean martial art, Tang Soo Do. I joined partially as an experiment to see how the frailty myth affects me, if it does at all, and out of a long time interest in the martial arts. I had never participated in any martial art (well, besides Tai Chi) and really didn’t have much of a clue as to what to expect, but I knew it would be challenging and that was exactly what I wanted. I wanted to push myself physically and mentally, to see where I could take myself. At the same time I also joined a “real” gym (I had previously been going to Curves, a low impact women’s only gym), where I began weight-training. MTSDI was particularly interesting as Master Miller (the master instructor) has a particular interest in the philosophy behind/within the art. So, when training there is a balanced focus on mental training as well as physical training, which fits my project well. If one’s mind is focused elsewhere, on school, on work, etc. then one’s physical performance diminishes. If one believes he or she cannot do something, then he or she will fail. As Master Miller says, “there’s not can’t in Tang Soo Do.” This means that if one abides by a gender philosophy that is not conducive to identifying the self as physically active and having physical confidence, then this philosophy will not support an endeavor in Tang Soo Do. I believe challenging and reflecting on my own physical past will give me an added perspective while writing this SMP. Part of this SMP will be to blog my experience as a student of Tang Soo Do (which I have already begun) and to write a summary of my experience.
The last and most important part of this project examines the gender philosophies of canonical philosophers. While “the frailty myth” certainly wasn’t created solely by philosophers, they did have a large impact in shaping common philosophies about men and women. Nearly every male canonical philosopher has written something about the nature of men and women (particularly women), whether in passing or as a project in and of itself. Since these philosophers hold a lot of esteem, in the past and in the present, their philosophies on gender are often validated by the validity of their other philosophical works, which in turn reinforces customary gender philosophies. Often, philosophers who are thought of as extremely intelligent or even geniuses seem to fall short when it comes to gender. In other words, while the rest of their works are extremely logical and ground shaking, truly works of a master mind, their philosophies on gender often sharply contrast, with logical fallacies/errors and philosophical inconsistencies littering the pages. So, by examining certain canonical philosophers’ gender philosophies, I will show how his philosophy is or is not relevant to current gender conceptions.
At this point I would like to lay down the criteria for the examination of each philosopher and state which philosophers I will be utilizing. I will organize the philosophers in chronological order starting with Aristotle. The philosophers in order and with their relevant works are: Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals, Rousseau’s Emile and Sophie, and Kant’s Of the Distinction of the Beautiful and Sublime in the interrelations of the Two Sexes. I will begin each examination by explicating his gender philosophy. I will then show how this philosophy may potentially shape the physical body if embodied. Finally, I will show how or if this philosophy is relevant today. Most of these philosophers are only concerned with white upper and middle class citizens of western countries. Also, since “the frailty myth” affects primarily white middle and upper class westerners, I will not explore the impact of these philosophies on other races or classes (although I would if I had more time). These criteria should be sufficient in demonstrating how canonical philosophers have influenced the shaping of gendered bodies.
This introduction was useful in that it tied together common themes throughout the last semester’s work on this project, presented a side project for my SMP, and laid out the criteria for the examination of canonical philosophers.
Arguments from Biology and SocializationThe purpose of this paper is to explain the nature/nurture debate regarding the origin of gender and to explicate my position on the matter. While this debate is in the forefront of many feminist and anti-feminist minds, it is an issue that needs to be clarified especially since this project is set on uncovering how the social affects the biological, i.e., the physical. I will begin by briefly summarizing the biological account of gender and the argument from socialization. I will then support my generalization of the issue with evidence from Anne Fausto-Sterling’s, Sexing the Body and Colette Dowling’s, The Frailty Myth. Finally, I will present my position on the matter, which is that while we have no absolute proof of gender as an entirely biological or socially constructed entity, there is plenty of evidence showing that as a society and as individuals, we do have control in shaping our bodies.
The argument from biology, or the claim to nature, argues that science proves gendered characteristics are determined by biology alone. In other words, the fact that I am a female determines how I will interact with others, my mood around certain “times of the month,” my emotional needs, my physical strength, etc. (the list could go on). To be more specific, the female body has a genetic code built into it that determines my gendered characteristics. So, my actions/interactions can be explained by the fact that I have two X chromosomes, rather than one X and one Y chromosome. The most obvious evidence of male/female difference due to biology or genetic makeup is in the construction of the genitals and the basic skeletal structure of males and females. However, the argument from biology goes much further, by claiming that even the brain structure of males and females is inherently different, and thus explains the natural, biological difference between the actions/interactions of males and females. The biological argument is often adopted by scientists, as science is the only thing that provides abstract positive truth (maybe, in some cases, with the exception of God) and can affirm this truth. This view posits that gender roles are unchangeable, absolute, and fixed.
The argument from socialization claims that the origin of gendered characteristics can be explained purely by environmental factors. In other words, gender is constructed by society. So, the reason why I play with dolls rather than soccer balls isn’t because I am biologically predisposed to some sort of motherly instinct, but because this is the option society has presented to me as a female. The fact that I have two X chromosomes does not affect my actions, but the fact that my parents raised me in an environment that encouraged certain feminine characteristics does determine my future behavior. This position is often taken up by feminists, as it provides a way to change woman’s previous role as “immanent” being, towards a state of independence and agency.
Although both Fausto-Sterling and Dowling ultimately disagree with the argument from biology, they both provide a clear explanation of the arguments used from biology to explain innate difference. For Dowling, the nineteenth century was the culmination of many ideas about the essence of woman, which were validated by the scientific revolution, resulting in the belief that women were in fact, weak. She says, “Nineteenth-century women were given to believe that weakness was their natural condition . . . Educators, psychologists, churchmen, and physicians—particularly obstetricians and gynecologists—were its [the frailty myth’s] chief proponents” (Dowling 3-4). In other words, the natural condition of women during this time period was supported with religious and scientific information claiming that woman was biologically inferior to man. As added proof to Dowling’s claim, Fausto-Sterling provides explicit examples of this debate within biology. In Sexing the Body, Fausto-Sterling states that, “Scientists, such naysayers would argue, have proven that in addition to our genitalia, key anatomical differences between the male and female brain make gender an important marker of ability” (Sexing the Body 115). In other words, science shows us that men and women’s biology distinguish in ability to perform in the world. In Myths of Gender she elaborates as well. She says,
"Theories abound that there are more male than female geniuses and that boys wind up ahead of girls in the classroom and hence in the job market. Why? Because, some would hold, hormonal differences between the sexes cause differences in brain structure and function" (Myths of Gender 14).So, the fact that girls aren’t as scholastically inclined is based on a theory that woman’s biology does not support this type of scholastic endeavor. Another example, which I have mentioned briefly above, is the common assumption that women are ruled by their hormones. Fausto-Sterling says, “The idea that women’s reproductive systems direct their lives is ancient” (Myths of Gender 91). So, menstruation, pregnancy, and menopause all pose problems to woman’s endeavors outside of the home (i.e., participating in the male world). So, both Fausto-Sterling and Dowling show that the argument from nature claims that male and female biological bodies are the cause of the differences between the abilities, or characteristics of the sexes.
Fausto-Sterling and Dowling also present the other side of the nature/nurture argument, but ultimately disagree with the argument from socialization as a sole basis in determining the origin of sex differences, or whether such fundamental differences exist. Dowling bases a large part of her argument on socialization and holds the position that, “Gender is a fascinating subject because so much gets determined by a concept that is basically ‘socially constructed’” (Dowling 44). Thus, the argument from socialization, according to Dowling, in large part, creates our personal and external conceptions of gender (i.e., our view of gender in terms of the self and other). So, our physical bodies do not determine our ability; rather, our social conditioning influences the development of our physical bodies; thus, determining our physical abilities. She says,
"Culture, or environment, is a major influence on skill development. In tests to examine agility, coordination, and static and explosive strength in almost four thousand individuals between the ages of three and eighty, living conditions explained 22 percent of variance. Culture explained 26 percent" (Dowling 71). This example goes to show that even when gender is not in question, environment and culture affect the physical development of the individual. However, Dowling does not believe that individuals are solely shaped by socialization, but are in a state of constant development. Anne Fausto-Sterling also exposes feminists’ account of socialization. She says, “. . . feminist theorists view the body not as essence, but as a bare scaffolding on which discourse and performance build a completely acculturated being” (Sexing the Body 6). In other words, the body is given meaning by society through social customs and gender. Fausto-Sterling would not agree with this account, but does acknowledge that his is an argument from the socialization theory. Thus, Fausto-Sterling and Dowling explain that socialization is a way of explaining the differences between male and female characteristics, as well as the physical shape of the body, even though they do not necessarily adopt the theory of socialization as the sole foundation of their argument.
For this project, I will pose that both the argument from biology and the argument from socialization are limited in their perspectives on the gendering or sexing of the body. This is the position that both Dowling and Fausto-Sterling take, and which I find both intuitively and intellectually plausible. The arguments from biology and from socialization are dualistic in that they present two opposing reasons explaining the origin of sex differences. The first is purely of the body. The second is purely of society/culture. However, I find both explanations too simplistic. There does appear to be fundamental differences in the common appearance of the feminine body and the common appearance of the male body, i.e., males tend to be larger and more muscular, and women tend to be smaller and leaner. And if scientific tests were to be conducted to determine the differences between the two sexes, and perhaps even to explain what biological processes are occurring in causal relationship to these differences, I might find them valid. However, to say that our biology is the first cause of these differences is faulty. While it may certainly be true that fluctuating hormones and aggravated behavior have a causal relationship, this does not explain whether the fluctuating hormones caused the aggravated behavior, or whether aggravated behavior caused the fluctuating hormones. Thus, in examining whether male bodies are innately stronger than female bodies, I would affirm that both biological and environmental factors need to be taken into consideration. This makes intellectual sense in that one cannot confirm a cause merely on the fact that the effect appears to occur, but also makes intuitive sense in that I, as a female, do not feel I am limited by my physical body, which I believe is a shared feeling amongst other females who hold a similar philosophy about the self. In other words, our gendered philosophies (being the filter of our gendered environmental factors), influence the physical/biological shape of our bodies.
While the nature/nurture debate may appear to be common knowledge these days, I find it important to reiterate and to show the limits of this dualism. The argument from biology claims a fixed notion of gender, while the argument from socialization is a completely changeable notion of gender; however, neither can explain fully the complexities involved in the formation of gender and its characteristics. Rather, a combination of both points of view seems to provide a more in-depth and comprehensive answer to the questions: What makes males different than females and is there a possibility for change?
Embodying the Philosophers This section begins my critique of the canonical philosophers who have participated in shaping a common philosophy of gender amongst white, middle and upper-class, heterosexual society. In this section, I will discuss the gender of philosophies of Aristotle, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emanuel Kant, and will show that their philosophies present woman as weak, inferior, and subordinate to man, and that the embodiment of these gender philosophies supports the frailty of woman. At times their philosophies will explicitly denounce woman’s physical capacity. At other times, the philosophers may focus on a negative account of woman’s mental capabilities; however, I will argue that the denunciation of woman’s mental capabilities, in turn, affects the physical development of woman.
The last and most important part of this project examines the gender philosophies of canonical philosophers. While “the frailty myth” certainly wasn’t created solely by philosophers, they did have a large impact in shaping common philosophies about men and women. Nearly every male canonical philosopher has written something about the nature of men and women (particularly women), whether in passing or as a project in and of itself. However, these philosophers hold a lot of esteem, historically and in the present, their philosophies on gender are often validated by the validity of their other philosophical works, which in turn reinforces customary gender philosophies. Often, philosophers who are thought of as extremely intelligent or even geniuses seem to fall short when it comes to gender. In other words, while the rest of their works are extremely logical and ground shaking, truly works of a master mind, their philosophies on gender often sharply contrast, with logical fallacies/errors and philosophical inconsistencies littering the pages. So, by examining certain canonical philosophers’ gender philosophies, I will show how his philosophy is or is not relevant to current gender conceptions.
Feminist philosophers such as Nancy Tuana point out that reading works about women is unsettling for women as these philosophers claim that they (women) are incapable of doing the activity they are currently doing. Tuana says, “The woman reading Aristotle cannot identify with Aristotle’s description of woman, for his construction of woman’s nature entails that she is unable to undertake the very thing in which she in engaged—philosophy” (Tuana 3). Despite these difficulties, Tuana wants women and men to begin reading philosophy with a critical eye, looking for ways gender is being constructed. This project will focus on understanding the way philosophers have constructed gender and showing has these philosophies have been embodied.
Embodying AristotleI argue that Aristotle believes women are deformed men and of an inferior quality, and that this gender philosophy has cultural and internal ramifications that support the embodiment of frailty. I begin my discussion of Aristotle by showing Aristotle’s use of Logos to support the activity of man and the passivity of woman. I then show how this biological analysis of man and woman is extended into the everydayness of man and woman. Finally, and most importantly, I show how Aristotle’s gender philosophy, if embodied, negatively shapes the body of woman through the suppression of activity.
Understanding Aristotle’s use of logos in his gender philosophy is important as it explains the necessity of having two sexes within the blooded species of animals. Logos, on this account, is how the world has been rationally ordered. In other words, logos provides reason for the existence of male and female, in a similar way that God provides us with a reason for the distinction between male and female. Aristotle says, “They differ in their logos, because the male is that which has the power to generate in another . . ., while the female is that which can generate in itself . . .” (Aristotle 61). So, the faculty possessed by the male is opposed to the faculty possessed by the female. In other words, male and female are not overlapping in anyway, i.e., males and females are necessarily opposite of one another. Thus, the purpose of the male is to beget children and the purpose of the female is to give birth to them, according to logos.
Aristotle goes on to say that the male is the active partner of the generative couple, as the male provides the form or soul of the child, and the female the passive partner, as she provides the matter. He says, “Male is that which is able to concoct, to cause to take shape, and to discharge, semen possessing the ‘principle’ of the ‘form’. . .” (Aristotle 63). So, the male semen actively shapes the matter (menstrual blood) of the female. This can be explained further by Aristotle’s four causes: material, form, agent, and purpose/final product. So, a child is created through these four causes, according to Aristotle, with the mother providing the matter, the father providing the form, the father initiating the process, and the child being the “final” product or purpose. So, the male provides both the form and is the active participant in sex, which is why I say Aristotle defines man as active.
For Aristotle, soul is better than body, as soul provides the form, which is closer to the final product. He says, “And the proximate motive cause, to which belong the logos and the Form, is better and more divine in its nature than the Matter, it is better also that the superior one should be separate from the inferior one” (Aristotle 62). So, according to Aristotle, because the male provides the form, and thus the ability of the child to reason and not just the mere body (material substance) of the child, he is better than the female, and since woman lacks the ability to give soul to the child, she is like the male, but in his deformed counterpart. Aristotle says, “The reason is that the female is as it were a deformed male; and the menstrual discharge is semen, though in an impure condition; i.e., it lacks one constituent, and one only, the principle of soul” (Aristotle 63). So, the male is the superior human product, while the female is his deformity, as the male possess the ability to give soul.
Aristotle’s belief in the deformity of women doesn’t simply lie in her reproductive capacity, but extends to her capacities as a human as well. He says, in his Politics, “For that which has the capacity, in virtue of its intelligence, of looking forward is by nature the ruling and master element, while that which has the capacity, in virtue of its body, of carrying out this will of the superior is the subject and slave by nature” (Aristotle 66). So, man, the intelligent being, the possessor of reason due to his ability to produce soul, is the master and ruler, while the female, the maker of matter, the passive, is the ruled, or rather, is the subordinate of man. This implies that man is naturally smarter and more capable of reasoning than woman, which leaves woman to be man’s slave.
While this explanation on the generation of male and female species was intended by Aristotle to be empirically scientific, I find that in many ways this is a philosophical account of gender, as he’s often placing value judgments on his findings. For instance, he says, “. . . females are weaker and colder in their nature; and we should look upon the female state as being as it were a deformity . . .” (Aristotle 65 emphasis mine). While Aristotle does give an argument as to why males are better than females (i.e., men provide souls, women lack this ability), this is, in large part, a value judgment and not a mere explicative account of the generation of animals, which is implied in the word should. In other words, the fact that females provide the matter and males the soul does not necessarily imply that the male is the better and the female the worse; rather, he jumps from the mechanics of male and female biological reproduction to a hierarchical evaluation of these capacities. That is why he has to add the second part, “and we should . . .”, for simply stating that women are weaker and colder in their nature does not necessarily imply that they are deformities. He provides a value judgment again in a quote I used earlier, “And the proximate motive cause, to which belong the logos and the Form, is better and more divine in its nature than the Matter, it is better also that the superior one should be separate from the inferior one” (Aristotle 62, emphasis mine), as he’s using the words “better,” “superior,” and “inferior,” which are value judgments made by the author. Thus, I consider this a gender philosophy because Aristotle often deals with the value of males and females.
When I conceptualize woman in accordance with Aristotle’s gender philosophy, I picture a weak, frail, disfigured, helpless person; this being a result of Aristotle’s negative value judgments placed on woman. Woman is defined first and foremost as inability. While he specifically speaks of this in regards to reproduction, this inability is transferred to woman’s everydayness in that logos has destined her to the position of inferior, of the subordinate. Thus, it would make sense that she is by nature inability and needs the rule of the male to survive. If this gender philosophy were adopted by social institutions and enforced in the majority of situations throughout the day, woman may come to believe she is inadequate. Aristotle’s philosophy may verify her inadequacy, and, in turn, she may begin to feel that Aristotle was right. If she continues to believe this, the inadequacy will leak into other aspects of her life. Thus, she will feel physically and mentally incompetent and will become just as much, a weak and frail creature.
Woman’s inability is tied up with the notion of woman as the passive, which promotes the idea of woman as a sedentary being. Woman is passive, again, because she does not provide the active seed in reproduction. Passivity, along with inability, is not only in relation to reproductive function, but is transferred into woman’s everydayness, as she is destined by logos into the category of the subordinate, who must accept the rule of man without resistance. Ruling is active. To rule one must be confident and actively provide/create for his subordinate, or the subordinate won’t comply. To be passive is to be accepting. No creation is involved, no confidence is needed. If woman is unpracticed in the area of confidence, her ability to succeed mentally or physically, will be diminished greatly. Add to this the general claim Aristotle is making about woman’s inability, and woman has another reason to believe she is not capable of mental and physical prowess. Thus, there is no reason for her to be anything but a sedentary being.
And to top it all off, woman is deformity. What more could Aristotle say to completely diminish the hope of woman to be anything other than a mere slave to man? And even a slave may be better off in this case. While slaves are believed, by Aristotle, to be of a similar inferiority, the male (and even the female) slave is granted the exception of physical labor as one area of prowess. However, woman is granted no such exception. Her only purpose, according to Aristotle, is to bring forth children, and she’s not even good at that. He says, “There is also a difference between human beings and the other animals with regard to gestation. Other animals are most of the time in better physical condition, whereas the majority of women suffer discomfort in connexion with gestation” (Aristotle 66), this being due to their sedentary nature. Claiming that woman is by nature deformed is a sure way of suppressing the mental and physical prowess of woman, if she and/or her culture chooses to embrace such philosophies.
If our culture or our own philosophies are shaped by this gender philosophy, or even parts of it, then the likely hood of women reaching their physical potential would be diminished. What’s interesting is that our current gender philosophies do reflect the idea of woman as passive and, in some cases, of woman as inadequate. For example, it is the male who is the fighter, the protector, the provider (all active roles) and it is the woman who is the homemaker, the caregiver, the lover of peace (all accepting and peaceful roles). An aggressive woman is a threat. She’s a bitch. An aggressive man is a role model. He’s a Man. Our society (although this is and has been changing) promotes feminine passivity and masculine activity. Thus, it’s no coincidence that women are physically weaker than men. If men possess an active mentality they are more likely to use their bodies and develop physical strength. Woman’s passivity encourages her to stay back, away from the action, and focus on maintaining the present, which in turn may be cause for the deterioration of her present physicality. So, it should be evident how Aristotle has influenced our current gender philosophies and the current shape of the masculine and feminine body.
In this interpretation of Aristotle I have shown that Aristotle has presented woman as a weak and inferior creature, who is destined to be ruled by man. I have shown that this account is not merely a biological analysis of the reproductive functions of males and females, but also a philosophy of gender that has influenced our current philosophies of gender. And through this analysis I have proposed that the embodiment of this gender philosophy has encouraged the frailty of women throughout history and in our current day.
Embodying Jean-Jacques Rousseau The purpose of this paper is to show that the gender philosophy presented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau encourages the frailty of woman. I will begin by showing that Rousseau, in Emile, argues that the constitution of man and woman are different by nature; therefore, their education should be different. I will then show how this is a philosophy of gender, as Rousseau is postulating the origin of the differences of the sexes and is offering a suggestion (a theory/philosophy) to deal with this difference. Finally, I will show that Rousseau’s gender philosophy, if embodied, encourages woman to limit her physical development, while he encourages man to make it his duty to develop his strength. I will also discuss his use of power in his gender philosophy, as Rousseau seems to be presenting a relationship of power dependent on the physical and mental weakness of woman and the physical and mental strength of man.
Rousseau believes that differences in constitution between the two sexes are due to nature, or to biological sex. He says, “Everything that characterises as sex should be respected as established by nature” (Rousseau 133). Rousseau provides three ways that the constitutions of men and women differ, the first being that men are active and strong and women are passive and weak by nature. He says, “From this diversity comes the first difference which has to be noted in their personal relations. It is the part of the one [the male] to be active and strong, and the other [the female] to be passive and weak” (Rousseau 131). Second, Rousseau says that woman is intended, by nature, to please man through her charms and grace, and that man is intended, by nature, to please woman through his strength, with the emphasis being on woman’s subordinate position and man’s dominant position. He says, “Accept this principle and it follows in the second place that woman is intended to please man . . . Masterfullness is his special attribute. He pleases by the very fact that he is strong” (Rousseau 131). Rousseau’s third point about difference in sex is that both the strong (the male) and the weak (the female) depend on each other out of necessity, but woman ultimately depends on man more so than man depends on woman. He says, “Hence as a third consequence of the different constitution of the sexes, the stronger may appear to be master, and yet actually be dependent on the weaker . . . by enduring law of nature” (Rousseau 132). A few moments later he adds, “Men and women are made for each other but they differ in the measure of their dependence on each other. We [men] could get on better without women than women could get on without us” (Rousseau 134). Men and women naturally need each other, but if it came down to an instance where one had to go without the other, men would be better off than women. In other words, woman’s natural weakness cannot stand on its own, but man’s natural strength can. While women are naturally dependent on men, men are only partially dependent on women by nature. Rousseau uses these three points to show that men and women are constituted differently in accord with nature.
Since Rousseau believes men and women are naturally, or biologically different in constitution, he makes the suggestion that men and women should be educated differently. Since woman is destined to please man, her education should be geared toward pleasing men. While man is destined to please through his strength, he must develop his strengths. He says, “In the boys the object of the training is the development of strength, in the girls the development of graces” (Rousseau 136). Here Rousseau seems to be speaking of physical strength and physical grace, so if men are to be physically strong they must train to develop this strength, and if women are to be graceful in their movements they must learn how to be graceful. Developing strength for the male will please the female, whether through providing protection, or through aesthetic appearance, and developing grace for the female will please the male, not practically, but aesthetically. Rousseau also suggests that girls should refrain from learning how to read and write at an early age, but should focus on activities that they will do in their adult life, activities that they are naturally inclined to do like needlework, counting, and dress. He says, “As I see it, the special functions of women, their inclinations and their duties, combine to suggest the kind of education they require” (Rousseau 134). Rousseau wants women to develop grace and the practical skills needed as house wives, which requires women to be educated differently than men.
While many may not think this portion of Rousseau’s philosophy of education is important, or rather that Sophie’s education is a “side note,” I will argue that Rousseau is doing very influential work by delineating a philosophy of gender, as he’s trying to understand the origin of gender differences and a way of dealing with these differences. The origin of gender differences, to Rousseau, is nature. In other words, nature has purposefully split humanity into male and female, with the males possessing certain innate characteristics and women different innate capabilities. Rousseau says, “All we know with certainty is that the common features are due to the species and the differences to sex” (Rousseau 131). In other words, the features that are common to both males and females are features due to species and the different features are due to sex. Rousseau seems to be suggesting that all of our characteristics are derived in some way from our biological and physical bodies. The rest of his discussion about Sophie, or the ideal woman, is focused on the purpose of these gender differences and the appropriate education of a woman to ensure the refinement of her specific differences, as well as those of Emile. So, Rousseau is philosophizing about the meaning of these differences and providing a structure of interaction for the male and the female. Thus, Rousseau is providing a philosophy of gender in his discussion about the philosophy of education (after all, don’t education and gender go hand in hand).
Yet in Rousseau’s attempt to show that men and women are by nature different, he fails to show how, by nature, these differences exist. For instance, he says after asserting that man is the strong and woman the weak, “Accept this principle and it follows in the second place that woman is intended to please man” (Rousseau 131). Rousseau is basing his entire argument on flimsy ground, as he, in no way, supports this claim, and asks his reader to merely accept this principle. Although he could have appealed to Aristotle in support of his claim, Rousseau fails to do as much and leaves this paper shell of an argument to flutter around through the centuries.
If this gender philosophy was accepted by a culture and presented to woman as her only option for existence, thus the embodiment of this gender philosophy, by the woman, would ultimately bring forth a physically frail and subordinate body. Rousseau places emphasis on woman’s frailty. He says she is the passive and he is the active (Rousseau 131). She is to only develop enough physical strength to do her activities (household activities) with grace (Rousseau 136). Instead, her energies should be focused on her outward physical appearance, i.e., clothing, adornments, etc. She’s not to be seen doing physical labor outside the house. Her duties are directly for her family in maintaining the house. Rousseau says, “They [women] should not be sturdy like men but for them” (Rousseau 136). Her strength isn’t for herself, but for others. Her body serves men through sex, through child birth, through food (cooking, nursing), and through domestic physical labor, but not for her own pleasure, needs, wants, desires; and while Rousseau values some basic physical development in the female, she should never provide more strength than is necessary for the task. Rousseau says, as I have quoted before, “In boys the object of the training [physical training] is the development of strength, in the girls the development of graces” (Rousseau 136). To develop more than grace would be excessive and unnecessary, as her place in the world does not require strength. Thus, if women aren’t presented with the option of developing strength beyond grace, women will remain week, or if women have the option, but refuse it because they want to remain feminine, they again, have no other option but to remain weak.
In Rousseau’s theory the strong and the weak are dependent on each other, which leads me to suggest that this is a relationship of power, which falsely bonds woman and man to their specific powers, furthering woman’s immanence. Rousseau says, “Hence as a third consequence of the different constitution of the sexes, the stronger may appear to be master, and yet actually be dependent on the weaker . . .” (Rousseau 132). So, for Rousseau, man and woman are dependent on each other. The man’s power is his strength. Woman’s power is her charm. The man is supposed to be strong and able to support and defend the family. The woman is supposed to charm him into doing his best and being kind. He says, “By giving woman the capacity to stimulate desires greater than can be satisfied, nature has made man dependent on woman’s good will and constrained him to seek to please her as a condition of her submission” (Rousseau 132). While each sex is supposed to naturally posses his or her own power, Rousseau also states that if one sex tries to gain power allotted to the opposite sex, then this power structure falls apart and the man or woman in question will loose all advantage (Rousseau 134). If this relationship of power was supported by a society, then both women and men would be presented with limited options, with women getting the short end of the stick. If woman took these options (which would be highly likely if these were the only options present) refraining from aggressive passions, maintaining a level, pleasant attitude, and focusing energies on charm and beauty rather than physical development would be necessary training for her, which means her body will respond accordingly. Pursuing further physical development, a better education, or living for herself would be out of the question as she may feel this is her only way to exist within the world. Thus, her body will form accordingly to the level of passivity it encounters, i.e., this power structure reinforces frailty.
So, Rousseau’s gender philosophy sketches woman as passive and subservient to man. Her sole purpose is to please man by her charms and her skills as a mother and wife. I have shown that while these ideas about the sexes may appear to be a somewhat trivial part of Emile, they are, rather, a philosophy for the interrelation between the sexes proposed by Rousseau. In this section I have also shown the ramifications of adopting a gender philosophy of this nature, which will ultimately promote the frailty of women’s bodies.
Embodying Immanuel Kant I will argue that Kant conceives of woman as a creature of the beautiful whose virtue and moral capabilities should follow along these lines; thus, when this gender philosophy is embedded within cultural institutions, women are left with very few options but to conform to a gender philosophy that emphasizes woman as an object pleasing to man. When such a philosophy is dependent on the eye of another, which does not enjoy the appearance of feminine physical strength, the physical capabilities of women diminish significantly.
In Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime,” woman is parallel to man in that she is of the beautiful and man of the sublime. By beautiful Kant means of the explicitly aesthetic. In other words, flowers are explicitly beautiful, or a sunny day is explicitly beautiful. Both of these examples are non-threatening. Sublime beauty, on the other hand, explains things that are implicitly beautiful. For instance night time can be beautiful, but at the same time presents threats and obstacles, or, as another example, wolves are beautiful but can be violent at the same time. So, women are explicitly beautiful. He says, “her figure in general is finer, her features more delicate and gentler, and her mien more engaging and more expressive of friendliness, pleasantry, and kindness than in the male sex” (Kant 116). The difference described by Kant is one of a natural or biological origin. He says, “Women have a strong inborn feeling for all that is beautiful, elegant, and decorated” (Kant 117). The word inborn indicates that these characteristics are a result of biology or of a feminine essence (perhaps). In other words, these characteristics are unchangeable and should be accepted as they truly are. Any cross over of these characteristics goes against nature and destroys woman’s “feminine power.” Woman also has an inclination towards things that are beautiful.
In this text Kant is attempting to explicate a theory as to the origin of gender differences and is attempting to prescribe a method of interaction between the two sexes, which makes this theory a philosophy of gender. At the beginning of the third section of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant delineates the differences between males and females. He says, “. . . certain specific traits lie especially in the personality of this sex which distinguish it clearly from ours and chiefly result in making her known by the mark of the beautiful” (Kant 116). Such delineation defines woman and man. Woman is not a woman on account of her physiology (i.e., a womb, vagina, breasts) or her intelligence, or any other characteristics, except that she is a woman in that she is beautiful and appreciates the beautiful. The same is true for man, he is not defined by his physiology, or other characteristics, but by his ability to be rational and dutiful. In this way, Kant is categorizing what is appropriately masculine and appropriately feminine, rather than letting these distinctions remain free through a lack of discourse on the subject. Also, Kant is attempting to understand the origin of these differences. As I have said, Kant believes gender is “inborn,” i.e., from biology or an essence. While he believes these powers are innate he doesn’t have an answer as to why these are innate; rather, he admits that these “powers” are mysterious. He says, “. . . and not forgetting what one must reckon as a secret magic with which she makes our passion inclined to judgments favorable to her . . .” (Kant 116). This mystery is part of the feminine essence, which is part of woman, and distinguishes female from male. Kant is providing a philosophy of gender in that he provides theory as to the differences between male and female and to the origin of these differences.
Kant’s conception of woman as beautiful and as the knower of beauty does not support the conception of woman as strong. Since woman should be both morally and physically beautiful, according to Kant (with a few exceptions, i.e., when woman ages, she’s allowed to focus on other things beyond her physical appearance, but things still of the beautiful), cultivating physical strength is of little priority to her. The acquisition of physical strength is not beautiful. Building muscle requires one to lift heavy objects. In lifting these objects, people (for one reason or another) feel compelled to make awful faces. Although this can be controlled, it’s not beautiful. Building muscle encourages the production of sweat. One’s cloths become wet and smelly: characteristics which certainly are not beautiful and one’s face often turns red from exertion. Kant says that women desire pale faces as they reflect inward feeling and delicate sensation (Kant 122). A face red with exertion is not beautiful, and a pale face, or even a simple rosy face, is preferable. Also, if woman were to take up a physical activity for the first time, there would be a period where she would have to train her body to move appropriately. During this period she will be clumsy, as her body is not used to moving in this manner and all grace will temporarily be lost, which makes her temporarily less attractive to the male. Throughout training for any physical activity, woman’s face will be contorted with a look of desire and concentration, loosing all hope of charming men, as woman’s face charms when there’s a pleasant look upon it. Kant says, “A woman in whom the agreeableness beseeming her sex particularly makes manifest the moral expression of the sublime is called beautiful in the proper sense; so far as the moral composition makes itself discernible in the mien or facial features . . .” (Kant 121). If woman were to pursue her full physical capacity, she would not be beautiful and would loose her “power” over man.
Another aspect of Kant’s philosophy that does not support the conception of the feminine body as a strong body is the idea that there is beauty in woman’s weakness. While Kant is speaking of moral weakness, I find that this moral weakness leads to physical weakness. The one moral weakness that Kant points out in women is vanity. He says, “Vanity, for which one reproaches the fair sex so frequently, so far as it is a fault in that sex, yet is only a beautiful fault” (Kant 119). A person who is vain is a person obsessed with his or her looks. This obsession is particularly focused on maintaining a body that replicates the common conception of beauty held by society, in this case, men’s conceptions. As mentioned in the last paragraph, the activities involved in creating a muscular/athletic body are not beautiful in the explicit sense. A person who is vain would not want to participate in these activities for risk of looking silly. Similarly, Kant believes that men in general have a common conception of what is attractive in women. He says, “Regarding the somewhat finer taste, I affirm that the sort of beauty we have called the pretty figure is judged by all men very much alike, and that opinions about it are not so different as one generally maintains” (Kant 122). A woman who believes her “power” is rooted in her looks would be likely to live up to their (men’s) conception of a beautiful woman. Later, Kant explicitly describes what physical features a beautiful woman has. He says, a lady is called pretty if she possesses, “A well-proportioned figure, regular features, colors of eyes and face which contrast prettily, beauties pure and simple which are also pleasing in a bouquet and gain a cool approbation” (Kant 121). A muscular body would be out of the question for a vain woman looking to harness her “feminine power.”
While Kant’s gender philosophy may seem eerily familiar but distant to women today, there was a time when women were subjected to similar philosophies about women which are, in some ways, held over today and do not support an image of woman as a strong body. Fashion models, and actresses are common examples of women who live up to the idea of woman as part of the beautiful realm. Models (and for the most part, actresses) are chosen for their physical appeal to men. They are slender, well proportioned, and have, probably what Kant would call, attractive facial features. They are, as the name indicates, models of feminine beauty. These bodies are not strong bodies (although this is changing slightly). Many models are anorexic or bulimic and are physically frail. These women are attempting to maintain an image of beauty that is, in many ways, wholly unattainable. While this image of woman may not be what our mother’s or our mother’s, mother’s image of woman was, woman has not changed so drastically. She may have had a few more pounds previously, or a lot of extra pounds, but she was never strong and she was always for the liking of men. When woman is embedded in a culture that supports gender philosophies such as Kant’s, her options are limited to a body that is for the aesthetic pleasure of men, as this is where her power lies. Although the option to be physically strong is always there it leads her down a road of harassment and social discomfort (to say the least), as she would no longer fit into the category of the neat category of woman. Embodying the philosophies of Kant, Rousseau, or Aristotle doesn’t seem that far out of question when the social powers around women are constricting their options and supporting the frailty myth.
Kant’s gender philosophy is quite the romantic explanation of males and females, but one that upholds the frailty myth. I have shown that Kant supports a theory of men and women that holds men as in the category of the sublime and women in the category of the beautiful. I have shown that Kant is providing us with a philosophy of gender, and I have shown how this philosophy does not allow for the feminine strong body. Last, I have shown how this philosophy is still present within modern society and has been embodied by women of the past, and still has the potential to be embodied today. Strength is of the sublime. It is both beautiful and ugly; therefore, woman cannot pursue the strong body.
Body as Source of Intelligibility: Supporting the Notion of a Different Intelligibility due to the Inhibited Intentionality of the FeminineThis paper will show that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body as the source of intelligibility, or knowledge of world can be extended to provide an explanation for limited feminine motility. I will begin by 1) setting up the problem of women’s motility, 2) explaining Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of motility and intelligibility, and 3) introducing Iris Young’s theory that women move in the world differently. Next, I will present Young’s theory in a way that suggests feminine intelligibility is shaped by feminine motility, and may support a difference between masculine and feminine intelligence. As evidence of how bodily motility shapes intelligibility, I will use the Confucian concept of li, as presented in Hahm Chaibong’s essay entitled Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucaultian Interpretation, and Joe Hyams’ book entitled Zen in the Martial Arts to show the Martial Artists belief in intelligibility through the practice of a physical art.
While all human beings possess the ability to move, (even quadriplegics, as technology has given them ways of interacting with the world) I will be writing about the varying degrees of motility, in particular, the difference between modes of feminine and masculine motility. Models of feminine motility have been created by past philosophers, religious and educational institutions, as well as institutions of health and fitness (along with many others), which have supported an understanding of feminine motility that is the direct opposite of masculine motility. Masculine movement, on the one hand, includes the ability to move in the world with strength and confidence of body. Strength and confidence are the bodily skills needed to protect, to build, to destroy, and to rule (general masculine characteristics). Feminine movement, on the other hand, includes the ability to move with grace and lightness of body. Grace and lightness are skills needed to obey, to serve, to do intricate and detailed work, and to please (general feminine characteristics). The two categories of motility oppose each other in that the masculine category cannot, at the same time, possess feminine characteristics of motility, or vice versa. A person of strength and confidence cannot be light and graceful. Strength is generally accompanied by bulk (although there are exceptions) and bulk is often absent of grace. Thus, feminine motility and masculine motility are two opposed categories of movement.
As mentioned, past philosophers and religious institutions (to name a few) have supported a similar mode of feminine motility. Influential philosophers such as Kant, Rousseau, and Aristotle all believed that feminine bodies were weak and incapable of masculine activities. Kant says, “her figure in general is finer, her features more delicate and gentler. . .” (Kant 116). Rousseau presents his view of the feminine body explicitly. He says, “It is the part of the one [the male] to be active and strong, and the other [the female] to be passive and weak” (Emile 131), and Aristotle, who seems to be the least friendly to the feminine body, says, “females are weaker and colder in their nature; and we should look upon the female state as being as it were a deformity . . .” (Aristotle 65). The feminine body here is passive, weak, sedentary, and ornamental. If the feminine body is weak and incapable than its motility will vary from its masculine counterpart.
Religions have also maintained and encouraged a similar view of feminine motility. In Christian churches, and in the religion itself, the feminine body has represented purity, a source of food and nourishment, and peace. A body that is pure is a body that is untouched and that does not seek touching. It does not move within the world, but retains and maintains it original state; thus, on this account, the feminine body is a body that is sedentary. In other words, it doesn’t move out in the world, but into itself, its pure state. The feminine body as a source of food and nourishment, while providing an important role within society, can also be seen as the weakening of the feminine body. When a woman is breast-feeding she gives of herself, i.e., her energy and her strength, to another. If she does not receive the proper nourishment, her strength will diminish. Even as a cook for others, she still expends her energy and strength for the nourishment of others. The feminine body as a symbol of peace also promotes a sedentary view of the feminine body in that she is not actively engaged with the world, but to maintain a peaceful state, or passive engagement. When I speak of peace here, I am not speaking of world peace or peace for the state, but peace for the home, peace for the village, etc. Peace, in this sense, is a state of maintaining and not necessarily a state of active engagement.
Merleau-Ponty provides the foundation for my discussion about feminine motility. This will serve as my interpretation of Merleau-Ponty and not necessarily a summary of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, particularly my interpretation on intelligibility.
For Merleau-Ponty, motility is inseparable from world; thus, an explanation of world according to Merleau-Ponty is needed. World for Merleau-Ponty is given, i.e., world exists prior to our entrance into it, and is what we enter into and are given upon conception. Merleau-Ponty says, “The world is there before any possible analysis of mine . . .” (CPR 81). World does not come about through a gradual realization of it, but is already there at the start. Perception, however, grants us different access to understanding world. Merleau-Ponty says, “. . . the world is what we perceive” (CPR 87). It allows us to focus on particular aspects, helping to organize and to come to a temporal understanding of world. World is temporal in that it is a moving understanding, i.e., as we age, we gain a different understanding of world; thus, knowledge of world constantly shifts and is temporal. However, perception will never allow us to fully grasp or possess world. Merleau-Ponty says, “I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible” (CPR 87). So, consciousness of world is brought about through perception of world, which brings with it temporal knowledge of world.
Later in the Phenomenology of Perception, particularly in the section “The Lived Body,” Merleau-Ponty discusses how our bodies are what inform us of world. In other words, our bodies are what give us the capability to perceive. It is the motility of the body which creates world. He says, “Consciousness is being towards the thing through the intermediary of the body” (The Body 154-55). So, bodies are vehicles of openness which experience/perceive the world. As bodies perceive, as they move within the world, they become conscious of world; thus, as consciousness develops, world develops. As infants our bodies are inexperienced within the world (motility isn’t fully developed), which may explain our general inability to remember life as an infant, but with time our bodies gain experience within the world, and, therefore, gain consciousness. Our bodies allow us to form a horizon of knowledge.
Intelligibility comes from knowledge of world, and, therefore motility. Merleau-Ponty says, “A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its ‘world’, and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it. . .” (Merleau-Ponty 155). Thus, when the body learns to move within the world in a particular way, that movement is incorporated into, and becomes a part of, world for that being. It is the culmination of world, at a given moment, that creates intelligibility. Fragments of knowledge do not constitute intelligibility; rather, intelligibility is a horizon of knowledge, or the accumulation of knowledge gained through motility (or the body moving toward things in the world). Merleau-Ponty says,
At each successive instant of movement, the preceding instant is not lost sight of. It is, as it were, dovetailed into the present, and present perception generally speaking consists in drawing together, on the basis of one’s present position, the succession of previous positions, which envelop each other (The Body 155).
So, past movements, or past knowledge, are incorporated into the current perception of world. In other words, as being gains knowledge it doesn’t forget it; rather, it uses that knowledge to inform one’s physical movements in the present. This, again, means that knowledge is always in motion. As long as we are moving we are acquiring knowledge of world and re-inventing our intelligibility. So, for Merleau-Ponty, motility enables beings to acquire a horizon of knowledge, i.e., motility allows the development of intelligibility.
Iris Young writes an essay in response to Merleau-Ponty entitled, Throwing Like a Girl. While Young is sympathetic towards Merleau-Ponty’s work, she argues that feminine movement is different than masculine movement and uses Merleau-Ponty’s account of motility and intelligibility to show that while women have bodies that move towards the world their bodies are, at the same time, “laden with immanence.”
In section II of Throwing Like a Girl, Young argues that there are three modalities of feminine movement: ambiguous transcendence, inhibited intentionality, and discontinuous unity. She finds the source of these modalities in that woman’s experience of the body is both as a thing and as a capacity (Young 264). Young points out that in Merleau-Ponty’s work, he often speaks of the body as a transcendence to the world, an openness that connects being and world. She says, “The transcendence of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty describes is a transcendence that moves out from the body in its immanence in an open and unbroken directedness . . .” (Young 265). However, Young argues that, for women, there is another layer attached to this transcendence, which makes the experience quite different. She says, “While feminine bodily existence is a transcendence and openness to the world, it is an ambiguous transcendence, a transcendence that is at the same time laden with immanence” (Young 265). In other words, feminine movement doesn’t simply begin in immanence (i.e., in a child like state), but remains in immanence (Young 265). For example, girls (and boys for that matter) who have not been taught to throw will only use the part of the body that is directly related to the motion while the rest of the body remains “rooted in immanence” (Young 265). This immanence, she believes, can be extended to the majority of feminine movements. She argues that women are typically the ones who remain in this state of immanence, while the boys (who are not subject to “sexist oppression in contemporary society” and have been taught to throw) learn to put their whole bodies into the motion of throwing, allowing the body to competently complete the task. Feminine transcendence is ambiguous in that it both has the potential to move away from the body’s initial immanence, but at the same time it holds itself back from this “continuous calling forth of capacities” (i.e., from the continuous usage of its physical capacity).
Inhibited intentionality relates to what I have just sketched out, that of the restricted movement of the feminine body. Young finds that Merleau-Ponty’s account of “intentionality in motility” points towards an uninterrupted movement from aim to enactment. In other words, movement first starts with an aim and then ends in the enactment. Young argues that feminine intentionality is interrupted in that the enactment is believed by her to be problematic. Young says, “Feminine bodily existence is an inhibited intentionality, which simultaneously reaches toward a projected end with an ‘I can’ and withholds its full bodily commitment to that end in a self-imposed ‘I cannot’ (Young 265). In other words, the feminine body does not go towards a task with a confident “I can;” rather, it underestimates its real physical potential. For example, when stretching to reach a food item up high, it is a feminine style of movement not to reach to the individual’s full reaching capacity, or, if we go back to the throwing example, it is a feminine style of movement not to put the whole body into the throwing motion. So, the feminine intentionality is inhibited by a false belief in its motility. Thus, aim and enactment are problematic in this account of feminine motility.
Young goes on to argue that the unity of feminine movement is discontinuous. Discontinuous unity is the breaking up of movement from aim to enactment. She argues that on Merleau-Ponty’s account movement smoothly goes from aim to enactment in one continuous unified motion, but Young wants to say that feminine movement is discontinuous because the aim doesn’t always lead to competent enactment. In other words, women often know that they have the potential to perform an action, as they have seen others do it, but don’t believe they can competently perform the action themselves; thus, there is a discontinuity in their performance of the action. She says, “The part of the body that is transcending toward an aim is in relative disunity from those that remain immobile” (Young 266). So, in the example of the feminine throwing style, the arm is in disunity with the rest of the body, the person does not engage the whole body in the act of throwing but only one part. Thus, the aim is separated from the act, as the body inefficiently attempts to perform the action. Belief in one’s incompetence is what maintains this state of immanence and reinforces discontinuous unity.
Space is also an issue for Young. If women move differently within the world, their understanding and usage of space must be different as well. There are three modalities in regards to spatiality as well: enclosed space, double spatiality, and positioned space. As I have mentioned before, feminine movement tends to be small and limited and feminine bodily comportment tends to take up little space. While much space is available, the feminine body makes very little use of it. Young says, “The space, that is, that is physically available to the feminine body is frequently of greater radius than the space that she uses and inhabits” (Young 268). Young uses the example of women (typical women) catching a ball. She says most women tend to wait for the ball and then react to it when it comes near, rather than move towards the ball to catch it (Young 269). In this example, which can be extended to other types of movement, space is not utilized despite its presence. The problem here, Young will argue, is that there is a conflict between the “here” and “yonder.” In other words, the space that is “here” is tangible, but the space “yonder” is not to the feminine spatial eye. She says, “The space of the ‘yonder’ is a space in which feminine existence projects possibilities in the sense of understanding that ‘someone’ could move within it, but not I” (Young 268). She refers to this as double spatiality. Rooting the self in the ‘here’ positions the self in space. She says, “In its immanence and inhibition, feminine spatial existence is positioned by a system of coordinates that does not have its origin in her own intentional capacities” (Young 269). In other words, she feels fixed and unable to move. Another way of looking at this is to think of feminine motility as being “field-dependent.” In other words, her movement is rooted in the immediate space around her and does not extend beyond this position, although the potential exists. Young calls this positioned space.
For my argument I will accept Merleau-Ponty’s account of motility and intelligibility, as well as Young’s feminist account of Merleau-Ponty, but would like to focus attention on the difference in intelligibility between males and females due to the difference in motility. If intelligibility comes from motility (as Merleau-Ponty would have it) and if motility is inhibited for women (as Young would have it), then women’s intelligibility is also inhibited. In other words, I will argue that one’s mental capacity is shaped by one’s physical capacity, as it is one’s movement in the world that informs him or her of world.
Young presents a study that shows how spatial intelligibility is influenced by motility. She says,
". . . it has been claimed that males have a greater capacity for lifting a figure out of its spatial surroundings and viewing relations in space as fluid and interchangeable, where as females have a greater tendency to regard figures as embedded within and fixed by their surroundings" (Young 268).Young believes that the feminine tendency to embed figures in their surroundings is the result of feminine body spatiality, as I have mentioned before, that orients the body to a rooted place in relation to its surroundings. She says, “If feminine body spatiality is such that the woman experiences herself as rooted and enclosed, on the reversibility assumption it would follow that visual space for feminine existence also has its closures of immobility and fixity” (Young 269). In other words, knowledge of visual spatiality is gained through an understanding of body spatiality, like a chain of events. For example, if there exists a belief, even a subconscious belief, that the body is rooted, then there is a likely possibility that the person will move as if she were rooted. If this rooted experience is the sum of her experiences, then it is likely that her visual spatiality will be shaped similarly, as these are her only experiences in the world. This seems to be one of the few places where she directly ties intelligibility and motility together for purposes beyond explanation of her theory. I will take this idea and extend it to all aspects of her theory, showing how it may be applicable to women today.
Ambiguous transcendence plays a large part in the hindrance of feminine intelligibility. As mentioned before, ambiguous transcendence is the simultaneous moving away from immanence and holding oneself back from “the continuous calling forth of capacities.” If feminine movement is ambiguous, if it lacks direction, then the experience of ambiguous direction can be extended to the mental processes. Our bodies place us in positions that expose us to different types of knowledge. If the body lacks a direction and focus, then the body, as a whole, will acquire knowledge that is ambiguous. In other words, in this situation, the body will acquire knowledge that is fragmented or pulled apart. For example, a person may understand her physical potentiality, but doubts her ability to achieve it (either consciously or unconsciously). The fact that her body experiences this conflicted, ambiguous sensation leaves her to acquire a conflicted and ambiguous intelligibility, since intelligibility is gained from experienced motility according to Merleau-Ponty. Thus, feminine intelligibility is fragmented if feminine transcendence remains in a state of immanence.
In terms of inhibited intentionality, intelligibility is hindered in that if the body is immanent in its moving out into the world, i.e., if the body reaches out, but does not reach to its full potential in a fluid motion, then feminine intelligibility will develop in a similar fashion. In other words, if one is seeking knowledge but is hesitant that she will be capable of obtaining this knowledge, then the motion from the aim to the acquisition becomes problematic. She will remain immanent in her aim and will not fully reach toward her goal, just as her body remains immanent in the action of throwing. This may be a contributing reason why women score lower on the mathematical portion of standardized tests, as women are often told they are not as equally competent as males in mathematics, just as they are told they are not as equally competent as males in athletics. If they believe this to be true, then when (or if) they do aim at gaining mathematical knowledge, they may doubt their ability to do so, especially if their previous bodily experiences is an experience of incompetence; thus, inhibiting their intention to acquire mathematical knowledge. In this case, the aim is made problematic by self doubt. So, our bodily experiences provide us with information about our capabilities that informs our belief in our mental capacities, with the result being that women perform differently than men in mathematics and other areas of study.
Effort put toward acquiring knowledge is also discontinuous for many women. Just as the connection between aim and acquisition is unfocused and problematic, it is also discontinuous. In other words, the motion from aim to acquisition is broken. As mentioned before in the throwing example, feminine bodily experience is often discontinuous, with the arm being severed from the body in its motion, i.e., the whole body is not put into the motion of the ball. This type of body movement provides the ground work for our intelligibility, as our movement within the world informs our intelligibility. Thus, when women go to learn a new concept or idea, they run the risk of not putting their whole effort into the learning process, as a result of the problems above: ambiguous transcendence and inhibited intentionality. Evidence of this can be seen, again, in the mathematics where women may feel inhibited, which ultimately leaves the directed motion of learning broken and discontinuous. Thus, lack of physical confidence (freedom to move within the world) hinders mental confidence and development.
Evidence of gaining intelligibility from the body can be seen in many East Asian philosophies and in the martial arts. In Confucianism, Li is a way of molding and shaping the body to create an ethical being. Hahm Chaibong writes an essay entitled, Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucaultian Interpretation, where he discusses how intelligibility is gained from li. Also, Joe Hyams’ book entitled, Zen in the Martial Arts, shows an example of how intelligibility in gained from the practice of the martial arts. Although Zen in the Martial Arts is not scholarly writing, Hyams is a long standing practitioner of the martial arts, who has studied more than the physical element of the martial art, but also the spiritual. I will use both of these writers in my examples.
According to Chaibong, in Confucianism there is no distinction between mind and body; rather, the mind and body are one, in a way that mind and body cannot be distinguished. Chaibong says,"Confucianism does not accept the soul-body, res cogitans-res extensa dichotomy so dear to Western thought . . . It would be misleading, therefore, to say that Confucianism ‘prioritizes’ the body over the soul, res extensa over res cogitans. One would have to go further and say that for Confucianism, body is all there is" (Chaibong 316).In other words, the body is an opening to the world through which intelligibility is gained and through which character is made visible. Mind is not considered something that is in accord with body, or that one can point to in any way. To say that mind and body work together is to distinguish between the two. Body is all there is. Thus, intelligibility for the Confucian does not come from the brain or mind alone, but comes from the body.
Within Confucianism is the concept of li, which can be described as a ritual way of movement, used to develop the ethical self, and, from which, I will argue, intelligibility arises. Chaibong explains li as, “. . . a matter of cultivating, training, and disciplining one’s body so that it will always practice and manifest truth, virtue, and sincerity” (Chaibong 318). In other words, ritual activity trains the body to act appropriately and from this ritual, morality arises. Chaibong says, “Li is a codification of what is considered “proper” behavior far all social contexts in which one finds oneself” (Chaibong 317). So, li can be extended to all activities of life, including menial tasks, as well as intense training in the martial arts. If these ritual movements are practiced and accepted fully by the practitioner, then the person will come to understand morality, putting the practitioner in harmony with the people and world around him or her. In other words, knowledge is gained through the ritual movements leading to a cultivated intelligibility. So, for Confucians, li, or ritual movement, provides a way of showing how physical movement leads to the development of intelligibility, which, in this case, would be considered a moral intelligibility. The example of li corresponds with my previous argument that women’s inhibited intentionality, in regards to bodily movement, can lead to inhibited intelligibility.
The martial arts could be considered a way of practicing li; thus, the martial arts could be a way of showing how movement of the body informs intelligibility. For instance, to perform many of the moves in the martial arts, more than just physical strength is needed. In other words, while learning to perform a move there’s a shift in perspective that occurs; this allows one to perform moves otherwise thought impossible. This shift in perspective isn’t necessarily body centered, but is a perspective that can be adapted to all aspects of life. For instance, when learning complicated moves in the martial arts, or moves that are physically strenuous, one must learn to focus on the moment and push away all other thoughts. Until this is done, the movement cannot be executed. The ability to comprehend this idea also does not allow one to execute the movement; rather, it is through the actual physical practice of mastering it that knowledge is gained. Many martial artists claim that the ability to focus while doing physical activities finds its way into their everyday lives. Hyam speaks of this in his book, when he tells the story of a day at his dojo where he was squeezing practice in between two work appointments and felt very distracted. He was performing very poorly and his instructor knew exactly what was wrong and told Hyam, “As long as what you are doing at the moment is exactly what you are doing at that moment and nothing else, you are one with yourself and with what you are doing—and that is Zen . . .” (Hyam 20). After this class, Hyam noticed that he felt anxious and distracted while doing many activities in his life and tried to apply the same focused technique he usually does in his martial art practice to his daily activities, and he did so with success. Thus, he learned this focus through the physical discipline/ritual of the martial arts. So, the practice of martial arts can be considered similar to li and can be used as an example in showing that intelligibility is gained from the body. At the same time, this example can be used to show that women’s inhibited intentionality results in limited intelligibility, in that the physical body is not engaging in activities that will encourage its development.
In this paper I have shown that motility leads to intelligibility. With Merleau-Ponty providing the foundation for my argument and Young extending Merleau-Ponty’s theory to take gender into account, I have shown that women’s intentionality has been historically inhibited and that this inhibition has lead to a limited intelligibility. Through examples of li and the martial arts, I have also shown how this primarily philosophical and abstract method of thinking about intelligibility and the body is applicable to real phenomenological experiences. This paper is significant to me and to philosophy in that it attempts to explicate the reason why women may think differently than men in a way that goes beyond a mere biological or environmental explanation, showing how environment and biology are inter-related and are, in many ways, inseparable.
Tang Soo Do JournalA part of this thesis is a journal chronicalling my experience in Tang Soo Do. To view this portion go to www.bodyandphilosophy.blogspot.com
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